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The main essay of this thesis, found in the first chapter, examines how two poli-
cies that are a priori equivalent, fuel economy standards and feebates, interact
differently with complementary policies that also attempt to improve fuel econ-
omy. To examine these interactions I build a general equilibrium model of the
automobile market that allows manufacturers to trade off horsepower, weight,
and fuel economy of vehicles along a production possibility frontier (PPF). I also
estimate household demand for vehicles and miles for a simulation model that
includes the used car and scrappage markets. This model allows me to simulate
the interaction of a research and development policy that increases the PPF of
domestic firms, or a tax credit that increases demand for efficient vehicles, with
either a CAFE standard or feebate. I find that vehicle emissions increase under
all these interactions but the effects are muted under the feebate because it al-
lows fuel economy to improve by 0.60% to 1.88%, while CAFE, by targeting an
average fuel economy, will always offset these uncoordinated complementary
policies.
The second essay examines transportation systems with unpriced conges-
tion where single-occupant low-emission vehicles are allowed into high occu-
pancy vehicle (HOV) lanes to encourage their adoption exacerbates congestion
costs for carpoolers. The resulting welfare effects of the policy are negative, with
environmental benefits overwhelmingly dominated by the increased congestion
costs. Exploiting the introduction of the Clean Air Vehicle Stickers policy in Cal-
ifornia with a regression discontinuity design, our results imply a best-case cost
of $124 per ton of reductions in greenhouse gases, $606,000 dollars per ton of ni-
trogen oxides reduction, and $505,000 dollars per ton of hydrocarbon reduction,
exceeding those of other options readily available to policymakers.
The third essay examines the ‘Energy Paradox.’ From previous literature,
it can be found that consumers tend to undervalue discounted future energy
costs in their purchase decisions for energy-using durables. We show that this
finding could, in part, result from ignoring consumer heterogeneity in empirical
analyses as opposed to true undervaluation.
The fourth essay examines used vehicle scrappage rates. We find that
not only are vehicles lasting longer but that scrap rates are less responsive to
changes in vehicle price than previously estimated. These parameters help to
refine the parameters used to evaluate public policies like CAFE standards and
gasoline taxes that are known to have important effects on used vehicles.
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CHAPTER 1
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF UNCOORDINATED
REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR
1.1 Introduction
It is often the case that different aspects of a market failure are targeted with
different policy instruments when the optimal instrument is not available to
regulators. Although these aspects may be closely related, the instruments that
address each may not be under the authority of a single agency. But it can be
difficult to coordinate the implementation of multiple instruments when each is
administered by a different agency. This failure to coordinate may result in the
actions of one agency undermining the goals of another. Problems with coor-
dination may appear not only across agencies at the same level of government,
but also vertically as state or local agencies pursue their own policy objectives
independent of federal agencies.1 While failure to coordinate may be inevitable,
it may be possible to choose instruments that are more robust to coordination
failures. Two policies that appear at first equivalent may react very differently
to the uncoordinated actions of another regulator pursuing its own policy ob-
jectives.
The transportation market is one such sector where the conditions arise for
unintended consequences from multiple agencies attempting to correct many
aspects related to the under provision of fuel economy. The most far-reaching
1Several reasons given for this lack of coordination are heterogeneous preferences resulting
in some states desiring stronger regulation than, chosen nationally (Goulder, Jacobsen, & van
Benthem, 2012), and federal “gridlock” resulting in decentralized decision making (Fischer &
Preonas, 2010; Lyon & Yin, 2010) by various agencies or states.
1
regulation in this market, fuel economy standards, attempts to reduce the ex-
ternalities associated with carbon emissions and gasoline use by improving the
fuel economy of the vehicles on the road. This is not, however, the only reason
that fuel economy may not rise to optimal levels. Firms may underinvest in re-
search and development (R&D) if they are unable to capture spillovers to other
firms, a problem which is often addressed with government sponsored R&D
grants. On the demand side, policy makers may also subsidize the sales of new
technology, such as hybrid vehicles, if they are concerned that information on
these new products is slow to diffuse. The purpose of this paper is to examine
how the failure to coordinate policies targeting fuel economy may cause interac-
tions that are unanticipated by regulators, and how the inability to improve that
coordination may prompt regulators to switch from a fuel economy standard to
a closely related policy—a feebate—that appears, in a simple theoretical model,
to confer no advantage over a fuel economy standard.
Historically, the Environmental Protection Agency along with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration have administered fuel economy stan-
dards in the United States. Known as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standard, this standard mandates a minimum average fuel economy
for the car and truck fleets produced by each manufacturer. In recent years,
both domestically as well as abroad, governments have begun to consider an
alternative policy instrument known as a feebate.2 Feebate, a portmanteau of
fee and rebate, is a schedule of government taxes (and subsidies) that change
2The most recent feebate was proposed by Senators Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Olympia Snowe
(R-ME), Richard Lugar (R-IN), and John Kerry (D-MA) as part of bill S.1620 The Efficient Vehicle
Leadership Act of 2009. Most countries in the EU as well as the United Kingdom have some
form of feebate, either on new vehicles as in the French ‘bonus/malus’ system or on yearly
registration fees as in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. See also (Anderson, Parry,
Sallee, & Fischer, 2011).
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proportionally with the fuel efficiency rating of a vehicle.3 A feebate policy is
characterized by a pivot point and a fee rate. Cars with efficiency above the
pivot point receive a rebate and those below it a fee.
Although generally unrecognized by policy makers and economists, a fuel
economy standard and a feebate can, in a simple framework, be set to provide
identical outcomes.4 Both policies generate a price wedge shifting preference to-
wards fuel economy, and it does not matter whether that price wedge is set by
the government in the case of the feebate, or the firms in the case of fuel econ-
omy standards. But the distinction in who sets the price wedge does matter
when the baseline policy interacts with other uncoordinated policies adminis-
tered by different agencies attempting to further improve fuel economy. While
these complementary policies are often intended to improve overall fuel econ-
omy, the choice of baseline policy can have large implications for the success
of these complementary policies. Examples of complementary policies include
R&D grants from the Department of Energy on the supply side, or fuel-efficient
vehicle tax credits, administered by the Internal Revenue Service, are one of
many such policies on the dema. Because CAFE allows the firms to determine
the price wedge, complementary policies will prompt firms to relax the price
wedge to exactly achieve the standard and, due to more vehicle sales, increase
total emissions. The interaction of a feebate with a complementary policy, by
contrast, will produced improvements in the average fuel economy but may
increase or decrease total emissions depending on how the quantity of sales
and vehicle miles traveled (VMT) change. This paper demonstrates this distinc-
3More generally feebates can be used for the efficiency rating of products ranging from appli-
ances to homes. For example, the city of Portland, Oregon has considered feebates on residential
and commercial construction.
4(Klier & Linn, 2012c) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only other paper that notes the
equivalence between feebates and standards in the first order conditions of producers.
3
tion in behavior between fuel economy standards and a feebate, and shows that
R&D policies may not only be inefficient, but actually counter-productive when
pursued in a regulatory framework that guarantees those improvements will be
channeled away from the targeted product attribute.
To accurately model how CAFE and feebates interact with these comple-
mentary policies I build a detailed model of the automobile market. I model
suppliers as endogenously selecting the optimal fuel economy of their products
along a production possibility frontier, allowing for more flexibility in the way
they meet these regulatory targets. This is the first general equilibrium model
to bring a supplier model of this type into a framework that also accounts for
VMT, used vehicles, and scrappage markets.
Several prior studies have focused on supplier behavior in the automobile
market. Some earlier models of automobile supply, including (Berry, Levinsohn,
& Pakes, 1995), (Goldberg, 1998), (Kleit, 2004), (Austin & Dinan, 2005), (Bento,
Goulder, Jacobsen, & von Haefen, 2009), and (M. R. Jacobsen, 2012a) assumed
either fixed product characteristics or allow for some increase in fuel econ-
omy based on a cost-benefit analysis using engineering cost curves. (Knittel,
2011) provides evidence of a production possibility frontier where manufac-
turers trade off between horsepower, weight, and the fuel economy of vehi-
cles. (Klier & Linn, 2012a), whose approach is most similar to mine, estimate
the cost of CAFE when accounting for these product attribute tradeoffs, while
(Whitefoot, Fowlie, & Skerlos, 2012) and (Gramlich, 2009) also investigate these
costs using a production possibility frontier with fewer tradeoffs. Several pa-
pers in this literature have examined feebates specifically. (W. B. Davis, Levine,
Train, & Duleep, 1995), (D. L. Greene, Patterson, Singh, & Li, 2005), and (Small,
4
2012) examine the effects of a US feebate policy using simulation.5 Only (Small,
2012) compares feebates with a CAFE standard in a simulation model, finding
they can produce effects that are similar in magnitude.6
This paper also contributes to a very large literature that compares equiv-
alent tax (or price) instruments and quantity controls on environmental dis-
amenities. This literature often, although not exclusively, focuses on how un-
certainty affects the optimal choice of policy, as first examined by (Weitzman,
1974). (Adar & Griffin, 1976), (Yohe, 1978), (Stavins, 1996), (Hoel & Karp, 2001)
and (Newell & Pizer, 2003) generalized these results to other settings. (Roberts
& Spence, 1976) analyze a hybrid system combining price and quantity instru-
ments. Using a political economy model, (Finkelshtain & Kislev, 1997) illustrate
how price and quantity instruments are subject to different lobbying effort by
firms. (Baron, 1985b) shows that price instruments dominate when the regulator
has incomplete information on a firm with market power.
A final group of studies examines the efficiency of overlapping and unco-
ordinated regulation. (Goulder et al., 2012) find that local policies to improve
fuel economy can be partially or entirely offset by a national CAFE standard.
(Baron, 1985a) finds that less efficient local regulations will attempt to compen-
sate when a national agency fails to properly regulate pollutants. Several stud-
ies (Bo¨hringer, Koschel, & Moslener, 2008; Bo¨hringer & Rosendahl, 2010) have
examined overlapping regulation in European energy markets finding that they
decrease efficiency. (Levinson, 2010) suggests similar inefficiencies are likely to
5Two other papers study the outcomes of feebate policies in Europe. (D’Haultfoeuille, Dur-
rmeyer, & Fe´vrier, 2012) estimate the fuel economy increase caused by the policy in France.
(Klier & Linn, 2012c) use the sales changes in European countries under a feebate to find the
shadow cost of compliance with a standard.
6One reason for this is that (Small, 2012) chooses a fee rate to meet the same fuel savings as
the CAFE standard.
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occur in the US market if permit trading overlaps with command and control
policies as is often proposed.7
Methodologically, my study differs from previous models of supplier behav-
ior by allowing new vehicle manufacturers to adjust product characteristics in
a framework that also included used vehicles and scrappage markets. I also
model the VMT decisions of households, which allows me to accurately cap-
ture changes in total emissions.8 Because my model incorporates a production
possibility frontier, I am able to shock this frontier with improvements from an
R&D program and illustrate the effects on all associated markets, which is not
possible in earlier models.
To conclude, I perform several simulations that illustrate how a CAFE stan-
dard and feebate differ in the presence of two complementary policies.9 Specifi-
cally these simulations compare how a CAFE standard and feebate interact with
an efficient vehicle tax credit or a national R&D policy. My model allows me
to capture how leakage patterns differ in each of these scenarios in terms of
changes to average fuel economy of the fleet and total emissions. I find that
while the CAFE standard undermines the intended fuel economy effects of these
complementary policies and increases total emssions, the interaction with a fee-
bate results in higher average fuel economy, but these gains are insufficient to
offset higher vehicle sales and VMT resulting in higher emissions. This suggest
that while feebates may be the optimal baseline policy, better coordination of
these policies is required to ensure reduced emissions.
7A related literature (Kolstad, Ulen, & Johnson, 1990; Burrows, 1999) considers overlapping
legal regulation, finding that it can improve efficiency. For an overview of other overlapping
environmental policies see (Fischer & Preonas, 2010).
8(Klier & Linn, 2012a) is the most similar but does not model used or scrappage markets and
does not model the VMT decision of drivers.
9In future work I plan to explore the optimality of each policy focusing instead on uncer-
tainty.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the
theoretical equivalence between a general fuel economy standard and a feebate
and discusses why this equivalence fails to hold in the presence of complemen-
tary polices. Section 3 details the specification of the model used in estimation
and simulation, section 4 details the data used, and section 5 the estimation of
demand using that data. Section 6 then presents an overview of the simulation
and the results and section 7 concludes.
1.2 Fuel Economy Standards versus a Feebate
1.2.1 Theoretical Equivalence
Although there are many variations on fuel economy standards10 and feebates,
initially I focus on the most simple formulation of each. For the fuel economy
standard, the firms must meet a sales-weighted average fuel economy greater
than or equal to the level mandated by the government. The simplest formula-
tion for a feebate consists of two elements: a fee rate and a pivot point. These
two elements provide for a fee schedule where vehicles are awarded a propor-
tional rebate for efficiency over the pivot point and a proportional fee when their
efficiency is less than the pivot point.11 I limit the scope of my analysis to fee-
bates that are linear in fuel efficiency. Initially I only consider revenue-neutral
10I use ‘fuel economy standard’ to designate a generic standard and CAFE to designate the
specific formulation used in the United States, which, for example, has separate standards for
cars and trucks.
11For example, under a feebate with a pivot point of 0.03 gallons-per-mile and a rate of $1000
per 0.01 gallons per mile, a Lexus ES 350 at 0.045 gallons per mile would be assessed a $1500 fee
while a Toyota Prius at 0.020 gallons per mile would receive a $1000 rebate. When policies like
this are enacted, they are often not a smooth linear function as modeled here but a schedule of
tax ‘notches’ that can create distortions (Sallee & Slemrod, 2012).
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feebates although simulations in later sections allow for non-revenue-neutrality.
Because a one unit mile-per-gallon improvement is not an equal improvement
in gasoline savings across the entire range of fuel economy ratings, fuel econ-
omy standards are calculated using the harmonic mean and feebates are calcu-
lated based on the gallon-per-mile rating of the vehicle.12
Consider an economy in which K identical firms produce J different types
of vehicles for a large population of consumers of size N. Each consumer is
endowed with income Io and owns an equal share of the profits of each firm.
Consumers get utility from vehicles and the consumption of a numeraire good
x.
Consumers are divided into J groups depending on their preferred vehicle
type. Let N j denote the size of the group of consumers who prefer type- j vehi-
cles and that type- j consumers only consume type- j vehicles, getting zero utility
from any other vehicle. To simplify the analysis I assume that utility is linear
in the numeraire good. Each consumer is characterized by the pair (w, j), where
j is the preferred vehicle type, and w is the willingness to pay for that vehicle,
which is distributed uniformly w ∼ U[w j,w j].
The economy will produce an allocation of vehicles and numeraire good
amongst consumers. Let it be described by the mapping {q(w, j), x(w, j)}where:
q(w, j) =

1 if (w, j) owns a vehicle of type j
0 otherwise
12Using the mpg rating of the vehicle provides non-linear benefits for each unit increase. A
one unit mpg improvement to a low-fuel-economy vehicle provides larger gasoline and op-
erating cost reductions than those achieving higher fuel economy (Larrick & Soll, 2008). The
harmonic mean is used to calculate the sales weighted fuel economy for CAFE in the United
States. Evaluation of efficiency in liters-per-100 kilometers as is done in European and Asian
countries requires the use of the arithmetic mean to calculate these averages.
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and x(w, j) is consumption of the numeraire. The different policy instruments
are evaluated based on the allocations they produce.
Utility maximization implies that a type- j consumer will purchase a type- j
vehicle if his willingness to pay exceeds the price of that vehicle, p j. Given the
uniform distribution, the demand for vehicle j is
q j(p j) = N j
w j − p j
w j − w j (1.1)
Turning to the firms, I assume that each of the K firms, indexed by k, pro-
duces with the cost function c(qk1, . . . , qkn) =
∑n
j=1 c j(qk j).13 For each vehicle j, the
cost function c j(q j) is assumed to be increasing, smooth, and strictly convex. Let
mc j(q j) = c′j(q j).
Assume that the fuel economy is fixed for each vehicle. It can be expressed
either as the mile per gallon rating mpg j or its inverse g j, the gallon per mile
rating, such that mpg j = 1/g j. Firms operate in a competitive market.
Unregulated Case
Where the firms are not subject to regulation by the government a representative
firm optimizes over a vector of quantity qk = {qk1, . . . , qkn} of goods to sell at
market-determined prices p = {p1, . . . , pJ}. The firm’s problem is formulated as
max
qk
J∑
j=1
[p jqk j − c j(qk j)] (1.2)
13In a setting with identical firms, tradability of permits is not required but will be if firms are
heterogeneous.
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This optimization implies that
p j = mc j(qk j) or qk j = mc−1j (p j) (1.3)
Market supply of vehicle j is
qSj = Kqk j (1.4)
To clear the market for vehicle j, the quantity demanded equals the quantity
supplied when
qDj = N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j) = q
S
j (1.5)
Since mc j is monotonically increasing there exists a unique p j that sets supply
equal to demand.
Fuel Economy Standard
Now let the government subject firms to a fuel economy standard. The sales-
weighted harmonic mean of the vehicles produced must be greater than or
equal to the mandated fuel economy level, mpg. Under the standard, firm k
chooses a vector of quantities qkc = {qck1, . . . , qckJ} to solve
max
q
J∑
j=1
[p jqk j − c j(qk j)] (1.6)
s.t.
mpg ≤
∑J
j=1 qk j∑J
j=1 qk j
1
mpg j
The constraint, which represents the fuel economy standard, can be significantly
simplified using the gallon-per-mile rating of the vehicle, g j and the gallon-per-
mile equivalent of the fuel economy standard g = 1/mpg.
0 ≤
J∑
j=1
(g − g j)qk j (1.7)
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The first order condition for product j is
p j = mc j(qk j) − λ(g − g j) (1.8)
where λ is the shadow cost of the fuel economy constraint. This implies that
firms choose quantity according to:
qck j = mc
−1
j (p j + λ(g − g j)) (1.9)
Equilibrium is determined by:
N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j + λ(g − g j)) (1.10)
The prices that solve this equation are identical for consumers and produc-
ers. Denote that vector by pc = {pc1, . . . , pcJ} and the resulting allocation by
{qc(w, j), xc(w, j)}
Feebate
Alternatively let the government subject the firms to a feebate with rate R. De-
note the pivot point, in gallons per mile, that results in revenue neutrality as
g0. Consumers face the tax/rebate inclusive price p j. When the fee −R(g0 − g j)
is levied on vehicle j, the firm faces the price p j + R(g0 − g j) and chooses
q f
k
= {q fk1, . . . , q fkJ} to solve
max
qk
J∑
j=1
[(p j + R(g0 − g j))qk j − c j(qk j)] (1.11)
which gives the first order condition
q fk j = mc
−1
j (p j + R(g0 − g j)) (1.12)
Equilibrium is determined by:
N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j + R(g0 − g j)) (1.13)
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Denote the consumer price vector that solves these equations as pf =
{p f1 , . . . , p fJ}. Note that the producer prices, unlike in the case of the fuel economy
standard, are not identical to consumer prices. Denote the resulting allocation
as {q f (w, j), x f (w, j)}.
Feebates versus Standards
It can be seen from the first order conditions of the firm under each regula-
tion, equations 1.9 and 1.12, that either instrument can be used to create a price
wedge that increases the consumer price on inefficient vehicles and decreases
the consumer price on efficient ones. In both cases this results in a higher aver-
age efficiency of the vehicles sold in the market. This leads to two propositions:
PROPOSITION 1: An allocation {qc(w, j), xc(w, j)} achieved under fuel economy stan-
dard mpg can be replicated by setting fee rate R = λ.
PROPOSITION 2: An allocation {q f (w, j), x f (w, j)} achieved under feebate rate R and
resulting revenue neutral pivot point g0 can be replicated using a fuel economy standard
by setting a standard of mpg = 1/g0.
Propositions 1 and 2 follow since the price wedge created is equivalent under
both policies. This results in identical consumer prices and quantities of vehicles
sold. What is less intuitive is the equivalence in the firms’ profits and therefore
the resulting allocation of the numeraire good. This relies on the revenue neu-
trality of the feebate and that the constraint under the fuel economy standard is
exactly binding on the firms. This equivalence is demonstrated in more detail
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in Appendix A but can be described graphically.
Diagrammatic Intuition
Figure 4.5 illustrates firm profits for a simplified case of the model above where
j ∈ {1, 2}. Vehicle 1 is a high performance, low efficiency vehicle, while vehicle
2 is a low performance, high efficiency vehicle. Panel A depicts the market
equilibrium where firms are not subject to regulation. The profits from vehicle
1 are depicted by the shaded Region A, while profits from vehicle 2 are depicted
by Region B.
Panel B depicts profits where the firms are subject to a fuel economy stan-
dard. The price wedge on vehicle 1 results in higher consumer and producer
prices and reduces the quantity sold. Profits from this vehicle are now C + D.
The standard reduces prices for vehicle 2, increasing total sales. This results in
profit losses in Region F. Profits from this vehicle are now G − F.
Panel C depicts profits where the firms are subject to a feebate. The fees
collected on vehicle 1 result in a difference between consumer prices P1 and
producer prices P∗1. Region I is no longer part of firm profits and instead is
collected to finance rebates on vehicle 2. These rebates increase the producer
price P∗2 above the consumer price P2 resulting in total firm profits on this vehicle
as L + J.
The diagrams show how the price wedge created under either policy results
in identical consumer prices and total quantities sold. To see that the total profits
are identical under the two regimes, first note that the binding fuel economy
standard ensures that D = E + F. Similarly the revenue neutrality of the feebate
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ensures that I = J + K. If we remove the Region D profits from vehicle 1 and
apply them to vehicle 2, the diagram of profit and losses would be that of vehicle
2 under the feebate: F is no longer a profit loss and becomes Region K, while E
becomes increased profits as in Region J.
Despite this equivalence, it is important to note that a key distinction be-
tween these policies lies in who controls the creation of the price wedge, and
the ability of that entity to react to changes in the market. In the case of the fee-
bate the price wedge is directly created by the government, while in the case of
the fuel economy standard, it is generated by the firms to achieve the standard
mandated by the government.
1.2.2 Interaction with Complementary Policies
The equivalence shown above is predicated on the complete flexibility by the
government to change the target of the baseline policy in response to any event
in the market. Federal policies such as CAFE are often set in advance for many
years at a time. In the more than 30-year history of CAFE, the standard has only
been updated a few times. Once set, these policies are minimally adjusted to
account for other developments in the market. Additionally, other agencies or
states may choose to enact polices that address the under provision of fuel econ-
omy in the market. A multitude of these policies exist at the state and national
level, including various subsidies for the production of these vehicles, tax in-
centives, and special privileges for fuel efficient vehicles. Little thought is given
when these policies are implemented as to how they interact with a national
fuel economy standard. First I illustrate the effects of a fuel efficient tax credit,
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inspired by the demand policy shock examined in (Goulder et al., 2012) under
CAFE. I then examine how outcomes would differ under a feebate. Finally I
briefly discuss the effects of a shock to the production possibility frontier.
To illustrate this difference in outcomes I continue with the special case
where firms produce only two vehicles indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}. In Panel A of
Figure 1.2 either a feebate or fuel economy standard is modeled. Vehicle 1 is the
inefficient vehicle and vehicle 2 is the efficient vehicle. For inefficient vehicles,
the wedge a-b will be generated by a feebate of R(go − g1), or the equivalent fuel
economy standard λ(g − g1). For efficient vehicles, wedge c-d will be of size
R(go − g2), in the case of a feebate, and λ(g − g2) in the case of fuel economy.
Now let an agency enact a tax credit aiming to increase demand for the fuel
efficient vehicle. Panel B depicts these effects under a fuel economy standard. To
maintain the required average, g, initially the firm may simply maintain output
of the efficient vehicle at Q2. Should the firm do this, there will be no change
in vehicles sold in the market and the firm will entirely capture the subsidy
with increased prices. This outcome represents a best case scenario in terms of
changes to emissions as there is no increase in sales and the average is main-
tained. This, however, is not the least cost solution for the firm as the firm has
not set λ equal across all products. The increased demand for efficient vehi-
cles allows the firms to decrease the shadow cost of the fuel economy standard
constraint on the inefficient vehicle. Now the firm has increased the sales of
inefficient products to Q′1 and also of efficient vehicles to Q
′
2. Thus total emis-
sions are now larger as more vehicles are on the road with the same average fuel
efficiency as before the tax credit.
The effects of the tax credit under a feebate are illustrated in Panel C. The
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case illustrated here assumes the government cannot change the rate or pivot
point in response to the credit. Because neither R nor go have changed, R(go−g2)
remains the same and the price wedge from e-f is preserved in g-h after the de-
mand increase. No changes occur for the inefficient product as the price wedge
remains R(go − g1). Together these results imply that although more cars are on
the road, they are of higher average fuel economy. If however the government
does shift the pivot point to maintain revenue neutrality, this only improves the
outcome. This case (not illustrated here) would shift the pivot point up to main-
tain revenue neutrality. This shift, towards the more efficient vehicle, would
reduce the price wedge on the efficient product and increase it on the ineffi-
cient product. This would mute some of the overall quantity expansion, yet still
maintain the higher average fuel economy relative to the initial case. Whether
the pivot point adjusts or not, it is clear that the overall effect is ambiguous and
may result in lower emission while it must be the case that emissions are higher
under a fuel economy standard.
The second type of complementary policy I model affects the ability of firms
to supply fuel efficiency. To illustrate this case, I examine a government spon-
sored R&D program that increases the production possibility frontier (PPF) for
domestic firms. An example of such a policy occurred as recently as August
2011 when the US Deptartment of Energy awarded $175 million to domestic
firms to improve vehicle fuel economy. Assuming these grants are successful,
one might expect the fuel efficiency of all vehicles to improve. These gains
may not, however, materialize if firms can channel these improvements towards
weight and horsepower, attributes that are valued for their safety and perfor-
mance. This decision is highly dependent upon the baseline policy chosen by
the EPA.
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Although this type of policy shock shares some similarities to the tax credit,
its effects are somewhat subtler. In an unconstrained world these improvements
would be channeled in constant ratios towards fuel economy, horsepower, and
weight. Both a fuel economy standard and a feebate create a price wedge that
increases the valuation towards fuel economy. The crucial distinction is that
under the standard, this wedge is set by the firm while under the feebate it is set
by the government. When the PPF of the firm expands in the presence of the fuel
economy standard constraint, the firm will never exceed the standard unless the
expansion is so great that the standard is no longer binding. Firms will channel
these improvements towards the characteristics consumers value most. Sales
will increase as all products become more attractive, while the fleet average fuel
economy is held constant. The feebate does not allow for a reduced price wedge,
implying that some portion of these improvements will be channeled towards
fuel economy, increasing the fleet average. Any improvements will, of course,
make vehicles more desirable and increase sales so the effect of the policy on
total emissions is ambiguous: more efficient vehicles may reduce emissions, but
more sales of all vehicles may increase them.
The lesson from both of these complementary policies is clear when inter-
acting with a fuel economy standard: they must increase total emissions and
will have no effect on the average fuel economy of the fleet. By contrast the out-
comes under a feebate are less clear: while both complementary policies result
in higher average fuel economy, they may also increase total sales, resulting in
an ambiguous effect on total emissions.
It should be noted that these predictions ignore many idiosyncrasies of how
fuel economy standards are enacted under CAFE. For example CAFE is only
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binding on domestic firms, and the results above assume that the complemen-
tary policies only target the CAFE constrained, domestic firms. Many policies,
like that studied in (Goulder et al., 2012), will target all efficient cars—those pro-
duced by constrained firms as well as foreign, unconstrained firms. This simple
analysis also ignores the substitution consumers make between the efficient and
inefficient vehicles. Several other particular details of how CAFE is constructed
affect these conclusions. The different standard for cars versus trucks provides
one important example. In cases where a policy changes the ratio of cars to
trucks, the overall fuel economy of products sold may change although the in-
dividual car and truck fleets attain the same average. Broader market effects
may also have implications for both CAFE and feebates. Market power may
cause other firms to change their fuel economy or quantity decisions in ways
that are hard to predict but will have implications for overall emissions. To sim-
ulate all of these interactions, I now turn to building a detailed model of the
automobile market.
1.3 Model Specification
The model consists of five agents: new vehicle producers who maximize prof-
its, households who maximize utility, used vehicle dealers, scrappage dealers,
and the government. Households make ownership and vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) decisions. New vehicle producers choose price, horsepower, and weight
of the vehicles they produce to maximize profits. Because they face a production
possibility frontier (PPF) when making their decision over product attributes,
the choice of horsepower and weight determines the fuel economy of the vehi-
cle. Vehicles are aggregated in the simulation by manufacturer, class, and age.
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Within each of the seven manufacturers, there are nine potential classes of vehi-
cles and four age classes, as listed in Table 2. The used car market adjusts prices
such that the supply of all used cars (after scrappage) is sold. The scrappage
market removes cars based on the age and price of the car using estimates from
Bento, Roth, and Zuo (2012). Where a feebate is simulated, the government sets
the pivot point to maintain revenue neutrality.
1.3.1 The Supplier Model
Suppliers maximize profits in a Bertrand Oligopoly framework. While this
model accounts for some product innovation in the medium run, it does not
account for drastically new types of product offerings. It only allows for two
types of innovation. The first is changes along the PPF between horsepower,
weight, and fuel economy, which are assumed to be within control of the firm.
The second type of change that can occur is an expansion of the PPF, which is
assumed to occur exogenously. It also has been shown to expand faster when
regulatory pressure increases (Knittel, 2011). I also assume that an exogenous
R&D policy has the ability to shift the PPF outward.
There are K firms indexed by k = {1, . . . ,K}. Products are indexed by j =
{1, . . . , J}, with the subset of products produced by firm k denoted by Jk. The vec-
tor of prices is denoted by p = {p1, . . . , pJ}, horsepower by h = {h1, . . . , hJ}, weight
by w = {w1, . . . ,wJ}, and fuel economy, in gallons-per-mile, by g = {g1, . . . , gJ}
Firm f maximizes profits by choosing price and product attributes for the
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products it produces:
max
p j,h j,w j,g j
J∑
j∈Jk
(p j − c j(g j, h j,w j))q j(p, h,w, g) (1.14a)
s.t.
ln(g j) = ω1ln(h j) + ω2ln(w j) +G j (1.14b)
ln(c j) = µ1ln(h j) + µ2ln(w j) + µ3ln(g j) +C j (1.14c)
Marginal cost, c j, is a function of the vehicle product attributes, but is constant
in quantity. Quantity of product j demanded, q j, is a function of the prices and
attributes of all products produced in the market. Constraint 1.14b defines the
PPF faced by the firm and determines the tradeoff between horsepower, weight
and fuel economy. The ω values are estimated using historical data and the
G js are calibration parameters. Constraint 1.14c defines the marginal cost of
producing this vehicle. The µ parameters are based on estimates from (Berry,
Kortum, & Pakes, 1996) and the C js are calibration parameters.14
I distinguish between seven producers. Following (M. R. Jacobsen, 2012a),
firms are heterogeneous and produce products of differing fuel economy. Un-
der CAFE, these differences expose them to different regulatory environments.
Some firms, like Toyota, produce sales weighted fuel economy above the stan-
dard required by CAFE and therefore face the unregulated producer problem as
outlined in maximization problem 1.14. Other firms, in an unconstrained world,
would produce fuel economy averages below the standard. Historically, these
have been the domestic manufacturers Ford, GM, and Chrysler. These firms are
14I choose to allow marginal costs to adjust to changes in product characteristics, although the
values for these parameters vary substantially across the literature. In particular it is unclear
which direction decreased weight should change marginal cost. Weight can be decreased by
reducing the amenities (and cost) of the car, or it can increase cost by replacing metal parts with
more costly, lightweight materials (Cheah, 2010). (Berry et al., 1996) found that cost decreased
as weight was reduced when CAFE was altered in the past.
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subject to the profit maximization problem:
max
p j,h j,w j,g j
J∑
j∈Jk
(p j − c j(g j, h j,w j))q j(p, h,w, g) (1.15a)
s.t.
ln(g j) = ω1ln(h j) + ω2ln(w j) +G j (1.15b)
ln(c j) = µ1ln(h j) + µ2ln(w j) + µ3ln(g j) +C j (1.15c)
J∑
j∈JCar
q j(p, h,w, g)[gCar − g j] = 0 (1.15d)
J∑
j∈JTruck
q j(p, h,w, g)[gTruck − g j] = 0 (1.15e)
The terms gCar and gTruck are the fuel economy levels targeted by CAFE. Histor-
ically, CAFE has had separate targets for cars and trucks. For most of the last
30 years, this has been set at 27.5 mpg (0.036 gpm) for cars and 20.7 mpg (0.048
gpm) for trucks. These firms face three types of constraints. Constraint 1.15b is
the PPF, constraint 1.15c is the marginal cost equation, and the constraints 1.15d
and 1.15e are the CAFE constraint for cars and trucks. The Lagrange multiplier
for constrains 1.15d and 1.15e are the shadow costs of the regulation, which are
equal for all cars or trucks. The problem of the constrained firms can also be
used for the problem of the unconstrained firms; however, because their fuel
economy exceeds the standard, the multiplier is zero effectively removing the
CAFE constraints.
Recently, the CAFE standard has been reformulated to adjust based on the
footprint of the vehicle fleet of the manufacturer. I do not adjust the standard for
these changes for two reasons. First, I do not model changes to the footprint of
each vehicle, preventing me from precisely predicting the new target. Second,
there are additional allowances for environmentally beneficial changes such as
reductions in hydrofluorocarbons, which change the standard.
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Under a feebate, each vehicle is assessed a fee or rebate, and that is added to
the price of each vehicle. The manufacturers’ problem in this regulatory envi-
ronment is given as
max
p j,h j,w j,g j
J∑
j∈Jk
(p j − R(go − g j) − c j(g j, h j,w j))q j(p, h,w, g) (1.16a)
s.t.
ln(g j) = ω1ln(h j) + ω2ln(w j) +G j (1.16b)
ln(c j) = µ1ln(h j) + µ2ln(w j) + µ3ln(g j) +C j (1.16c)
where R is the rate of the feebate and go is the pivot point, both established by
the government.
1.3.2 Household Demand
The households in the model derive utility from their choice of vehicles and
VMT each year. To account for multicar households, each household is modeled
as facing multiple choice occasions.15 On each choice occasion, the household
chooses a vehicle or the outside good. The outside good includes any trans-
portation option not explicitly modeled, including public transportation. The
budget of each household used to purchase vehicles includes exogenous income
as well as the value of the initial car endowment. Utility is modeled according
to (Bento et al., 2009):
Vi j =
−1
α
exp
(
−α
(
yi
Ti
− ri j
))
+
1
β
exp
(
−βpMi j + γi jDiX j
)
+ τi jDiX j + ψ jX j (1.17)
15The use of the term ‘choice occasion’ simply implies that households face multiple oppor-
tunities to buy vehicles. Because these choice occasions are independent of one another they do
not allow for vehicle choices on one choice occasion to influence the utility on another choice oc-
casion. (Spiller, 2010) relaxes this assumption and finds that it produces a slight downward bias
in the gasoline elasticity of VMT although the effect is smaller than the bias from aggregation of
the product space and from omitting vehicle fixed effects, which I account for.
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Parameters α, β, γi j, τi j, and ψ j are estimated parameters.16 Income, yi, is divided
among Ti choice occasions and ri j is the rental rate, which includes deprecia-
tion and the foregone interest of borrowing the value of the car for a year. In-
come also includes the household’s share of producer profits, government trans-
fers (particularly from a non-revenue neutral feebate), and any capital gains or
losses based on used vehicle holdings. Interactions between household charac-
teristics, Di, and vehicle characteristics, X j, enter both the linear and non-linear
portion of the utility function. The operating cost of the vehicle, pMi j , is the price
per mile to drive the vehicle and includes gasoline costs as well as any govern-
ment taxes.
Applying Roy’s identity to the indirect utility function gives the demand for
VMT.
VMTi j = exp
(
α
(
yi
Ti
− ri j
)
+ βpMi j + γi jDiX j
)
(1.18)
where the terms α, β, and γi j are parameters identical to those in the utility func-
tion.
1.3.3 Used Vehicles, Scrappage Markets, and the Government
The used car market consists of all cars that are not new or scrapped. Vehicles
are scrapped on a probabilistic basis. The fraction of scrapped cars of type j is
given by θ j and adjusts according to θ j = b j(p j)η. Scrappage consists of two com-
ponents, technical scrappage and scrappage due to price. Technical scrappage,
b j, is scrappage due to aging and is calibrated to match the technical scrappage
rates estimated in Bento, Roth, and Zuo (2012). The scrappage due to price
16The parameters α and β are restricted to be positive. These restrictions are made to ensure
that income is positively related to utility and that price is negatively related to utility.
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adjusts based on the price elasticity parameter, η. This value, also taken from
Bento, Roth, and Zuo (2012) is estimated at -0.71.
For a feebate, the government must balance its budget. It can do this two
ways. Either it can choose a pivot point go such that.
J∑
j=1
(R(go − g j)q j(p, h,w, g)) = 0 (1.19)
or it can raise revenue to make up a deficit, or rebate the excess. Because the
behavior I am interested in assumes the government cannot adjust the CAFE
standard or feebate, I do not allow the government to change the pivot point
after balancing its budget in the initial condition; rather, it must come from a
uniform lump sum tax.
The solution to the model is a vector of used car prices, new car prices, new
car horsepower, new car weight, and a pivot point. In equilibrium these values
ensure that manufacturers have maximized profits, each non-scrapped car has
a buyer, and, in the case of feebates, that the policy remains revenue neutral. To
implement the model, the parameters, particularly of the demand model, must
be estimated using observed data.
1.4 Data
The data used to estimate the demand model come primarily from two sources,
the National Household Transportation Survey (NHTS) and Ward’s Automo-
tive Yearbooks. Additional data sources include National Automobile Dealers
Association (NADA) used car price data, gasoline price data from the American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA) and national level
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sales data from R.L. Polk. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for these data
sets.
Information on household demographics and their vehicle choices come
from the 2001 and 2009 waves of the NHTS. These data contain 150,147 house-
holds and detail information on family size, education, the number of workers,
children, and drivers in the household, as well as the location of the household,
allowing for classification into rural or urban status and region of the country.
The data identifies the vehicle choices made by the household based on make,
model, and vehicle age.17 I exclude households with missing income or gen-
der as well as residents of dormitories. I also drop vehicles whenever they are
unidentified or mileage is missing. After cleaning, 150,134 households remain,
together owning 316,164 vehicles.
Vehicle attribute data come from Wards Automotive Yearbooks 1972-2010.
For the primary years used in the demand estimation (2000-2006), it provides
price, horsepower, weight, and fuel economy. For these years there is provide
information on 1,523 vehicles. The full sample of vehicles used to estimate the
PPF contains information on 43,839 vehicles classified by make, model, and
trim.
Vehicle data are supplemented with several other data sets. National sales
data from R.L. Polk provide annual new car sales from 2000-2006. These sales
data are used to create annual national shares of each product. NADA used car
data are used to recover the yearly depreciation rates. This data set contains
6,776 vehicles at the model level for model years 1990 through 2010. Percent de-
17As vehicles age, the identification becomes decreasingly credible and this motivates me to
generate used car quantities and characteristics based on new car samples in a method described
below.
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preciation is constructed as the percent of value lost over the course of the year.
Although I allow this value to vary based on the make and class of the vehicle,
I assume it is constant over the lifetime of the vehicle. The mean depreciation
rate across all vehicles is calculated as 16.2%. The rental rate of the vehicle is
calculated as r j = D j + ρP j where D j is the depreciation rate and ρP j is the for-
gone interest of owning the car for a year. I set ρ at 3.21%, the average return on
t-bills from 2000-2006. Finally, ACCRA data on monthly average gasoline price
by state are used to calculate per-mile gasoline costs. These data, taken from
2001 and 2009, are averaged across months, and the average price of gasoline is
taken as the price for gasoline in the state where the household lives.
1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Empirical Model
To simulate counterfactual polices, I require a model of demand. The goal of
this estimation is to specify as parsimonious a demand specification as possi-
ble, while still addressing several welfare calculation and estimation concerns.
These concerns are specifically 1) to jointly estimate the vehicle choice and VMT
demand in a welfare consistent framework, 2) to include sufficient heterogene-
ity among the agents to capture the relevant substitution patterns, and 3) to
control for the endogeneity between price and other unobserved product char-
acteristics. To address these concerns, the method of demand estimation fol-
lows two literatures. The first jointly estimates vehicle choice and VMT (Bento
et al., 2009; Feng, Fullerton, & Gan, 2005; Spiller, 2010; Gillingham, 2010). The
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second literature estimates vehicle choice from market level data (Berry et al.,
1995; Nevo, 2001; Petrin, 2002). Consumer demand starts with the conditional
indirect utility model
Vi j =
−1
α
exp
(
−α
(
yi
Ti
− ri j
))
+
1
β
exp
(
−βpMi j + γi jDiX j
)
+ τi jDiX j + ψ jX j + εi j (1.20)
where
α = exp(α˜)
β = exp(β˜)
Each household chooses between the available products and the outside good
for each choice occasion. The outside good j=0 includes all other transportation
options. The inclusion of this outside good allows for the total demand for
all vehicles to be downward sloping, an important margin of adjustment for
policies aimed at reducing fuel use.18 J denotes the choice subset in a given
year. Each household makes multiple discrete-continuous choices of vehicle
and VMT each year. The number of choice occasions, denoted Ti, are taken to
be the number of drivers in the household plus one. The error term, εi j, is a
random taste shock that has a Type I, extreme-value distribution. To capture
preference heterogeneity among the agents, I include interactions of household
and vehicle characteristics in the spirit of (Goldberg, 1995). In particular, I try to
create sufficient heterogeneity in the product space I am most concerned with by
interacting horsepower and weight with numerous household characteristics.19
18At this stage I do not estimate used car demand due to lack of data on market shares, but I
extend these estimates to the used car market in the simulation by a method detailed below.
19Fuel economy appears as part of the cost per mile of operation. Fuel economy cannot be
interacted with other household characteristics to maintain the welfare consistent formulation
that allows for the recovery of demand for VMT. Alternatively, I could use a random coefficient
specification to model this heterogeneity, but even using efficient methods such as Halton se-
quences or quadrature would drastically increase the computational burden of the simulation
below.
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Take θ = {α, β, γ, τ, δ}, the estimated preference parameters. With the utility
specification given above, the probability that household i chooses product j is
given as
Pi j = Pi( j|p, X,D, θ) = exp(Vi j)∑
h exp(Vih)
(1.21)
The choice of VMT is assumed to be observed with a random error i j, which is
distributed standard normal:
VMTi j = exp
(
α
(
yi
Ti
− ri j
)
− βpMi j + γi jDiX j + i j
)
(1.22)
which gives rise to the likelihood function
l(V̂MT i j| j ∈ J, j , 0) = 1(2pi)1/2σi exp
−12
 V̂MT i j − VMTi jσi
2
 (1.23)
The joint likelihood that a household choice occasion i chooses vehicle j and a
given VMT is given by
Li =
J∏
j=1
Pi j( j)1i j
J∏
j=1
l(V̂MT i j| j ∈ J, j , 0)1i j (1.24)
where 1i j is an indicator variable that equals 1 if j is chosen on that choice occa-
sion and 0 otherwise.
1.5.2 Estimation
The above vehicle choice and VMT demand model is estimated in two steps.
The first step uses maximum likelihood estimation with the nested contraction
mapping algorithm from (Berry et al., 1995). Demand estimation follows from
(Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes, 2004), but is estimated using maximum likelihood
similar to (Train & Winston, 2007) and (Langer, 2010). Let θ2 be the set of non-
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linear parameters {α, β, γ, τ}.20 Predicted market shares Sˆ J(θ2, δ) are matched to
observed market shares S j rather than observed sample shares to reduce vari-
ance.21 This is particularly important with the 2009 wave of the NHTS in which
some regions of the country are overrepresented and representative population
weights are not available.22 (Berry, 1994) shows that for a given θ2, a unique δ
exists that matches observed market shares with predicted market shares.
S j = Sˆ J(θ2, δ(θ2)) =
∑
i Pi j(θ2.δ(θ2))
Ni
(1.25)
The term δ, which represents utility derived from the automobile that is invari-
ant across households, is specified as δ j(θ2, S j) = ψ jX j + e j, where e j represents
utility not captured by observable characteristics.
Estimation of θ2 proceeds in an iterative fashion. For a trial value of non-
linear parameters θ2, the contraction mapping recovers the mean utility δ j for
each product. Having recovered the household invariant utility, the non-linear
parameters are solved by maximizing the likelihood function. The VMT equa-
tion is also estimated in this maximum likelihood stage. VMT demand is pro-
vided in the data only for the year of the survey. Therefore, the gas price used
is taken from the survey year (rather than the model year, which is used for the
vehicle choice).23
When θ2 has been maximized and δ j recovered, the linear parameters ψ j are
20Some regressors in γ are not interactions with household characteristics. Because these re-
gressors are exponentiated with other terms that do interact with household characteristics and
enter independently into the VMT estimation, they are non-linear rather than linear parameters.
21To calculate observed shares, the total sales are divided by the number of choice occasions
nationally. To approximate the national number of drivers per household (plus one) I add the
adult population plus the number of total households from census data.
22Although this oversampling is not included in the documentation, it is clear from the sum-
mary statistics of the data.
23Although cross sectional variation does exist between states in the 2009 survey, a second
cross section helps identify these VMT parameters with more precision. For this reason the 2001
survey is included in the estimation.
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estimated from the vector δ. This set of moment conditions is based on the exo-
geneity assumption that the vector of product characteristics X j is independent
of the error term e j. Of particular concern is that the error term e j can be decom-
posed as ξ j + ε j, where ξ j is correlated with price. In this case the exogeneity
assumption fails and the bias leads to an underestimate of the price coefficient.
This is a frequently raised concern because unobserved quality increases both
price and market share. To identify θ2, I instrument for price using product char-
acteristics of vehicles within and outside the firm. As in (Whitefoot et al., 2012), I
choose instruments that are less flexible in the short run, including vehicle foot-
print and length as well as the number of products in the same market segment,
both within and outside of the firm.24 I estimate demand for each model year in
2000-2006 as a separate market, having been limited to these years by the avail-
ability of data for new vehicle market shares. This allows households to choose
from over 200 new cars in any given year. Having estimated the demand side, I
can then solve for the marginal costs of each product as described below in the
simulation section.
1.5.3 Estimation Results
Tables 1.3 and 1.5 report the results of the demand estimation. The household-
vehicle interaction coefficients are presented in Table 1.3. The results from this
estimation are generally intuitive and in line with expectations. For example, in-
terpreting the γ-parameters that enter the VMT decision, households with more
24These instruments are unlikely to be perfectly exogenous, but as my model is predicated on
the fact that price is chosen simultaneously with horsepower, weight, and fuel economy, I do
not use these three characteristics as instruments, as is traditionally done. As can be noted from
the price setting condition of the firms in equation 1.9, CAFE requires the firms to correlate price
and fuel economy. However imperfect, the instruments I use represent an improvement over
the OLS coefficient estimates, which result in upward sloping demand curves.
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workers, and those in suburban and rural locations demand more VMT. The τ-
parameters, which enter only the vehicle decision, are also generally intuitive.
Households with at least one college degree prefer higher horsepower, lower
weight vehicles. Households in the South and Midwest prefer domestic vehi-
cles, while households on the coasts prefer European vehicles. One surprising,
although statistically insignificant, effect is the interaction between Asian vehi-
cles and Southern households being positive. This may be a result of the NHTS
2009 survey over sampling the urban areas of Texas, which may bias southern
preference towards urban preferences. Alternatively, this may be due to the in-
creased manufacturing presence of these companies in Southern states. Many of
the terms are statistically insignificant, likely due to the large number of house-
hold interactions with horsepower and weight; however, α and β, which control
the response to vehicle price and the price of driving, are statistically significant.
The household invariant parameters are presented in Table 1.5. Horsepower
and weight have positive coefficients, which matches expectations that con-
sumers will value these attributes (for their performance and safety, respec-
tively). This relationship is also consistent with the tension necessary for suppli-
ers who face an opportunity cost when increasing fuel economy at the expense
of these attributes.
Table 1.6 presents several elasticities of interest. The sales-weighted price
elasticity of demand is estimated at -7.5, which lies within the generally ac-
cepted range for these estimations. Gasoline-price elasticity of VMT is estimated
at -0.45, which is higher than (Bento et al., 2009) estimate of -0.32, but lower than
(Spiller, 2010) estimate of -0.62. It also lies within the range given by (Graham &
Glaister, 2002), who found long-run estimates of the gasoline-price elasticity of
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VMT ranging from -0.23 to -0.80. The results in Table 1.6 also suggest that urban
drivers, who have more public transportation options, have more elastic de-
mand than suburban or rural drivers, and that working households, who have
fewer discretionary trips, have more inelastic demand than retired households.
1.6 Simulation
1.6.1 Assumptions and Calibration
To bring the estimated results to the simulation, several changes must be made.
The demand model estimated above was estimated for new cars only and for
more than 200 new car products per year. To use this level of disaggregation in
the new and used car market is computationally challenging. Thus, products
are aggregated into the class categories listed in Table 1.1. The attributes of
these vehicles are the weighted sum of observed models in those classes. This
provides the relevant product characteristics with the exception of the product
specific fixed effect, which controls the market share of each product. Matching
the demanded level of vehicles with the observed market shares generates these
values.
The modeling of the used car market poses several challenges. The first in-
volves the extension of the utility model to used vehicles. I make the assumption
that the utility parameters for used cars are the same as new cars. This may re-
sult in the model predicting used cars as being more substitutable with new cars
than they actually are. Over-substitutability would provide an upper bound on
potential leakage to the used car market, as new car makers would have more
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market power than the model would predict. To determine the product fixed
effect for these used vehicles, initial quantities are required.25 To obtain these
quantities for a given class for a previous model year, I assume the class had the
same total sales in previous years but decrease those quantities to account for
scrappage due to aging.26
Some calibration of the suppliers is also necessary. Two sets of cost are
needed: the shadow cost of CAFE and the marginal cost of products. I take
the shadow costs of CAFE from (Anderson & Sallee, 2011b), who estimate these
values using the flex-fuel loophole. As this loophole decreases the standard for
these firms, I calibrate at this lower level, but increase it to the normal value for
my initial equilibrium. To recover the marginal costs of each product, I use the
first order conditions of each firm with respect to price. To find these values, I
solve the system of first order conditions such that they are all equal to zero.27
25Two other options are possible here, using the observed used cars in the NHTS dataset
or using national shares observed. Identifying older vehicles in the NHTS data is unreliable.
Additionally, current class distinctions become difficult to impose on older vehicles. Estimates
of quantities of used vehicles are also unreliable and prohibitively expensive.
26Although this yields unrealistic quantities of some vehicles (for example, large numbers of
older SUVs) it also has advantages. The assumption stabilizes the baseline simulation partic-
ularly if I simulate outcomes in future years and allow the fleet to age. In the cases where a
product had not existed in the past and a new vehicle ages into that product category, price has
to drop drastically to match the increasing supply with the nonexistent demand. By smoothing
initial quantities, price fluctuations in later years that are unrelated to the regulatory environ-
ment would be minimized.
27These values will solve all the firms FOCs including those with respect to horsepower and
weight. Because the FOCs with respect to horsepower and weight will not be exactly zero I
find the residual and subtract it from each FOC for my starting conditions. This ensures that
the initial starting equilibrium is stable. I could also perform this exercise using the FOC with
respect to horsepower or weight instead of price but I opt for price as pricing is likely the most
flexible for the firms and therefore the most likely to be exact.
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1.6.2 Simulation Results
Efficient Vehicle Tax Credit for Domestic Cars
The first set of simulations models an efficient vehicle tax credit. This credit is
modeled after the hybrid tax credits created as part of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005. They range from $1,700 to $3,400. These credits were designed to sup-
port new technologies that risk-averse consumers with limited information may
be hesitant to adopt. These credits were limited to the first 60,000 hybrid cars
or trucks produced by each manufacturer. As the Asian manufacturers have
already exhausted these credits, the vast majority currently go to domestic pro-
ducers and I model this policy as a uniform $2,000 credit on the most efficient
car produced by each domestic manufacturer.28
The results of this simulation are given in Tables 1.7 and 1.8. The interactions
of the tax credit under the CAFE baseline are examined in Panel A of Table
1.7. As predicted above, the overall quantity of domestic vehicles sold under
a CAFE standard increases. The individual fuel economy ratings of cars and
trucks also remain constant before and after the policy. Despite this, the overall
fuel economy of the domestic manufacturers increases by 0.47% to 0.58% as the
policy, targeted at cars, increases the car fleet relative to the truck fleet. This
result would reverse if the tax credit had instead targeted the most fuel efficient
trucks. Market competition decreases overall sales for the foreign manufactur-
ers, but it slightly increases the share of cars relative to trucks resulting in small
improvements in the fleet fuel economy of foreign firms. Panel C of Table 1.8
displays the changes to VMT and gasoline and calculates welfare changes from
28I assume the revenues to finance this tax are raised from a uniform lump-sum tax.
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these values. The interaction of the tax credit with CAFE results in an increase in
total VMT and gasoline consumption.The first set of welfare calculations, which
follows (Small & Rosen, 1981), incorporates changes in utility due to VMT and
vehicle choice and is broken into changes in welfare for consumers of domes-
tic and foreign vehicles. These large improvements for domestic firms occur
because the subsidy on the most efficient vehicles relaxes the CAFE constraint
for cars and allows manufacturers to channel the fuel economy of all cars, not
just those targeted with the tax credit, towards other more valued characteris-
tics. The associated externalities are calculated using the percentage changes in
VMT and gallons of gasoline applied to the U.S. VMT and gasoline consump-
tion in 2011 using costs from (Parry & Small, 2005). As both VMT and gasoline
consumption increase, all externalities increase. These large costs overwhelm
all other welfare gains associated with improved vehicle choice resulting in to-
tal welfare losses of $22.25 million.
The interactions of the complementary tax credit with a feebate baseline are
examined in Panel B of Table 1.7 and Panel D of Table 1.8. I choose a rate of
$500 per 0.01 gpm as this is a common benchmark rate chosen for the evalu-
ation of feebate policies in the literature. The results in Panel B show that the
increases in total quantity are on a similar order as those under CAFE in Panel
A. What is very different, and one of the key results of my paper, is that the
average fuel economy increases for the targeted car class. Combined with the
increased share of cars, at 0.45% the overall fuel economy of the domestic man-
ufacturers is nearly double of that under CAFE. The feebate either preserves
or increases the fuel economy rating of every manufacturer and every class of
vehicle in the presence of the efficient vehicle tax credit. This result does not,
however imply that overall gasoline use decreases or that welfare increases un-
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der this interaction. The changes to VMT, gasoline consumption and welfare
are depicted in Panel D of Table 1.8. While the complementary policy does in-
crease the average fuel economy of the fleet, and a model holding VMT constant
might suggest there would be gasoline savings, I find that the increased vehicle
sales and rebound effect, result in higher total VMT and gasoline consumption.
These increases are, however, smaller than those under CAFE. The total welfare
improvement from vehicle choice is less than the interaction with CAFE, but
the aggregation of associated externalities is considerably less as well. The total
welfare loss is $149.01 million. Although the feebate is successful in increasing
fuel economy and mitigates the emissions increases under this interaction, it is
not necessarily better for welfare. It is noteworthy that total impact on welfare
is due largely to changes in congestion, accidents, and local pollutants, all of
which are VMT related externalities. Any policy that allows for an increase in
VMT is therefore likely to be welfare reducing.
Research and Development Policy
In the final set of simulations, a complementary national R&D program expands
the PPF of domestic manufacturers. R&D policies such as this may be enacted
when private R&D spending is less than optimal due to positive information
spill overs. While these policies aim to improve fuel economy, they are unco-
ordinated with the EPA and are not contingent upon meeting higher standards.
For example, in August 2011 the Department of Energy awarded $175 million
dollars to domestic firms (many of them automakers) attempting to “improve
the fuel efficiency of next generation vehicles.”29 The amount by which these
29http://energy.gov/articles/department-energy-awards-more-175-million-advanced-
vehicle-research-and-development. Although this particular set of grants was timed near
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grants could expand the PPF is difficult to predict, but I choose an increase that
allows manufacturers to produce 1% higher fuel economy vehicles while main-
taining current levels of horsepower and weight.
The results of these simulations are compared in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. Table
1.9 shows how the R&D policy affects individual firm fleets. Panel A shows that
under the CAFE standard, the three domestic manufacturers maintain the sales
weighted fuel economy of both cars and trucks at pre-policy levels. One reason
for this is that my model allows the manufacturers to channel this fuel economy
improvement towards horsepower and weight. This, in turn, makes these vehi-
cles more attractive to consumers, and increases overall sales for domestic firms
by nearly 1%. In the absence of a policy prompting people to drive less, this
will promote emissions leakage. One idiosyncrasy of CAFE is that it has differ-
ent standards for cars and trucks. Although one might expect the net effect of
the policy on fuel economy of these firms to be zero, it is not. The expansion of
the PPF changes the relative composition of each firm’s fleet between cars and
trucks. In this simulation, the policy has a slight negative effect on fuel economy
for Ford and GM. This is primarily because the truck sales are more important
for these manufacturers and CAFE binds tighter on their truck than car fleets.
As that constraint is relaxed due to the increase of the PPF, the truck segment
expands faster than the car segment reducing overall fuel economy. This also
affects the fuel economy of the foreign firms. These firms have a small overall
increase in fuel economy as their sales shift toward cars.30 The net result for new
the announced increase in the new CAFE standard, the firms awarded the money were not
required to reach a higher target and no changes to CAFE have been proposed in response to
the outcomes of this research.
30This confirms a result found in other papers (e.g. (Whitefoot et al., 2012)) that foreign,
unconstrained firms increase sales of trucks when CAFE is tightened. In this simulation, the
expansion of the PPF moves the market closer to the unconstrained equilibrium where domestic
firms produce more trucks and foreign firms more cars.
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vehicles is a decrease in fuel economy of 0.02%.
Panel C of Table 1.10 shows the VMT, fuel use, and welfare consequences
of the policy. As might be expected, welfare increases for consumers of domes-
tic vehicles. More surprising is the large decrease in welfare for consumers of
foreign vehicles. This effect seems to arise because the domestic firms move in
the product space allowing for foreign firms to capturing consumers left in the
vacated product space. These shifts are particularly large under CAFE as the
domestic firms make large changes to the profitable attributes of horsepower
and weight. While consumers of domestic vehicles are better off, consumers of
foreign vehicles are now purchasing a product less tailored to their individual
tastes. Welfare is also negatively impacted by the externalities associated with
VMT and gasoline consumption, which increase by 0.047% and 0.043% respec-
tively. The total welfare losses due to the interaction of CAFE with the R&D
policy are $276.79 million.
The results under a feebate are strikingly different and are reported in Panel
B of Table 1.9. I find that fuel economy increases for the individual car and truck
fleets of the domestic manufacturers engaged in the R&D program. The increase
in fuel economy is nearly 0.60% for each of these manufacturers. I also find that
quantity increases substantially less than under CAFE.
Panel D of Table 1.10 documents the VMT and gasoline consumption
changes as well as the welfare consequences of this interaction. As noted above,
domestic firms channel the improvements largely towards fuel economy result-
ing in profit increases between 0.05-0.07%, far smaller than under CAFE. Con-
sumers may value fuel economy, but they value it less than horsepower and
weight, which implies that the welfare improvements for consumers of these
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vehicles are more modest than under CAFE. Forcing these improvements to-
wards fuel economy also mutes the effect of the interaction in other ways. The
feebate provides less opportunity for shifting in the horsepower and weight di-
mensions of the product space. This means that very few welfare changes are
experienced by consumers of foreign vehicles. It is perhaps surprising that, de-
spite an increase in overall fuel economy of 0.37% and an almost negligible in-
crease in sales quantity of 0.03%, overall VMT and gasoline use increase. When
individuals drive more fuel efficient vehicles this lowers the price of driving,
implying that VMT (and all related externalities) increase. I find that total VMT
increases by 0.035% but the higher fuel economy of the fleet works to reduce the
total gasoline consumed to drive those miles. Despite this, the higher quantity
of sales and the extra miles travel produces an increase in gasoline consumption
of 0.017%. While this fuel economy increase helps to limit the externalities asso-
ciated with carbon, they are dominated by welfare losses arising from increased
VMT. In total, welfare decreases $79.52 million when the R&D policy interacts
with the feebate. In this simulation I find that the feebate is not only better at
increasing fuel economy and mitigating emissions expansions, but also reduces
the welfare losses implied by the interaction.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a model to examine the relative merits of a CAFE standard
versus a feebate in the presence of complementary but uncoordinated policies.
Although a priori identical, they react differently to complementary policies.
CAFE targets the average fuel economy of the fleet and allows the manufac-
turers to establish the price wedge, while a feebate targets the price wedge and
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allows the market to determine the average price. To compare their interaction
with complementary policies, I build a model of the automobile market that
pays particular attention to supplier decisions and incorporates used vehicle
and scrappage markets. My model is the first to incorporate a production possi-
bility frontier into the supplier decision in a general equilibrium model that also
accounts for the used vehicle and scrappage markets. This allows me to exam-
ine how an increase in the production possibility frontier caused by a research
and development program interacts with a CAFE standard or feebate, which
has not been possible in previous general equilibrium models. I am also able to
examine how a tax credit on efficient vehicles interacts with a feebate or CAFE
standard. I find that while both complementary policies increase rather than
decrease emissions, the increase is smaller under the baseline feebate policy be-
cause it improves the fuel economy of the fleet while a baseline CAFE standard
does not.
To build the model used in these simulations I first estimate a demand model
and calibrate the supply model using a variety of data sources. Parameters
for vehicle and mileage demand are estimated simultaneously in a maximum-
likelihood framework that accounts for correlation between unobserved prod-
uct attributes and vehicle price. These parameters are estimated using detailed
2009 NHTS data that links household characteristics with vehicle choices. Ve-
hicle data from Wards Automotive Yearbooks provide information on product
characteristics and are used in both demand and supply estimation. The pro-
duction possibility frontier of the suppliers, estimated using vehicle data from
Wards Automotive Yearbooks between 1971 and 2010, allows manufacturers
to endogenously choose horsepower, weight, and fuel economy of the vehicles
they produce.
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I simulate how several complementary policies attempting to further in-
crease the fuel economy of the fleet interact with either a national CAFE stan-
dard or a feebate. I find that the tax credit increases VMT and fuel consump-
tion under CAFE by 0.13% and 0.11% respectively. Comparatively, the feebate
increases in VMT by 0.12%, but because it allows for average fuel economy im-
provements, it increases fuel consumption by only 0.08%. I find similar results
for a complementary R&D program. While the expansion of the PPF for do-
mestic manufacturers could allow them to produce vehicles of a higher fuel
efficiency, I find that it is not necessarily in their best interest to do so. Under
a single standard there would be no improvement in average fuel economy but
under the current CAFE standard, which is differentiated by class, binds tighter
on trucks than cars; the R&D policy relaxes this constraint implying that average
fuel economy is, surprisingly, reduced by 0.02%, increasing gasoline consump-
tion by 0.043%. By contrast, feebates channel nearly 60% of the possible R&D
improvements to fuel economy, but these improvements are not enough to re-
sult in lower VMT or fuel consumption, which increase by 0.035% and 0.017%
respectively.
These findings underscore several lessons. Because different agencies may
target closely related aspects of a market failure using different policies, these
policies may interact in ways that give rise to outcomes that were unintended by
the regulators. Without coordination, these interactions may not only result in
welfare losses but also increase total emissions. This is particularly concerning
in the case of R&D spending to improve technology, which is often believed
to be a promising channel to reducing emissions without substantial sacrifice.
Moreover, the lack of enthusiasm to approve national climate change legislation
suggests coordination is unlikely to improve in the near future. Thus it may
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be useful to implement a baseline policy that is more robust to uncoordinated,
complementary policies.
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Table 1.1: Potential Vehicle Types
Manufacturer Class Age
Ford Small Car New
General Motors Medium Car 2-5 years
Chrysler Large Car 6-23 years
Toyota Small SUV 24 years or older
Honda Medium SUV
Other Asian Large SUV
European Van
Small Truck
Large Truck
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Household Data Vehicle Data
Variable Mean (SD) Variable Mean (SD)
Family Size 2.32 1.15 Price $ 28,445.00 14426
Number Work-
ing
1.09 0.95 Weight (lbs) 3652 835.8
Number Chil-
dren
0.38 0.79 Horsepower 198 59.70
Cars per House-
hold
2.03 0.83 Fuel Economy (gpm) 0.047 0.010
VMT (per car) 11,179 8050 Depreciation $ 5,034.00 4091
Household Composition Percent Variable Model Count
Urban 61% Domestic 638
Suburban 10% Asian 597
Rural 30% European 288
Children in
Household
20% Car 842
Retired Person
in Household
41% Van 128
Northeast 15% SUV 460
Midwest 11% Truck 93
South 53%
West 21% Total 1523
California 14%
Notes: Household data from NHTSA 2009. Vehicle data from Wards Automotive Yearbook.
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Table 1.3: First Stage Parameter Values: Vehicle and Household Interac-
tion Terms
Coefficient Estimate Standard Error
alpha -2.032 0.187
beta 1.770 0.314
Gamma Parameters
Vehicle Household
constant constant 1.657 0.243
# working 0.047 0.026
suburban 0.057 0.089
rural 0.181 0.092
hp -4.508 2.400
hp adult age 7.261 4.719
wt 4.310 1.553
wt adult age -3.926 2.623
van 0.025 0.205
van child 0.163 0.182
van retired 0.139 0.173
suv -0.041 0.135
suv child 0.109 0.142
suv retired -0.117 0.119
truck 0.264 0.148
truck child -0.131 0.167
truck retired -0.365 0.171
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Table 1.4: First Stage Parameter Values: Vehicle and Household Interac-
tion Terms
Tau Paramters
Vehicle Household
hp subruban 0.541 0.266
hp rural 0.150 0.209
hp 4year degree 0.287 0.111
hp child -0.017 0.166
wt subruban -0.271 0.149
wt rural -0.098 0.124
wt 4year degree -0.146 0.059
wt child -0.053 0.095
van adult age -0.154 0.097
van child 0.342 0.189
suv adult age -0.118 0.059
suv child 0.025 0.165
truck adult age -0.059 0.082
truck child 0.133 0.215
US midwest 0.314 0.128
US west -0.059 0.139
US south 0.171 0.112
Asian midwest -0.589 0.194
Asian west 0.262 0.150
Asian south 0.105 0.131
Euro midwest -0.800 0.499
Euro west 0.243 0.387
Euro south -0.103 0.363
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Table 1.5: Second Stage Parameter Values
Coefficient Estimate Standard Error
Constant -10.330 *** 0.284
Price -0.886 *** 0.126
Horsepower 0.762 *** 0.161
Weight 0.593 *** 0.107
European Firm 0.911 *** 0.179
Asian Firm -0.300 *** 0.081
SUV 0.255 ** 0.109
Truck -0.100 0.201
Van -0.443 ** 0.171
Notes: Second stage parameters are estimated using
an IV framework in the spirit of Berry et al. (1995)
that instruments for price with vehicle length, foot-
print and number of products in class both within and
outside of the firm. Domestic Firms and Cars are the
ommitted categories of the estimation.
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Table 1.6: Elasticities
Panel A: Price Elasticity of Demand
Vehicle Average -3.02
Sales Weighted -7.46
Panel B: Elasticity of Gasoline Use with Respect to Price
Full Sample -0.45
Urban -0.54
Suburban -0.36
Rural -0.46
Working -0.44
Retired -0.46
Poor -0.44
Rich -0.48
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Table 1.7: Tax Credit: Quantity and Fuel Economy Outcomes
Panel A: Fuel Economy Standard—CAFE
Quantity GPM MPG MPG Cars MPG Trucks
Total PrePolicy PostPolicy PrePolicy PostPolicy
Ford 2.46% -0.47% 0.47% 27.5 27.5 20.7 20.7
GM 2.85% -0.48% 0.48% 27.5 27.5 20.7 20.7
Chrysler 2.92% -0.58% 0.58% 27.5 27.5 20.7 20.7
Toyota -0.13% -0.03% 0.03% 33.2 33.2 22.7 22.7
Honda -0.14% -0.04% 0.04% 33.1 33.1 24.6 24.6
Other Asian -0.13% -0.04% 0.04% 28.7 28.7 22.8 22.8
European -0.09% -0.03% 0.03% 27.7 27.7 20.7 20.7
Total New 1.50% -0.20% 0.20%
Panel B: Feebate (£500 per .01 gpm)
Quantity GPM MPG MPG Cars MPG Trucks
Total PrePolicy PostPolicy PrePolicy PostPolicy
Ford 2.16% -0.87% 0.86% 26.7 27.1 20.1 20.1
GM 2.67% -0.95% 0.94% 26.7 27.1 20.1 20.1
Chrysler 2.64% -0.92% 0.91% 26.6 27.1 20.2 20.2
Toyota -0.12% -0.02% 0.02% 33.5 33.5 22.8 22.8
Honda -0.12% -0.03% 0.03% 33.2 33.2 24.7 24.7
Other Asian -0.10% -0.03% 0.03% 28.7 28.7 22.9 22.9
European -0.07% -0.02% 0.02% 27.1 27.1 20.3 20.3
Total New 1.39% -0.45% 0.45%
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Table 1.8: Tax Credit: Welfare
Panel C: Fuel Economy Standard—CAFE
Percent Change in VMT 0.13%
Percent Change in Gallons of Gasoline 0.11%
Welfare (Millions of Dollars)
Vehicle Choice and VMT
Domestic Vehicles 346.14
Foreign Vehicles -30.78
Total from Vehicles 315.09
Associated Externalities
Carbon -7.53
Congestion and Accidents -255.21
Local Pollutants -74.60
Total Externalities -337.34
Total Welfare Change -22.25
Panel D: Feebate (£500 per .01 gpm)
Percent Change in VMT 0.12%
Percent Change in Gallons of Gasoline 0.08%
Welfare (Millions of Dollars)
Vehicle Choice and VMT
Domestic Vehicles 152.70
Foreign Vehicles -3.60
Total from Vehicles 149.07
Associated Externalities
Carbon -5.49
Congestion and Accidents -226.41
Local Pollutants -66.18
Total Externalities -298.08
Total Welfare Change -149.01
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Table 1.9: Research and Development Policy: Quantity and Fuel Economy
Outcomes
Panel A: Fuel Economy Standard—CAFE
Quantity GPM MPG MPG Cars MPG Trucks
Total PrePolicy PostPolicy PrePolicy PostPolicy
Ford 0.99% 0.01% -0.01% 27.5 27.5 20.7 20.7
GM 0.82% 0.01% -0.01% 27.5 27.5 20.7 20.7
Chrysler 0.80% 0.00% 0.00% 27.5 27.5 20.7 20.7
Toyota 0.10% -0.06% 0.06% 33.2 33.2 22.7 22.7
Honda 0.11% -0.06% 0.06% 33.1 33.1 24.6 24.6
Other Asian 0.10% -0.05% 0.05% 28.7 28.7 22.8 22.8
European 0.07% -0.07% 0.07% 27.7 27.7 20.7 20.7
Total New 0.53% 0.01% -0.01%
Panel B: Feebate (£500 per .01 gpm)
Quantity GPM MPG MPG Cars MPG Trucks
Total PrePolicy PostPolicy PrePolicy PostPolicy
Ford 0.07% -0.59% 0.59% 26.7 26.8 20.1 20.2
GM 0.05% -0.60% 0.59% 26.7 26.8 20.1 20.2
Chrysler 0.05% -0.59% 0.59% 26.6 26.8 20.2 20.3
Toyota 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 33.5 33.5 22.8 22.8
Honda 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 33.2 33.2 24.7 24.7
Other Asian 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 28.7 28.7 22.9 22.9
European 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 27.1 27.1 20.3 20.3
Total New 0.03% -0.37% 0.37%
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Table 1.10: Research and Development Policy: Welfare
Panel C: Fuel Economy Standard—CAFE
Percent Change in VMT 0.041%
Percent Change in Gallons of Gasoline 0.043%
Welfare (Millions of Dollars)
Vehicle Choice and VMT
Domestic Vehicles 61.16
Foreign Vehicles -237.98
Total from Vehicles -173.70
Associated Externalities
Carbon -2.83
Congestion and Accidents -77.58
Local Pollutants -22.68
Total Externalities -103.09
Total Welfare Change -276.79
Panel D: Feebate (£500 per .01 gpm)
Percent Change in VMT 0.035%
Percent Change in Gallons of Gasoline 0.017%
Welfare (Millions of Dollars)
Vehicle Choice and VMT
Domestic Vehicles 8.23
Foreign Vehicles -0.09
Total from Vehicles 8.13
Associated Externalities
Carbon -0.84
Congestion and Accidents -67.18
Local Pollutants -19.64
Total Externalities -87.65
Total Welfare Change -79.52
52
Figure 1.1: Comparison of Firm Profits
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Figure 1.2: Efficient Vehicle Tax Credit
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION IN THE PRESENCE OF MULTIPLE
UNPRICED EXTERNALITIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR
2.1 Introduction
For reasons discussed in (Harberger, 1974), the estimation of the overall welfare
effects of government interventions to correct externalities is more challenging
than first outlined by (Pigou, 1932). In the presence of unpriced externalities or
other pre-existing distortions, policies levied to correct an externality can exac-
erbate or alleviate these other distortions in related markets. A priori, theory
cannot shed light on the relative importance of the primary welfare effect of the
policy defined by the welfare gain from correcting the externality addressed
by the policy and the interaction effects defined as the welfare effect that re-
sults from the interaction of the new policy with other unpriced externalities.
Multiple unpriced externalities are particularly prevalent in the transportation
sector, where unpriced congestion and air pollution interact in nontrivial ways
across space and time.1 Recently, in an attempt to reduce automobile-related
emissions, policymakers have introduced policies to stimulate the demand for
ultra-low-emission vehicles (ULEVs) such as gas-electric hybrids.2 A popular
1Automobiles are major contributors to local and global air pollution, including carbon
monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and hydrocarbons (HC), and the transportation sector
accounts for 20% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the United States (Ep, 2007). Automo-
bile use also leads to significant congestion costs. In 2003 these were estimated at $63 billion
dollars, with drivers in our area of focus losing 93 hours annually to congestion delays (Schrank
& Lomax, n.d.).
2Policies to promote the purchase of these new hybrid vehicles are also motivated by the
perceived lag in adoption that often results from a lack of acceptability of new technologies by
consumers (D. Greene, of Transportation, Assessment, & Division, n.d.; Helfand & Wolverton,
2011).
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policy, in place in nine states and under consideration in six others, consists
of allowing solo-hybrid drivers access to high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes
on major freeways.3 In this paper, we take advantage of the introduction of
this policy in Los Angeles, California to study interactions between multiple
unpriced externalities. We demonstrate the first-order importance of the in-
teraction effect between the policy and unpriced congestion and show that it
generates substantial welfare losses, dominating the expected primary welfare
gain of the policy. While it may not be too surprising that allowing solo-hybrid
drivers into HOV lanes is likely an inefficient policy to promote the adoption of
green technologies, we stress the remarkable variation of the interaction effect
between unpriced congestion and the policy across space and time. Congested
locations and peak travel periods make the HOV lane exemption attractive to
hybrid drivers, but create the greatest congestion costs for existing carpoolers.
While adding a single hybrid to any HOV lane at 2AM creates zero social costs
of congestion, adding one daily hybrid driver at 7AM to a very congested road
in our study area (the I-10W) generates $4500 in annual social costs. On these ex-
ceptionally congested roads, HOV lane traffic may be up to 30% above socially
optimal levels, implying significant congestion costs from allowing hybrid ac-
cess. As such, estimates of the effects of the policy that rely on average values
would underestimate the impact of a marginal hybrid on HOV travel times,
leading to erroneous estimates of the welfare effects of the policy. Our findings
imply a best-case cost of $124 per ton of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,
$606,000 dollars per ton of nitrogen oxides (NOx) reduction, and $505,000 dol-
lars per ton of hydrocarbon reduction in the most optimistic calculations. These
costs exceed those of other options readily available to policymakers. Further,
3Of nearly twenty states with HOV lanes, nine allow hybrid vehicles to drive in HOV lanes:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Utah and Virginia.
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a policy that was perceived as free was far from free. We find that it costs car-
poolers $3-$9 for every $1 of benefit transferred to hybrid drivers. If instead
a tax-credit were implemented, funded through a broad-based tax, the cost to
taxpayers would have been only $1.4 per dollar transferred. To measure the
magnitude of these interaction effects, we have assembled a rich dataset that
includes real time data from the Freeway Performance Measurement System
(PeMS) in California. PeMS reports hourly travel time for major routes and traf-
fic flow for detectors located in HOV and mainlines. We use both travel time on
a single route (I-10W) and detector level traffic flow for District 7, which corre-
sponds to the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area and more than 36% of all
HOV lanes in California. The analysis controls for possible confounding factors
through the use of a regression discontinuity (RD) design where travel time and
traffic flow in the HOV and mainline lanes are compared before and after the
start of the policy. A common tension within the RD literature is the use of short
run RD estimates to establish long run welfare effects. As a robustness check,
we also take advantage of the recent ending of the policy to test the persistence
of these changes in travel time. Similar changes at the end of the policy suggest
that there is a sustained, upward shift in congestion levels, validating the use of
our estimates for the welfare analysis. This paper contributes broadly to the lit-
erature on environmental policy in a second-best setting. When examining the
welfare effects of environmental policies in a second best setting, (Bovenberg &
de Mooij, 1994), (Bovenberg & Goulder, n.d.), and (Parry & Small, n.d.), empha-
size the importance of considering the interactions between preexisting distor-
tions caused by distortionary taxes in factor markets and the new environmen-
tal policy.4 As in (Parry & Small, n.d.), here the interactions occur between the
4In the context of automobile-related policies, (Parry & Small, n.d.) derive rules for the op-
timal second-best gasoline tax and examine the interactions between a gasoline tax and pre-
existing distortions caused by labor taxes and unpriced externalities within the transportation
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policy and unpriced congestion externalities. In contrast with nearly all prior
work in this area, which has typically relied on analytical and calibrated sim-
ulation models, our analysis provides one of the first econometric estimates of
the interaction effect between an environmental motivated policy and a com-
peting unpriced externality.5 These econometric estimates are incorporated into
a general equilibrium welfare framework, which is used to calculate the overall
welfare and distributional impacts of the policy. A key insight of the second-
best literature is that revenue-raising instruments can alleviate some of the wel-
fare losses associated with interaction effects (Goulder, Parry, & Burtraw, 1997).
In this context, we compare the welfare effects of this non-revenue raising pol-
icy with alternative revenue raising policies, including auctioning of the hybrid
stickers and high-occupancy toll lanes (HOT) that vary with fuel economy. We
also compare this policy against tax incentives, as recently examined in (Sallee,
n.d.).
2.2 Background on the Policy
California has long had a reputation for being at the forefront of environmental
policy. Because of perceived costs, many environmental policies typically face
resistance from taxpayers and industry. In contrast, the Clean Air Vehicle Sticker
(CAVS) policy was popular among nearly all interested parties. In the words of
Assemblywoman Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills), author of the measure, “This is
a win, win, win – cleaning up our air, reducing dependence on foreign oil and
system, such as congestion, air pollution and accidents with a simulation model.
5The exception is (West & Williams III, 2007) who estimate the parameters necessary to cal-
culate the optimal second-best gasoline tax using household level data.
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saving money at the pump.”6 Beginning August 10, 2005 and ending June 30th,
2011, owners of hybrid vehicles achieving 45 miles-per-gallon (mpg) or better
were able to apply for a special sticker that allowed them access to HOV lanes
regardless of the number of occupants in the vehicle. The goal of the CAVS
policy was to stimulate the demand for highly fuel-efficient vehicles, particu-
larly of ultra-low-emission vehicles (ULEV), such as the Honda Insight, Honda
Civic Hybrid, and Toyota Prius. The sticker had limited transferability and was
allocated to the vehicle and not the driver. The original bill allowed for the is-
suance of 75,000 stickers, but later legislation eventually increased the limit to
85,000. Stickers were available for $8 dollars to all owners of eligible vehicles,
including the owners of the over 65,000 estimated hybrids already registered in
California at the start of the policy. The rationale for this decision rested on the
idea of not penalizing earlier adopters. In Los Angeles County, a total of 27,228
stickers were distributed over the course of the program. By August 20th, more
than 12,000 applications for stickers were submitted to the DMV, implying that
a substantial number of hybrids entered the HOV lanes at the beginning of the
program.7 By February 2007, all 85,000 stickers had been issued. While the
original CAVS hybrid policy expired June 30th, 2011, it is nonetheless crucial to
understand the effects of these programs as California introduced a new HOV
exception program with 40,000 stickers for electric, hydrogen fuel cell, and plug-
in hybrid vehicles on January 1st 2012.8
6Salladay, Robert. 2004. “Hybrids Move Closer to Using Carpool Lanes,” Los Angeles Times,
May 7, 2004.
7Gledhill, Lynda. 2005. “Drivers race for carpool permits for hybrids: At 1,000 applicants a
day, some predict gas-saver gridlock,” SF Chronicle, August 20.
8The CAVS program was initially designed to expire on December 31st, 2008, however, as a
result of the popularity of the program, an organized group of hybrid drivers has successfully
lobbied for subsequent extensions of the program. Barringer, Felicity. 2011. “Hybrid Owners
Seek to Extend Carpool Privilege” New York Times, May 18.
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2.3 Data
Data on major highways in California is collected by the Freeway Performance
Measurement System (PeMS), a joint effort by the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans), the University of California, Berkeley, and the Part-
nership for Advanced Technology on the Highways (PATH). PeMS obtains real-
time 30-second loop detector data across 12 Caltrans districts. Each detector
compiles data on traffic flow and lane occupancy, which are then used to calcu-
late traffic speed.9 We use both travel time on a single route and detector level
traffic flow for District 7, corresponding to the greater Los Angeles metropolitan
area.
2.3.1 Travel Time on the I-10W
Because commuters are primarily concerned with the time it takes to commute
along a particular route, our initial analysis focuses on hourly travel time over
a single freeway route. Routes are defined as a segment of the freeway sys-
tem from a fixed starting point to a fixed destination and are predetermined by
PeMS. A route level measure of travel time combines information from multiple
detectors that a commuter would typically drive.10 The data set obtained from
PeMS reports the hourly travel times along a 17.5-mile section of the I-10W for
9Lane occupancy is the fraction of time the detector is on due to the pres-
ence of a vehicle. Based on average vehicle length and this lane occupancy mea-
sure, the speed of traffic is computed. See PeMS FAQ for more information:
http://pems.eecs.berkeley.edu/?dnode=Help&content=help faq.
10For example, drivers commuting to downtown LA from West Covina typically use the I-10
route, while those commuting from Thousand Oaks to downtown LA use US Hwy 101. PeMS
computes travel time over a freeway segment by dividing the length of the segment by the
calculated traffic speed at that detector and summing travel time across the segments that form
the route.
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the HOV lane and each of the four mainline lanes (Map 1). With the exception
of a three-plus occupant requirement during peak travel times in the HOV lane,
this route is fairly representative in terms of size and design for the Los Angeles
metropolitan area.11 In addition to the I-10W, travel time data is also collected
for the I-210W to broadly capture demand on competing freeways. While a
large window of data around the policy is desirable, our window of analysis is
limited by the availability of I-210W data to be January 2004 through December
2007. Finally, as weekend and holiday travel demand is substantially different
from weekday demand, these observations are removed from the initial analy-
sis resulting in a total of 34,980 hourly travel time observations by lane. Figure
1 plots the 2004-2007 average travel times for the HOV and mainline lanes of
the I-10W across the hours of the day. Morning peak is defined by Caltrans as 5
A.M. to 9 A.M. and afternoon peak as 4 P.M. to 7 P.M. The mid-day off-peak cor-
responds to 10 A.M. to 4 P.M. and the night off-peak from 8.P.M. to 4 A.M.12 The
figure reveals substantial variation in travel times over the course of the day,
with maximum travel time levels of over 35 minutes in the mainline reached
during the morning peak. This figure also underscores the large differential be-
tween mainline and HOV lane travel times during the morning peak, with a
maximum difference of nearly 10 minutes at 7 A.M. While the route level data
allows us to explore the heterogeneity of the CAVS policy across various times
of the day, it does not allow for exploration of the effect across various locations
of the LA metropolitan area. To explore the spatial effects of the program and
generality of the results, we also consider a detector level dataset of traffic flow
11The I-10W, westbound from West Covina to Los Angeles, was selected on the criteria of
data availability, data on a competing route, and high detector density. See Appendix A for
more detail on the selection of the I-10W and further discussion of the data used.
12See Tables E.2 and E.3 in Appendix E for weekday travel time averages for each lane and
route, including the I-210W, during the four peak and off-peak periods. The westbound direc-
tion implies peak demand in the morning period.
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spanning the LA area.
2.3.2 Detector Level Data
We estimate the citywide effect of the CAVS policy during peak hours using
a comprehensive dataset of 677 detectors collected by PeMS. These detectors
record hourly observations of traffic flow for HOV and mainline lanes on 18
freeways in Los Angeles. The wide spatial distribution of the final set of detec-
tors used in the analysis can be noted in Map 1. Three months of data, July-
September 2005, provide hourly traffic flow observations for 1,750 detectors
across the 18 freeways, which includes all freeways with HOV lanes.13 In ad-
dition, we also collect three months of data for 331 detectors around the end of
the policy, June 30th, 2011.14 Detectors located at on- and off-ramps are deleted
from the analysis. Each detector is also required to have at least 50 observations
after all deletions.15 As is the case for the I-10W, many routes have a dominant
commuting pattern such that only one peak time of day experiences congestion.
We estimate the effect of the CAVS policy for each detector during the particular
peak period corresponding to maximum traffic flow for that detector, during the
three-month period.16 This ultimately yields 677 individual detector level esti-
13A larger window than three months would strain the assumptions of the local linear regres-
sions used below.
14To ensure comparability with the start of the policy, we limit the detectors used in this
analysis to those active at the start of the policy. Removal of decommissioned detectors and
those with insufficient data further reduces the sample size.
15These deletions include hours outside of the specified peak period, weekend observations
and observations labeled as less than 100 percent observed. Where detectors are not properly
functioning, PeMS imputes missing values. By dropping all observations where Percent Ob-
served is less than 100, all data with PeMS imputation are removed from the analysis.
16This method implies that for nearly all of the I-10W detectors, the morning peak is selected
as the most congested time of day, as expected. Detectors for which the maximum traffic flow
occurs outside the peak periods are also excluded, as a detector with maximum flow occurring
at 2 A.M. is of questionable quality.
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mations of the effect of the CAVS policy on traffic flow, 200 of which are located
in HOV lanes for our main analysis of the start of the policy.17
2.3.3 Other Covariates
The PeMS data is supplemented with hourly measures of weather from the Na-
tional Weather Service at nine airports in the Los Angeles area. These measures
include rainfall in inches, visibility in miles, cloud cover as a percentage of the
sky, temperature in degrees Fahrenheit, and wind speed in miles per hour. The
Fullerton airport station is closest to the I-10W, and data from this station is
matched to the travel time data.18 Nominal weekly retail gasoline prices (reg-
ular reformulated) for Los Angeles from 2004 to 2011 were obtained from the
Energy Information Administration.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
We begin by describing the empirical strategy utilized to estimate the effect of
the CAVS policy on travel time on the I-10W. We employ a regression disconti-
nuity (RD) design where logged hourly travel time in lane i at hour h on date
t, TT iht, is regressed separately by lane on 1(Hybridt), an indicator variable for
observations after the implementation of the CAVS policy, a vector of covariates
17For the 331 detectors that comprise the end of policy analysis, 82 are HOV lane detectors.
18For the Fullerton station, of the 35,064 total observations, 840 had at least one weather mea-
sure missing. These missing weather measures are imputed from the other stations in the Los
Angeles area (Chino, Hawthorne, Hollywood, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Ontario, Santa Monica
and Van Nuys), following the algorithm used in (Auffhammer & Kellogg, n.d.). See Appendix
A.
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Xht, and a flexible nth-order polynomial in date f (Datet):
TT iht = α
i + βi1(Hybridt) + γiXht + f (Datet) +  iht. (2.1)
The coefficient of interest, βi, is the treatment effect of the CAVS policy on
travel time in lane i.19 Policy date is taken to be August 20th, 2005, which is
when stickers first became available. The vector of covariates Xht includes in-
dicator variables for month of the year interacted with day of the week, and
indicators for hour of the day. Additional controls include weather variables
(linear and quadratic rainfall, linear and quadratic visibility, and indicators for
cloud cover in the central specification), logged gas prices, and travel time on
competing routes (I-210W). 20 Finally, as people often choose freeway routes
based on travel updates in the hour before they leave home, we include travel
time on the I-210W lagged by one hour.21 While the introduction of the stickers
identifies the short run-effect of the policy, our interest is on the overall welfare
effects and distributional impacts of the policy, typically a long run calculation.
Therefore, the welfare estimates presented below are based on the assumption
that the unobserved, latent travel-time function is a vertical translation of the
observed travel-time function. However, one may be concerned with the non-
instantaneous adjustment for the rest of the stickers, which were distributed
over a longer period of time. To address this concern, we also estimate the effect
19As the dependent variable is logged, a one-unit increase in 1(Hybridt) would imply a per-
centage increase in travel times of e(βi − 1). Because this transformation does not significantly
change any of our results, we ignore it and simply discuss parameter estimates in the results for
the sake of exposition.
20Several robustness checks also include measures of temperature, (sustained) wind speed
and wind gusts. Temperature is included as three indicator variables, below 80 degrees, 80 to
100 degrees, and above 100 degrees. Wind is included as an indicator variable for sustained
wind speeds above 20 miles per hour and similarly an indicator for wind gusts indicates gusts
above 20 miles per hour.
21While the inclusion of the I-210W is justified by economic theory, as a robustness check,
estimations without the inclusion of the I-210W are also performed, yielding results similar to
the key findings presented below. See Appendix E.
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of the policys recent termination date of July 1st, 2011.22 Estimating the pol-
icy effects at both the beginning and end of the policy provides insight into the
transition and evolution of the policy effect.
2.4.1 RD: Global Polynomial
The potential for omitted time-varying factors to confound our estimation make
observations substantially before or after the introduction of the policy less in-
formative about the effect of the policy on travel time. Without controlling for
these time-varying factors, the error term may be correlated with time, and thus
with 1(Hybridt), producing biased estimates of βi. Under reasonable assump-
tions, regression discontinuity methods yield consistent estimates of βi in the
presence of time-varying omitted variables. (J. Hahn, Todd, & Klaauw, n.d.)
show that nonparametric identification of a constant treatment effect with a
sharp RD design requires that the conditional mean function is continuous at the
threshold. In other words, provided that all other factors affecting travel time
besides the CAVS policy are continuous at the policy date, the RD design will
yield a consistent estimate of the effect of the policy.23 Equation (2.1) includes
a single, flexible nth order polynomial in date, f (Datet), which controls for un-
observed, time-varying factors that evolve smoothly and may influence travel
22As discussed below, due to data window limitations arising from the recent termination
of the policy, we are restricted in terms of the types of analysis we can perform at the end of
the policy. As such, most of our analysis focuses on the effects estimated at the introduction of
the policy. We interpret the estimates as a conservative estimate of the congestion effects of the
policy, and where possible, also incorporate the end of policy estimates to support our analysis.
23If other discontinuous, unobserved changes occurred at the policy date, the effect of those
unobservables would be indistinguishable from the effect of the policy. For example lane clo-
sures due to construction would cause discontinuities in traffic flow. To reduce the likelihood
that the effects observed below are caused by other such scenarios we perform several robust-
ness checks including an examination of weekend travel time that would likely be affected by
construction but not the CAVS policy.
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times but are unrelated to the policy.24 Following the approach of (DiNardo
& Lee, 2004) and (L. W. Davis, n.d.), an eighth-order polynomial was selected
as the most parsimonious specification that adequately describes the underly-
ing time trend with a reasonable degree of smoothness, with estimates for sixth
through tenth-order polynomials also reported below.25 As standard tests sug-
gest serial correlation is of some concern, robust standard errors clustered at the
week level are calculated for all regressions.26 Finally, we note that we do not
have a sufficient time window to estimate a global polynomial model for the
end of the policy estimates.
2.4.2 RD: Local Linear
In a local linear regression discontinuity design, time varying factors are con-
trolled for with a linear trend within some local bandwidth of the policy discon-
tinuity (G. W. Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). In Appendix E, robustness checks on
the route level analysis using a local linear method - where f (Datet) is linear and
interacted with the policy variable - are performed, yielding similar results to
the global polynomial estimates reported below. The local linear specification
24An alternative approach to the regression discontinuity design would be to use a difference-
in-differences approach. However, it is difficult to construct an appropriate control group. As
all freeways in California were subject to the policy, no freeway in California could be consid-
ered untreated. Comparing against a freeway outside of California would strain the necessary
assumptions of the difference-in-difference approach.
25The most common method of polynomial selection in the literature chooses the order that
smoothly describes the underlying trend in the data, while presenting estimates for alternative
polynomial orders (D. S. Lee & Lemieux, n.d.). As this involves a substantial element of modeler
discretion, misspecification is a concern. As (DiNardo & Lee, 2004) note, misspecification of
the order can lead to biased estimates of the discontinuity and erroneous interpretations of
statistical significance. We report results for other polynomial orders as well as the order chosen
by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Matsudaira, n.d.). Graphs of other polynomial
orders are included in Figures D.1-11 in Appendix D.
26Clustered standard errors are reported for our results as they yielded more conservative
estimates of the standard errors than Newey-West standard errors; Newey-West standard errors
are presented in robustness checks in Appendix E.
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is also used for the detector level analysis of the effect of the CAVS policy on
traffic flows both at the introduction of the policy in 2005 and its expiration in
2011.27 The estimating equation is similar to equation (2.1), with logged-hourly
traffic flow as the dependent variable and weather covariates as well as hourly
fixed effects included. Traffic flow effects are estimated for each detector using
an Epanechnikov kernel with a 30-day bandwidth.28 To determine the citywide
effect of the policy on traffic flows in HOV and mainline lanes, the RD estimates
across detectors are averaged. Standard errors are calculated using 5,000 boot-
strap samples.29
2.5 Route Level Results
2.5.1 The Effect of the CAVS Policy on Travel Time
Figure 2 illustrates the regression discontinuity strategy for estimating the effect
of the CAVS policy on travel time. Panel (a) depicts travel time residuals in the
HOV lane during the morning peak and panel (b) for the mainline. Similarly,
panel (c) depicts the HOV lane residuals during the afternoon peak and panel
(d) displays the residuals for the mainline during the afternoon peak. Panels
27Local linear regression is utilized in the detector analysis because of the challenges associ-
ated with correctly specifying global polynomial controls for each of the 677 detectors.
28A 30-day bandwidth may not be optimal for all detectors; a robustness check Table E.19 in
Appendix E presents results using the Silverman Rule for bandwidth selection and Table E. 21
presents results using the method outlined in (G. Imbens & Kalyanaraman, 2012).
29We also correct these bootstrapped errors for spatial correlation and the imprecision of the
detector level estimates. To account for the imprecision of the estimates from the detector level
regressions, we first generate 5,000 sets of detector-level effects using the estimated means and
standard deviations on each detector. These effects are then spatially partitioned by route-
direction into disjoint blocks. For each of the 5,000 bootstrap renditions of the data we sample
blocks with replacement to account for the spatial correlation in the estimates. These samples
are then used to generate the mean and standard deviation of the estimated effect of the policy.
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(e) (h) present travel time residuals during off peak periods. The plotted points
represent the averaged, biweekly residuals of log hourly travel time regressed
against the covariate vector Xt. These residuals should reveal any underlying,
time-varying trends as well as any discontinuous changes in travel time at the
policy date.30 The fitted lines are the predicted values of a regression of these
residuals on the eighth-order polynomial time trend and the CAVS policy vari-
able. Panels (a) and (c) reveal that travel time in the HOV lane increased during
peak hours due to the CAVS policy, and that these effects are larger during the
morning peak than in the afternoon.31 Figure 2 also shows no policy effect on
travel time in the mainline.32 Figure 2 reveals that congested lanes and times of
day display noisier plots than less congested conditions. This is consistent with
(Schrank & Lomax, n.d.) who document that over half of congestion delays,
especially in peak periods, are the result of nonrecurring events.
Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Table 1 presents the regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of the CAVS
policy on travel time.33 For each time window and lane, the table reports the
30These underlying trends can produce biased estimates when using OLS. For example OLS
finds a statistically significant increase of 4.6 percent for travel time in the mainline during the
morning peak, despite the absence of a discontinuity in panel (b) of Figure 2. See Table E.4 in
Appendix E.
31When the time differential between the HOV and mainline lanes is the largest, stickered
hybrids will have the strongest incentive to move into the HOV lane - from the I-10W mainline
and also alternate routes without an HOV lane option. During off-peak hours, traffic flow is
often below the threshold level where congestion occurs (Vickrey, 1969). In these free flowing
periods, travel time will be invariant to the addition of hybrids and the policy should have small
effect.
32Slight differences between Figure 2 and the estimates in Table 1 are due to the fact that the
polynomial and discontinuity are fit to the residuals in Figure 2, while they are included jointly
in the regression in Table 1.
33These regressions include gas price, lagged I-210W travel time, weather covariates, indi-
cator variables for hour of day, and for month-day of week or day of week as noted. Robust
standard errors clustered by week are included in parenthesis for all regressions. Robustness
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point estimate and standard error for the coefficient of interest, the percentage
effect of the CAVS policy on travel time, broken down by morning peak, after-
noon peak and off-peak periods. The preferred specification of the eighth-order
polynomial is presented in column III. Consistent with Figure 2, the results in
column III confirm that the increase in travel time during the morning peak on
the HOV lane is 9.0 percent and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level;
this effect corresponds to an increase of travel time of 2.2 minutes. Columns
I-VI of Table 1 also present results for sixth-order through tenth-order polyno-
mials, as well as the results for the polynomial order chosen under the BIC.34
Across all polynomial orders, the estimate of the effect of the CAVS policy on
travel time in the HOV lane is relatively stable, ranging between 8.4 and 11.6
percent, and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.35 The point esti-
mates in the afternoon peak, 5.7 to 6.7 percent, are smaller than those estimated
during the morning peak, consistent with the fact that congestion is most se-
vere in the morning peak. Table 1 also reports the estimated effect of the CAVS
policy on mainline travel times. Broadly speaking, these point estimates are sta-
tistically insignificant and unstable (-6.4 to 7.0%) across polynomial orders and
checks of the global polynomial regression discontinuity estimates are presented in Tables E.8-
E.12 in Appendix E, with generally consistent with those in Table 1. These robustness checks test
the sensitivity of our main specification by altering covariate specifications (fixed-effects, con-
trols for competing routes, additional weather covariates, inclusion of holidays and gas prices),
removal of days near the beginning of the policy, estimating separate polynomials on either side
of the discontinuity, Newey-West standard errors, various data windows and altering weather
aggregation methods. Local linear regression estimates are generally consistent with the global
polynomial estimates and are reported in Tables E.13-E.17. All estimated coefficients are in-
cluded in Tables E.5-E.7.
34The BIC selects the 8th order polynomial as the preferred specification in the mainline dur-
ing the morning peak. For the morning peak HOV lane, a 10th order polynomial specification
is chosen.
35As a check on the size of the policy effect, we note that Caltrans occasionally performs vehi-
cle counts detailing the number, type, and occupancy of cars passing a point on major freeways
in California, including the I-10W. A two-hour car count conducted between 6:30 A.M. and 8:30
A.M. on a weekday in 2006 found 167 single occupancy hybrids traveling in the HOV lane. This
represents 5.8 percent of total vehicles counted in the HOV lane by Caltrans during that time.
Several other plausibility checks are detailed in Table E.22 in Appendix E.
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times of day. These provide little evidence that the CAVS policy affected main-
line travel times. As we discuss in section 2.7the mainline estimates do not en-
ter in our welfare calculations, but are nonetheless useful to establish that travel
time changes are unique to the HOV lane. While suggestive that the policy had
no effect in the mainline, we recognize that the mainline estimates are not as
precise as would be ideal. In particular, the fact that the mainline and HOV lane
estimates cannot be statistically distinguished raises concerns that the increase
in HOV travel times is driven by something other than the CAVS policy.36 We
examine this concern and several others related to the mainline below and in
the detector level results in Section 2.6.
Effects of the Policy by Time of Day
Thus far, we have examined the effects of the CAVS policy at peak and off-peak
periods and calculated the average treatment effect. However, it is likely that
these effects will vary even within peak periods, especially during the morn-
ing peak. Small (1982) finds that individuals will adjust work-trip departure
times in response to changes in congestion and that such behavior can result in
heterogeneous responses during peak hours. Hybrid drivers previously com-
muting in the mainline may depart closer to their preferred time, given access
to the less congested HOV lane. Table 2 presents the effect of the policy by hour
on HOV lane travel time, under the preferred specification of an eighth-order
global polynomial. The distribution of magnitudes mimics the congestion lev-
els noted in Figure 1, such that congested times of day are most affected by the
36We provide p-values for tests of the null hypothesis that the HOV and mainline effect are
identical as well as a test for induced demand. This no induced demand test examines the null
hypothesis that the true mainline effect is the decrease in travel time expected (one-fourth the
flow increase of the HOV lane) if all hybrid drivers had originated in the mainline lanes prior
to the policy. These tests are generally inconclusive given the mainline standard errors.
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CAVS policy. Point estimates are insignificant at 5 A.M. and at their largest from
8 to 9 A.M. These magnitudes grow as rush hour progresses from 8.8 percent at
6 A.M. to 12.2 percent at 9 A.M.37 The effect of the policy on travel time is again
most pronounced during the congested evening peak hours of 5 and 6 P.M. with
effects of 6.0 and 8.2 percent respectively.
2.5.2 Further Exploration
The estimates presented above provide strong evidence that the CAVS policy in-
creased travel times during peak hours on the HOV lane while mainline travel
times remained unchanged. A skeptic could still argue, however, that the pat-
tern of effects found here are the result of standard seasonal changes such as
school year effects, or that overall demand for driving increased around the
CAVS policy date, or that there are changes in commuting demand unrelated
to the policy, perhaps driven by macroeconomic factors such as unemployment.
Here we briefly discuss several robustness checks presented in Table 3. First,
one may be concerned that the effects found in the HOV lane are the result of
seasonal variation. Table 3 columns II and III present the regression estimates of
placebo tests using global regression discontinuity, where in column II, the pol-
icy variable becomes active on August 20, 2004, and for column III, it becomes
active on August 20, 2006.38 None of the point estimates are significant at the 10
37The asymmetric nature of travel times is also noted by (Arnott, De Palma, & Lindsey, 1993)
and (Small, Winston, & Yan, 2005) who document that travel times grow until late in the peak
due to persistence of events earlier in the day.
38One concern is that the global polynomial results in an unbalanced number of observations
on either side of the placebo policy date. In Table E.13in Appendix E, local linear results con-
firm the global polynomial analysis. In Table E.10 in Appendix E we also present regression
estimates of the 2005 policy effect using a traditional difference-in-differences analysis where
2004 or 2006 serve as the control year. Under these specifications, HOV lane point estimates are
significant at the 1 percent level and are qualitatively similar to the point estimates from our
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percent level in the HOV lane. Second, it is possible that total demand for driv-
ing increased around the time of the policy implementation. Table 3 column
IV presents global RD estimates using only weekend observations. These esti-
mates show no evidence of an increase in travel time on weekends, suggesting
that our results are not driven by a general increase in demand. Table 3 column
V shows that adding unemployment to the model has almost no effect on the
estimates, suggesting that the polynomial trend is capturing any work-week-
specific demand changes related to employment. Finally, Table 3 column VI
pools HOV and mainline observations with a single polynomial trend, yielding
point estimates similar to our central specification with tighter standard errors.
Paired t-tests find that the peak estimates in the HOV and mainline lanes can
be rejected as identical, suggesting there was not an across-the-board increase
in commuting demand.39
2.6 Detector Level Results
Thus far, we have established convincing evidence of the effect of the CAVS
policy on travel time on the I-10W. It is unclear, however, if these changes are
unique to the I-10W. The detector-level analysis, which is performed across a
larger set of roads at both the start and end of the policy, can help generalize
these results. Furthermore, the larger data set allows for more precise estimates
of the policy effect on mainline lanes. Figure 3 panel (a) plots the kernel den-
central specifications.
39The paired t-test, accounting for the covariance between the HOV and mainline estimates,
yields t-statistics of 5.07 in the morning peak and 5.26 in the afternoon peak. The detector level
regressions below also allow us to statistically distinguish the HOV and mainline estimates
in the most congested parts of the city where the effect is most pronounced, but without the
restrictive assumptions of a single polynomial trend.
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sity smoothed citywide distribution of the effects of the CAVS policy on hourly
traffic flow for mainline and HOV lanes at the start of the policy. This figure is
generated by separately estimating policy effect coefficients for the hundreds of
detectors across the city. While the mainline detectors indicate little evidence of
an effect of the policy on traffic flow, as shown in Table 4 column I, there is a
citywide positive increase of 5.7 percent in the HOV lane flow, statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level. Exploring the heterogeneity of the policy effect
across the city, Table 4 columns II-IV report the average estimated effect of the
policy on traffic flow by distance from downtown LA.40 For detectors within 10
miles of downtown LA, column II reports a mean effect in the HOV lanes of 9.1
percent, while the mean estimated effect in the mainline lanes is a statistically
insignificant 1.5 percent. Figure 3 panel (b) plots the smoothed distribution of
hourly flow effects for different spatial subsets, including the subset of detectors
on the I-10W. Despite the different HOV lane passenger restrictions, the distri-
bution of effects found on the I-10W is similar to those for detectors located
on other freeways near downtown Los Angeles.41 Furthermore, for detectors
located 0-10 miles from downtown LA, this estimation has sufficient power to
statistically distinguish the effect of the policy on HOV and mainline lanes, al-
lowing us to reject the possibility that there was a common increase in traffic
across both HOV and mainline lanes as a result of increased aggregate demand.
Columns III and IV increase the distance from downtown LA to 20 and 30 mile
rings. Moving further from downtown LA, the HOV lane effect drops to zero
40As noted by (Anas, Arnott, & Small, 1998), L.A. has multiple Central Business Districts
(CBD). Here, downtown LA was chosen to be the intersection of the I-10 and I-5 freeways. This
corresponds to the area near Union Station in LA.
41The I-10W detectors also confirm the route level analysis (detectors between 3 and 20 miles
from downtown LA). The traffic flow increase of 9.6 percent observed for the I-10W HOV detec-
tors implies that travel time in the I-10 HOV lane would have increased 6.7, which is statistically
indistinguishable from the estimate of 7.2 percent found in the route level analysis using local
linear regression (Table E.13 column II in Appendix E).
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and becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting that the increases observed
are closely tied to congestion and not due to a general increase in demand.
Next, we turn to the estimates at the end of the policy. We note that though the
city-wide effect is somewhat larger, it is not statistically distinguishable from
the start of policy estimates. Nonetheless, the increase in the point estimate is
consistent with expectations that the effect of the policy would increase as addi-
tional stickers were distributed over time.42 Finally, we note that the estimates
in Table 4 reveal no evidence of a change in flow in mainline lanes. While policy
makers may have expected congestion decreases in the mainline to be a poten-
tial benefit of the policy, these results are suggestive of the presence of induced
demand per the fundamental law of highway congestion (Downs, 1962; Vick-
rey, 1969; Duranton & Turner, 2011). Although our results are consistent with
the presence of induced demand, it is not possible to determine whether it is the
result of new Vehicle Miles Traveled or of diverted demand from other routes
or times of day. The source of this induced demand is important, as new VMT
generated by individuals commuting more frequently or switching from other
modes of travel can increase emissions, undermining a stated goal of the pol-
icy.43 In the best-case scenario for emissions reductions, diverted demand from
other routes or times of the day is the source of induced demand. In the welfare
analysis below, we argue that our final conclusions are robust to any of these
scenarios.
42The larger point estimate at distances far from the CBD at the end of the policy is also
consistent with the idea that commuters in more congested areas of the city would have been
more inclined to acquire stickers at the start of the policy, while more remote commuters may
have delayed their acquisition of stickers.
43New VMT from public transportation users is likely to be small as only 4.1 percent of com-
muters in Los Angeles use bus and 0.7 percent use rail (State of the Commute Report, 1999).
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2.7 Welfare
2.7.1 Conceptual Framework
Overall Welfare EffectsIn the spirit of the literature on taxation in a second best
setting (Harberger, 1974; Bovenberg & Goulder, n.d.), here we outline the key
welfare effects of the CAVS policy with the aid of a welfare formula and dia-
grams. We provide more details and mathematical formulas used to calculate
the effects in Appendix B. To begin, consider a classical transportation network
(Vickrey, 1969) where a fixed number of agents N select between the HOV and
mainline lane. In both HOV and mainline lanes markets, distortions stem from
the fact that agents ignore external congestion and pollution costs when mak-
ing driving decisions, generating a wedge between the marginal private cost
and the marginal social cost of using a vehicle. By allowing hybrid vehicles into
the HOV lane, the CAVS policy generates a tension between congestion relief
benefits in the mainline lane and congestion costs in the HOV lane.44 Let W be
the total social cost, including congestion costs imposed on carpoolers as well
as carpool formation costs, congestion costs of the HOV lane on single occu-
pant hybrids, congestion costs of travel in the mainline lane, emissions costs of
travel in hybrids and regular vehicles, and private net cost of driving hybrid
and regular vehicles. Let the social cost function be defined as:
W =3CCνCTH(CH) + 3CCτC + HνHTH(CH) + NMLνMLTML(NML)+
ER(CC + NML) + EHH + BR(CC + NML) + BHH
44The higher level of congestions in the mainline lane suggests larger congestion relief bene-
fits, while the triple occupancy in the HOV lane suggests larger costs. Which effect dominates
is an empirical matter to be resolved below.
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whereCC is the number of 3-occupant carpool vehicles, H is the number of stick-
ered hybrids, and NML is the number of mainline drivers. Value of time for each
type of agent is νi. TH(CH) is HOV travel time as a function of the number of
HOV lane vehicles where CH = CC + H, τC is the transaction cost of carpool for-
mation paid by carpoolers, and TML(NML) is mainline travel time as a function
of the number of mainline drivers. ER is the external emissions cost of regu-
lar vehicles, EH is the smaller external emissions cost of hybrid vehicles, BR is
the private net cost of driving a regular vehicle and BH is the private net cost
of driving a hybrid vehicle. Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium in the HOV lane
and the mainline lanes, which we assume to be the only distorted markets in
the economy. It also displays the market for vehicles with stickers. Suppose a
sticker is issued that allows an additional driver of a qualified hybrid vehicle
into the HOV lane without having to carpool, such that (dCH)
(dH)
= 1 and (dNML)
(dH)
= −1.
The marginal welfare effect of an additional hybrid vehicle using the HOV lane
can be determined via the change in total social cost:
dW
(dH)
= (EH − ER) + (3CCνC + HνH)
(dTH)
(dCH)
+ νH(TH − TML) − νMLNML
(dTML)
(dCML)
(2.2)
The first term (EH − ER) is the marginal primary welfare gain, arising from the
fuel economy improvements associated with the adoption of hybrid vehicles
induced by the CAVS policy. Integrating over the number of adopted hybrids
gives the total effect, equal to the reduction in the external cost of emissions of
mainline drivers (given by the area abcd in Figure 4) net of the increased exter-
nal costs of emissions of hybrids in the HOV lane, (given by the area efgh). The
second term (3CCνC + HνH)
(dTH)
(dCH)
is the marginal cost-side congestion interaction
effect, defined as the welfare loss for HOV lane drivers that results from the pol-
icys goal of inducing hybrid vehicles into the HOV lane. The total effect equals
the area fgji and reflects the value of the travel time delays in the HOV lane
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caused by the additional hybrids. The third term νH(TH − TML) is the marginal
rent effect equal to the travel time cost-savings for the hybrid vehicle from HOV
lane access. It represents the maximum willingness to pay for a hybrid vehicle
with a sticker, where given the fixed supply of stickers, rents will be generated
per (Bento & Jacobsen, n.d.).45 The total effect is given by the rectangle klmn.
This rectangle is effectively equal to the difference between the area padq (in the
mainline market) and the area rehs (in the HOV lane market). As we shall see
below, a priori, it is not obvious whether hybrid drivers appropriate this rent.
The final term −νMLNML (dTML)(dCML) is the congestion relief in the mainline lanes. In
reality, the number of agents is not fixed, and congestion relief in the mainline
may induce demand from other transportation options.46 The term above is the
marginal partial equilibrium congestion interaction effect, which we argue rep-
resents the upper bound of the congestion relief benefits for all other drivers in
the freeway system. The total effect is given by area btuc.47 We explicitly note
that the estimates of the effect of the policy on mainline travel times do not enter
the calculation of this source of welfare below. This welfare effect is exclusively
calculated from the estimated number of hybrid drivers that leave the mainline
45We assume that there are a sufficient number of drivers who are approximately indifferent
between a hybrid vehicle and their next best alternative, such that the private net costs of driving
a regular or a hybrid vehicle are equal (BR = BH). Therefore, the only cost incurred to gain access
to the HOV lane is the minimal administrative cost of the sticker. To the extent this not true,
there would be second order welfare loss that results from individuals choosing a less preferred
vehicle. This would manifest as a downward sloping willingness to pay for the travel time
savings of a stickered hybrid, reducing the magnitude of the rent effect. Because the program
was relatively small, we also abstract from any potential general equilibrium changes in the
value of all other vehicles.
46For example, drivers on less congested alternative routes will now replace the exiting hy-
brids on the congested travel route, dissipating congestion relief for the original drivers. In
turn, they may be replaced by drivers from backroads, or even new VMT. As noted in Table 5,
we assume new VMT accounts for 15% of these trips.
47In Appendix C, we demonstrate the conditions under which the partial equilibrium conges-
tion interaction effect derived above will upper-bound the system-wide congestion interaction
effect. The intuition is simple. The hypothetical congestion relief benefit is larger the greater the
external costs of congestion. Therefore in other freeways or travel options not as congested as
the mainline, the potential benefit cannot be as large as the benefit in the mainline.
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for the HOV lane, and the initial level of congestion in the mainline. Creat-
ing congestion relief benefits within the freeway system leads to re-allocation
of agents across freeways and potentially new trips and vehicle miles travelled
(Hymel, Small, & Dender, n.d.). To the extent that policy induces new vehicle
miles travelled, it may generate an additional negative source of welfare corre-
sponding to the value of the external costs of emissions associated with these
trips. This effect is represented by the area abvw. While our welfare calculations
are general equilibrium in nature, the partial equilibrium calculations derived
from the estimates in the preceding sections, in particular the effects of the pol-
icy on travel time in the HOV lane and the implied number of drivers leaving
the mainline to the HOV lane, serve as the key parameters for the welfare anal-
ysis. Distributional Impacts: Who appropriates the rents generated by the pro-
gram?While it is obvious that carpoolers will be made worse off by the policy,
a priori it is not obvious who benefits from the policy. We note that for a main-
line driver to move into the HOV lane, he must experience some gain. If the
agent already owns a qualified hybrid, he will appropriate the overall benefits
of travel time reductions and will only pay for the cost of the sticker; alterna-
tively, if the agent does not own a qualified hybrid, his maximum willingness
to pay for a hybrid vehicle with a sticker will reflect the benefits of travel time
reductions he would experience (given by the difference between dq and hs).
This is to say that other agents in the system, including dealers of new hybrid
vehicles or used hybrid sellers, have the potential to extract part of this willing-
ness to pay for the sticker and appropriate some of the rents generated by the
program.
78
2.7.2 Welfare Effects
Table 6 displays estimates and confidence intervals of the annual and present
value welfare effects of the CAVS policy on the I-10W, broken down by welfare
source.48 It underscores the following key results. First, the net welfare effect
of the policy was negative and equal to -$1.6 million dollars with congestion
relief benefits for other drivers included and -$3.3 million dollars without, and
the confidence interval does not include zero. Over the nearly six years of the
policy, this represents a discounted net welfare loss of -$8 million to -$18 mil-
lion dollars. The primary welfare gain from the policy is roughly $28,000 per
year, representing the emissions savings benefits if all hybrid vehicles on the
I-10W were purchased because of the CAVS policy. However, as (Shewmake
& Jarvis, 2011) note, roughly two-thirds of all stickers were distributed to hy-
brid vehicles registered before the start of the CAVS policy, suggesting the pri-
mary welfare gain may be smaller.49 By contrast, the interaction effects of the
policy are substantially larger. The cost-side congestion interaction effect from
increased HOV lane congestion is substantial and is estimated to be approxi-
mately -$4.0 million per year.50 The rent effect associated with HOV lane access
48The welfare calculations rely on the estimates from Sections 2.5 and 2.6, additional PeMS
and Caltrans data, as well as parameters from the literature. Table 5 displays these parameters,
with additional discussion of parameter choices in Appendix B. Travel time and flow are linked
following (Burger & Kaffine, n.d.) and discussed in Appendix B. Confidence intervals are gen-
erated from the standard errors of the hourly travel time effects in Table 2. All calculations in
Table 6 (including emissions effects) are for a one-way commute on the I-10W. The results in
Section 2.6 suggest that the policy would have a similar effect on travel time and emissions on
other core freeways throughout Los Angeles. The end-of-policy results in Section 2.6 are slightly
larger than those from the beginning of the policy. We use the beginning-of-policy estimates as
a lower bound and report welfare effects using the end-of-policy estimates in Appendix E Ta-
ble E.26. At the conclusion of this section, we present back-of-the-envelope calculations of the
statewide effect of the CAVS policy.
49Furthermore, (Diamond, n.d.) and (Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011) find no evidence that the
CAVS policy stimulated hybrid purchases, implying emissions savings and the primary welfare
gain may be near zero.
50These values are an upper bound on congestion costs if some marginal carpoolers broke
their carpools. However, it is unlikely that this represents a significant effect, as our estimates
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for hybrids is $672,000 per year.51 The system-wide congestion interaction ef-
fect for all other drivers in the transportation system is upper-bounded at $1.7
million dollars per year, representing the partial equilibrium congestion relief
benefit for I-10W mainline drivers.52 Finally, the emissions interaction effects
arising from induced VMT are very small, at -$6,275 annually for greenhouse
gas emissions, -$714 for NOx emissions, and -$251 for hydrocarbons.53 Thus,
the congestion costs arising from the policy interaction dominate the overall
welfare effect. Given the large negative effects of the policy on congestion, sen-
sitivity analysis in Appendix B finds that varying relevant parameters within
reasonable distributions does not affect the key finding that the overall welfare
impacts are negative. Because congestion is not priced, policies that exacerbate
the congestion externality increase the cost of clean technology promotion. This
is particularly true in congested areas like LA, as adding a car to the HOV lane
requires either an occupancy of 10 people or a solo hybrid driver with a value
of time of $200 in order to compensate for the congestion externality generated.
Second, Table 6 illustrates the distributional costs of the policy. The CAVS policy
reduced welfare for the average carpooler by $176 dollars per year. In contrast,
dividing the rent effect by the 904 hybrids per day estimated to use the I-10
of the number of hybrids entering the HOV lane based on increased travel time are consistent
with physical hybrid counts conducted by Caltrans.
51Small, Winston and Yan (2005) find that drivers may be willing to pay for increased reli-
ability of travel times. Following their procedure, an additional reliability benefit of $100,000-
$150,000 per year is created. On the other hand, hybrid owners entering the HOV lane will
decrease reliability for carpoolers. Due to the relatively small magnitude of benefits and offset-
ting effects, we exclude reliability benefits and focus on travel time.
52This upper-bound is likely to be a substantial overestimate. Estimates in Section 2.6 find ev-
idence of induced demand, implying that either hybrids originated from less congested trans-
portation options or drivers re-optimized their travel decisions and replaced exiting hybrids.
53Greenhouse gas emissions from induced new VMT (agents induced to drive by the absence
of hybrid vehicles in the mainline) are calculated to be 300 tons, a small increase equivalent
to the yearly emissions of 50 average fuel-economy vehicles. Similarly, NOx and hydrocarbon
emissions increased by a slight 0.05 and 0.06 tons.
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HOV gives a maximum rent per sticker of $743 dollars per year.54 These rents
were most likely appropriated by hybrid owners. Two-thirds of stickers were
distributed to hybrids registered before the policy, and despite the supply con-
straint, the remaining rents were likely captured by hybrid purchasers rather
than dealers or manufacturers, similar to the concurrent tax credits studied by
(Sallee, n.d.). We highlight several key findings related to the distributional im-
pacts: First, while total carpooler congestion cost substantially outweighs hy-
brid benefits, the cost per individual carpooler is relatively small and less than
the rents generated per sticker. Second, as hybrid owners are wealthier than
the average carpooler, this policy is likely to be regressive. Finally, the diffuse
costs spread across nearly 22,000 daily carpoolers and the concentrated bene-
fits of the policy may have enabled policy approval and subsequent extension.
Third, we also calculate the costs of transferring $1 dollar to hybrid owners. The
transfer ratio is at minimum 3.31 with a maximum of 8.87, implying a striking
cost of roughly $3-9 dollars to transfer $1 dollar of benefit per hybrid.55 Alter-
natively, hybrid tax credits could be used to stimulate hybrid purchases. Such a
credit could be financed through taxes, at a cost of approximately $1.40 per dol-
lar transferred, at a standard labor tax marginal excess burden of 0.4 (Browning,
n.d.). While access to HOV lanes is very valuable, the large number of HOV
lane users and heavy preexisting congestion implies substantial costs are cre-
54To validate our assumption that there are a large number of households who are indifferent
between hybrid and regular vehicle ownership prior to the policy, we investigated what this
value would imply for the premium a household is willing to pay for a hybrid with a sticker.
Doubling the $743 dollars a year benefits (for a two-way commute) and privately discount-
ing it (5 percent) over the initially proposed life of the policy gives a net present value of the
sticker of $4,800 on the I-10W. Our derived value is similar to that presented in (Shewmake
& Jarvis, 2011), who estimate an average premium of $3,200 for a stickered hybrid, as well as
suggestions of a $3,000-$5,000 premium for a stickered hybrid from some in the auto industry
(http://hffo.cuna.org/12433/ article/2599/html).
55The lower bound of 3.31 assumes that hybrid drivers appropriated all the rents and includes
congestion relief, while the upper bound of 8.87 assumes that manufacturers appropriated one-
third of the rent and excludes congestion relief. Using the end of policy estimates, the bounds
increase to 4.20 and 11.26.
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ated when transferring benefits to hybrids via the CAVS policy. Finally, under
the most optimistic scenario for the CAVS policy every sticker stimulated a
hybrid purchase and induced demand does not occur we generate back-of-
the-envelope-calculations of the statewide cost per ton of emission reductions.
Because the I-10W is a particularly congested freeway, it may be inappropri-
ate to simply apply the estimated welfare effects calculated above. Appendix
B presents our methodology for the back-of-the-envelope calculation and sen-
sitivity analysis on key parameters. We find that the best-case cost per ton of
GHG emissions reductions is $124 per ton, with costs per ton of NOx and hy-
drocarbon reductions of $606,000 dollars and $505,000 dollars.56 Even under
this extremely generous scenario, this is roughly an order of magnitude larger
than estimates of the marginal social cost of GHG emissions and substantially
larger than other emission control options.57
2.8 Conclusion
This paper employs a regression discontinuity design to estimate the interaction
effect between the Clean Air Vehicle Sticker policy and unpriced congestion in
56To the extent that the end-of-policy estimates in Section 2.6 are suggestive of larger policy
impacts on flow and thus congestion costs, scaling up the cost of GHG reductions accordingly
yields a GHG cost per ton of $160. Accounting for the fact that it is unlikely that all stickers
stimulated purchases of hybrid vehicles will raise the cost per ton; removing the two-thirds of
stickers received by preregistered hybrids increases the GHG cost to $482 per ton. On the other
hand, using mean estimates of the effect of early adoption on mainstreaming hybrid adoption
(0.6 additional purchases of hybrids per early adopter) from (Heutel & Muehlegger, 2010), the
cost per ton would fall to $310.
57California Assembly Bill 32 Scoping Plan is a comprehensive study of the cost of reducing
greenhouse gases prepared by the California Air Resources Board. The Scoping Report con-
sidered a wide-range of policies, with estimated costs per ton of emissions ranging from -$300
for greenhouse gas standards for vehicles, to $300 for additional solar water heaters. (Chandra,
Gulati, & Kandlikar, n.d.) estimate that the cost of GHG emissions reductions from tax rebates
for hybrid drivers was $195 per ton, while (Li, Linn, & Spiller, n.d.) estimate that the Cash-for-
Clunkers program reduced greenhouse gas emissions at a cost of $91-$301 per ton.
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Los Angeles. Although policies that allow single-occupant hybrid vehicles in
HOV lanes are viewed as a free method to stimulate hybrid demand, we pro-
vide evidence that the CAVS policy in California resulted in substantial welfare
losses. We show that the losses from the interaction between the policy and un-
priced congestion overwhelmingly dominated the primary welfare gain from
increased environmental benefits associated with the adoption of new hybrid
vehicles. Our results also underscore the remarkable variation of the interac-
tion effect across space and time, whereby adding one daily hybrid driver at
7AM on the I-10W generates $4500 in annual social costs. When incorporated
into a welfare analysis, our econometric estimates imply a best-case cost of $124
per ton for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, $606,000 dollars per ton
of nitrogen oxides (NOx) reduction, and $505,000 dollars per ton of hydrocar-
bon reduction in the most optimistic case. These are substantially above other
readily available options to policymakers. The results presented here have im-
portant implications for policy. Given the substantial cost of the CAVS policy, at
a minimum it is worth considering alternative policies that may have achieved
similar goals at lower cost. While a hybrid tax credit would cost taxpayers $1.40
per dollar transferred to hybrid owners, this cost increases to $3.31-$8.87 under
the CAVS policy. Therefore tax credit incentives funded through distortionary
taxes would be preferred to the CAVS policy despite its perception of being
free. Earlier literature on environmental policy in a second best setting high-
lighted the superiority of revenue-raising instruments over nonrevenue raising
instruments (Goulder et al., 1997). In our context, a natural option would be to
auction the stickers to hybrid drivers. In this case, recycling auctioned revenues
broadly by cutting preexisting distortions would only reduce the costs per dol-
lar transferred to hybrid owners to $2.91-$8.47. If revenues were instead used to
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compensate the carpoolers in full, hybrid drivers value of time would need to
be in excess of $200/hour to raise enough revenues to offset carpoolers for the
value of lost travel time. Whether auctioned or not, the major source of the inef-
ficiency of the CAVS stickers comes from the fact that this policy is blind to the
heterogeneity of the external costs of congestion across time and space. Alter-
natively, policymakers could ration HOV access via congestion pricing. Ideally,
a High Occupancy Toll (HOT) could consider both the external costs of conges-
tion and air pollution. While the emissions discount for hybrid vehicles would
be invariant across space and time (roughly 0.7 cents/mile), the congestion fee
itself would still adjust to reflect prevailing congestion conditions, as in (Keeler
& Small, 1977). For example, on the I-10W during peak periods, the congestion
fee would be roughly 45 cents/mile.58 The fact that the congestion fee would be
at least 60 times higher than the discount to hybrid vehicles underscores the sig-
nificance of the interaction effect studied here. Moving forward, policymakers
are already replacing CAVS with new policies to promote the adoption of plug-
in hybrids. Starting January 2012 40,000 stickers were issued to plug-in hybrid
vehicles allowing them to drive in HOV lanes. They have also allowed for an
unlimited number of stickers for electric, zero emissions vehicles. More broadly,
our findings imply that, even if these vehicles were truly zero-emission, promot-
ing their adoption at the expense of exacerbating congestion will still generate
substantial welfare losses. In contrast, promoting the use of buses in HOV lanes,
although a far less celebrated technology, may represent the win-win in terms of
pollution and congestion that policymakers were hoping with the CAVS policy.
58The discount per mile for hybrid drivers reflects the fact that the emissions reduction bene-
fits they generate are time and space invariant. The congestion fee per mile varies with the level
of congestion, and is calculated as the cost per mile delay imposed on other drivers.
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Figure 2.1: PeMS Detectors in District 7
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Figure 2.2: Average Travel Time by Hour
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Figure 2.3: Interstate 10 West Travel Time
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Detector Level RD Estimates for Flow
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Detector Level RD Estimates for Flow
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Figure 2.6: Welfare Effects of the CAVS Policy
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Table 2.1: Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Global Polynomial Results
I II III IV V VI
Polynomial order 6 7 8 9 10 BIC
Morning peak
CAVS policy/ HOV 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.116*** 0.116***
-0.026 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026
CAVS policy/ Mainline -0.011 -0.022 0.06 0.06 0.070* 0.06
-0.049 -0.053 -0.051 -0.051 -0.049 -0.051
Observations 4944 4944 4944 4944 4944 4944
P-Value for Induced Demanda 0.823 0.989 0.112 0.146 0.052 0.093
P-Value for Test of
Difference between
HOV and Mainline
0.084 0.088 0.607 0.77 0.41 0.332
Afternoon peak
CAVS policy/ HOV 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.067*** 0.062***
-0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.024 -0.015
CAVS policy/ Mainline -0.001 0.004 0.059* 0.059* 0.055 0.059*
-0.031 -0.028 -0.036 -0.036 -0.037 -0.036
Observations 3952 3952 3952 3952 3952 3952
P-Value for Induced Demanda 0.64 0.472 0.051 0.051 0.062 0.046
P-Value for Test of
Difference between
HOV and Mainline
0.1 0.087 0.963 0.973 0.782 0.934
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Table 2.2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Global Polynomial Results
Mid-day off-peak
CAVS policy/ HOV 0.048** 0.050** 0.027 0.027 0.041 0.041**
-0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
CAVS policy/ Mainline -0.064 -0.063 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009
-0.042 -0.042 -0.049 -0.051 -0.051 -0.05
Observations 5927 5927 5927 5927 5927 5927
P-Value for Induced Demand 0.227 0.24 0.975 0.969 0.955 0.975
P-Value for Test of
Difference between
HOV and Mainline
0.021 0.021 0.511 0.518 0.386 0.363
Night off-peak
CAVS policy/ HOV 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.022*** 0.022***
-0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
CAVS policy/ Mainline -0.008 -0.005 0.016 0.017 0.023 0.023
-0.019 -0.017 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
Observations 8894 8894 8894 8894 8894 8894
P-Value for Induced Demand 0.976 0.836 0.361 0.343 0.197 0.197
P-Value for Test of
Difference between
HOV and Mainline
0.062 0.055 0.971 0.964 0.992 0.992
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Table 2.3: Hourly Global Polynomial Regression Discontinuity Estimates
I II III IV V VI
Morning peak
5 A.M. 6 A.M. 7 A.M. 8 A.M. 9 A.M. 10 A.M.a
Policy (HOV) 0.027 0.088** 0.096** 0.125*** 0.122 0.072*
-0.025 -0.04 -0.042 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038
Observations 989 989 989 988 989 988
Afternoon peak
4 P.M. 5 P.M. 6 P.M. 7 P.M. 8 P.M.a
Policy (HOV) 0.045 0.060** 0.082*** 0.038 0.007
-0.027 -0.024 -0.028 -0.025 -0.017
Observations 988 988 988 988 988
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Table 2.4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Further Robustness Checks
I II III IV V VI
Morning Peak
True Date Placebo Weekend Macroeconomic
Policy (HOV) 0.090*** -0.006 -0.073* 0.002 0.091*** 0.102***
-0.028 -0.034 -0.039 -0.014 -0.027 -0.035
Observations 4944 4944 4944 1980 4944
Policy (Mainline) 0.06 -0.008 -0.024 0.011 0.06 0.048
-0.045 -0.032 -0.06 -0.02 -0.045 -0.036
Observations 4944 4944 4944 1980 4944 9888
Afternoon Peak
True Date Placebo Weekend Macroeconomic
Policy (HOV) 0.057*** -0.032 -0.006 0.023 0.056*** 0.081***
-0.022 -0.025 -0.029 -0.043 -0.021 -0.026
Observations 3952 3952 3952 1584 3952
Policy (Mainline) 0.059* -0.042** 0.04 0.023 0.059* 0.034
-0.035 -0.021 -0.048 -0.046 -0.034 -0.027
Observations 3952 3952 3952 1584 3952 7904
Policy date 8/20/05 8/20/04 8/20/06 8/20/05 8/20/05 8/20/05
L.A. Unemployment N N N N Y Y
Pooled, single trend N N N N N Y
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Table 2.5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Further Robustness Checks
I II III IV V VI
Mid-Day Off Peak
True Date Placebo Weekend Macroeconomic
Policy (HOV) 0.027 -0.017 -0.002 -0.02 0.027 0.028
-0.021 -0.027 -0.03 -0.031 -0.021 -0.031
Observations 5928 5928 5928 2376 5928
Policy (Mainline) -0.008 -0.028 0.048 -0.02 -0.008 -0.009
-0.049 -0.026 -0.058 -0.038 -0.048 -0.036
Observations 5927 5927 5927 2376 5927 11855
Night Off Peak
True Date Placebo Weekend Macroeconomic
Policy (HOV) 0.016** -0.003 -0.008 0.008 0.015** 0.039***
-0.007 -0.01 -0.012 -0.019 -0.007 -0.02
Observations 8894 8894 8894 3554 8894
Policy (Mainline) 0.016 -0.005 -0.014 0.002 0.017 -0.007
-0.022 -0.006 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.014
Observations 8894 8894 8894 3554 8894 17788
Policy date 8/20/05 8/20/04 8/20/06 8/20/05 8/20/05 8/20/05
L.A. Unemployment N N N N Y Y
Pooled, single trend N N N N N Y
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Table 2.6: Average of Local Linear Treatment Effects by Distance from CBD
I II III IV
Distance from CBD 0-10 10-20 20-30 0-30
Start of Policy
CAVS policy/ HOV 0.091** 0.058** -0.009 0.055**
-0.028 -0.029 -0.102 -0.025
Detectorsa 50 124 26 200
Observationsb 8,297 20,662 4,110 33,069
Flowc 915 845 686 842
CAVS policy/ Mainline 0.015 0.008 0.021 0.012
-0.017 -0.03 -0.022 -0.017
Detectorsa 152 254 71 477
Observationsb 24,461 40,863 10,682 76,006
Flowc 5,108 5,248 4,616 5,109
P-value test of difference in HOV and
Mainline
0.019 0.127 0.35 0.186
Implied Number of Vehicles Removed
from Mainlined
-83 -49 6 -46
Mainline Null Hypothesis without In-
duced Demande
-0.016 -0.009 0.001 -0.009
P-value for test of Induced Demandf 0.07 0.556 0.393 0.211
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Table 2.7: Average of Local Linear Treatment Effects by Distance from CBD
I II III IV
Distance from CBD 0-10 10-20 20-30 0-30
End of Policy
CAVS policy/ HOV 0.088*** 0.048* 0.116*** 0.071***
-0.025 -0.024 -0.043 -0.018
Detectorsa 21 46 15 82
Observationsb 3,579 7,677 2,409 13,665
Flowc 917 885 557 833
CAVS policy/ Mainline 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.007
-0.008 -0.005 -0.013 -0.005
Detectorsa 74 131 44 249
Observationsb 12,674 22,441 7,040 42,155
Flowc 5,078 5,195 4,568 5,049
P-value test of difference in HOV and
Mainline
0.001 0.102 0.021 0.001
Implied Number of Vehicles Removed
from Mainlined
-81 -42 -65 -59
Mainline Null Hypothesis without In-
duced Demande
-0.016 -0.008 -0.014 -0.012
P-value for test of Induced Demandf 0.02 0.002 0.048 0
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Table 2.8: Additional Welfare Analysis Parameters
Value Source
I-10W route length 17.5 miles PeMS
Value of time (Hybrid drivers) $32.86 Small, Winston, and Yan (2005)
Value of time (Carpoolers) $20.87 Small, Winston, and Yan (2005)
I-10W HOV lane occupancy per vehicle 3.1 Caltrans
I-10W mainline occupancy per vehicle 1.1 Caltrans
Elasticity of new VMT (short-run) 0.15 Hymel, Small, and Van Dender
(2010)
Hybrid fuel efficiency 45 mpg EPA
Fleet fuel efficiency 20 mpg EPA
Hybrid NOx emissions per mile 0.02 grams CA SULEV standards
Hybrid hydrocarbon emissions per mile 0.01 grams CA SULEV standards
Fleet NOx emissions per mile 0.07 grams EPA Tier II standards
Fleet hydrocarbon emissions per mile 0.09 grams EPA Tier II standards
Marginal social damage of GHG
emissions
$21/ton US Interagency Working Group
Marginal social damage of NOx emis-
sions
$15,000/ton Small and Kazimi (1995)
Marginal social damage of hydrocar-
bon emissions
$4,100 Small and Kazimi (1995)
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Table 2.9: Welfare Effects of the CAVS Policy for the I-10 West
Panel A Welfare Effects Annual Present Value
Primary welfare gain $28,127 $283,449
Cost-side congestion interaction effect -3,990,620 -21,495,008
[-$7,024,200, -$936,100]
Rent effect 671,882 2,363,240
[$186,650, $1,153,750]
System-wide congestion interaction effect 1,744,620 9,397,209
[$423,500, $3,057,000]
Emissions interaction effect -7,240 -38,998
Net welfare effect of the CAVS policy for the I-10W -1,553,225 -8,366,274
[-$2,776,700, -$321,200]
Excluding system-wide congestion interaction effect -3,297,846 -17,763,483
[-$5,829,700, -$750,000]
Panel B Distributional Effects
Carpoolers using I-10W HOV lane (daily) 21,943 -
Hybrids using I-10W HOV lane (daily) 904 -
Congestion cost per carpooler -176 -948
Rent per stickera $743 $4,002
Transfer ratio- lower bound 3.31 -
[2.86, 3.46]
Transfer ratio- upper bound 8.87 -
[8.09, 9.07]
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CHAPTER 3
IS THERE AN ENERGY PARADOX IN FUEL ECONOMY? A NOTE ON
THE ROLE OF CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY AND SORTING BIAS
3.1 Introduction
Although economic theory suggests that rational consumers should be willing
to pay $1.00 more for a vehicle that saves them $1.00 in discounted future fuel
costs, a growing body of literature finds a marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP)
for reduced discounted future fuel costs ranging from $0.35 to $0.79 (Helfand &
Wolverton, 2011; D. Greene et al., n.d.). This perceived undervaluation of future
fuel costs is an example of an energy paradox in the automobile market. En-
ergy paradox is a general concept used to explain the unexpectedly slow diffu-
sion of apparently cost-effective, energy-efficient technologies that involve sim-
ilar trade-offs between up-front capital costs and future operating costs (Jaffe &
Stavins, 1994). Such a paradox may exist in automobiles and other energy-using
durables (Hausman, 1979).1
With increasing concerns related to climate change, energy security, and lo-
cal pollution, many have used this potential market failure to justify policies
that promote efficiency-improving technology. Policies that encourage even a
small correction in this paradox have the potential to result in sizable decreases
in energy use and its related externalities. The magnitude and sources of this
paradox have broad implications for any technology that uses energy. In the
automobile sector, some of this interest has focused on the debate between the
1The typical magnitude of the energy paradox in appliances requires discount rates of 20%
although estimates vary widely (see (Hausman, 1979), (Dubin & McFadden, 1984), (Ruderman,
Levine, & McMahon, 1987)).
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gasoline tax and corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, as well as
the design of future CAFE standards. Precise estimates of the MWTP for re-
duced discounted future fuel costs are central to this debate (Parry et al., 2010).
If consumers correctly value future fuel costs, gasoline taxes are found to be less
costly than CAFE standards in achieving targeted fuel reductions (Fischer, Har-
rington, & Parry, 2007; M. R. Jacobsen, 2012b). However, the opposite is true if
consumer undervaluation is sufficiently large. Although we focus on the auto-
mobile market, this note has implications for the valuation of energy efficiency
in a very broad category of purchases.
Our concern with prior literature is that it has often examined the energy
paradox ignoring the underlying consumer heterogeneity in MWTP for future
reductions in fuel costs. If consumers are heterogeneous in their MWTP, they
will sort into vehicles based on vehicle fuel efficiency: those with high MWTP
for reduced fuel costs will sort into fuel-efficient vehicles and those with low
MWTP will sort into fuel-inefficient ones. We show in this paper that ignoring
consumer heterogeneity in the MWTP for future fuel cost in a (multinomial)
logit specification could result in heteroskedasticity and bias the estimate of the
MWTP toward zero, suggesting spurious undervaluation. The purpose of this
note is not to argue whether there is undervaluation of fuel economy or not.
Rather our point is that an empirical analysis that ignores consumer hetero-
geneity may overstate the magnitude of undervaluation. Similar concerns of
bias due to sorting were raised in a recent study of the value of a statistical life
using labor market data (DeLeire, Khan, & Timmins, 2013).
In Section 3.2, we analytically illustrate the potential for bias from ignoring
consumer preference heterogeneity in future fuel cost in a simplified multino-
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mial logit framework. In Section 3.3, we provide further evidence with simu-
lations in a richer model of vehicle demand. In doing the simulations, we first
generate data from an equilibrium model of the automobile market and then try
to recover the average MTWP for fuel cost using a logit model and a random
coefficient logit model.2 Our analysis shows that, when undervaluation of fuel
costs is not present in the data-generating mechanism, the logit model could er-
roneously suggest significant undervaluation, whereas the random coefficients
logit model recovers the true average MWTP.
3.2 Bias Analysis from Ignoring Preference Heterogeneity
, In the context of vehicle demand, we assume that each consumer chooses to
buy a new vehicle, from among J models or products, or not to make any pur-
chase (labeled choosing the outside good) in a given period. For ease of ex-
position, we assume that the utility of consumer i from vehicle choice j only
depends on a single dimension of vehicle characteristics, fuel cost ( f c). We relax
this assumption in the simulations below. The utility of consumer i from vehicle
j is
ui j = βi f c j + i j (3.1)
where the heterogeneous preference βi has a mean β and variance σβ . i j has an
i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution (conditional on f c j) with a variance of
σ = pi
2/6. The utility function can be rewritten as:
ui j = β f c j + βi f c j + i j = β f c j + ei j (3.2)
2Given that consumers have multiple vehicle models from which to choose, the empirical
methods are multinomial logit models, but we suppress the word multinomial to save space
throughout our paper.
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where the variance of the composite error ei j, var(ei j| f c j) = σ2β f c2j + σ2 . Because
ei j exhibits heteroskedasticity, the underlying i.i.d. assumption of ei j would be
violated if one is to estimate β using the multinomial logit. To analyze bias of the
parameters estimated from the multinomial logit model due to heteroskedastic-
ity, we scale the utility and rewrite (2) as
ui jσ√
σ2β f c
2
j + σ
2

=
β f c jσ√
σ2β f c
2
j + σ
2

+
ei jσ√
σ2β f c
2
j + σ
2

(3.3)
ui j =
β f c jσ√
σ2β f c
2
j + σ
2

+ ei j (3.4)
= β f c j +
 β f c jσ√σ2β f c2j + σ2 − β f c j
 + ei j (3.5)
= β f c j + β f c j
 σ√σ2β f c2j + σ2 − 1
 + ei j (3.6)
The normalization makes ei j homoscedastic with a variance of pi2/6 . Equa-
tion (3.4) has re-casted the issue of heteroskedasticity to that of omitted vari-
able in a discrete choice model: estimating β using the multinomial logit model
ignoring heteroskedasticity based on equation (3.2) leads to the same prob-
lem as estimating β based on the last line in equation (3.4) while ignoring
z j = β f c j
[
σ√
σ2β f c
2
j+σ
2

− 1
]
. The omitted variable z j is positive as long as σ2β is not
equal to zero (assuming β to be negative). It is positively correlated with Follow-
ing (L.-F. Lee, 1982) and (Yatchew & Griliches, 1985) which analyze the omitted
variable bias in discrete choice models, the estimate of β from the multinomial
logit model would be biased upward (toward zero). Moreover, a larger σ2β im-
plies a smaller σ√
σ2β f c
2
j+σ
2

(closer to zero), and a stronger correlation between z j
and f c j, therefore, the bias would be larger as well. The following two issues
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would add complications to the above analysis. First, the omitted variable in-
troduces possible misspecification into the multinomial logit model. Second, a
utility function with more vehicle characteristics as defined in equation (3.7) in
the next section adds confounding factors to the bias in β when other vehicle
characteristics are correlated with the fuel cost variable. Nevertheless, the bias
analyzed above is likely to be the dominant issue in addressing our research
question. Because the bias does not have a closed-form solution due to the non-
linear nature of the model even in the simple specification analyzed above, next
we use Monte Carlo simulations that incorporate those two issues to provide
further support.
3.3 Simulations
3.3.1 The Equilibrium Model of Automobile Market
The equilibrium model for data generation is composed of a demand side and
a supply side. In the demand side, the utility of consumer i from vehicle j is
defined as
ui j = αip j + βi f ci j + βi f c j + γix j + i j (3.7)
where α, beta, and γ are individual-specific taste parameters. We define θ =
{αi, βi, γi}. p j is price of model j. f ci j is the present value of the total expected
discounted fuel cost of the vehicle; it is defined by
f ci j =
T j∑
t=0
δti ∗ AVMTit j ∗ gpeit/MPG j (3.8)
where T j is the expected lifetime of vehicle model j, δi is an individual-specific
discount factor, AVMTit j is annual vehicle miles of travel in year t (which usually
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decreases with the vehicles age), and gpeit is the expected gasoline price at year t
of consumer i. Heterogeneity can arise from any of the elements used to calcu-
late the lifetime fuel cost of the vehicle. x j is a vector of other vehicle attributes,
and i j is assumed to have a type I extreme value distribution. We normalize
the utility from the outside good, ui0, to zero. The probability of household i
choosing vehicle j is given by
Pi j =
exp(ui j)
1 +
∑
jt exp(ui j)
(3.9)
where ui j = ui j−i j. Given individual choice probabilities, the aggregate demand
can be obtained through summation. The supply side is composed of several
firms, each producing multiple vehicle models. They engage in Bertrand com-
petition in that each firm chooses prices to maximize its total profit in a given
year, taking the products available as fixed. Following the literature, we assume
that the marginal cost of each product is constant. The total profit of firm f is
pi f =
∑
f∈F
[(p j − mc j)q j(p, θ)] (3.10)
where F is the set of all products produced by firm f , mc j is the marginal cost,
and q j is the aggregate demand. p is the price vector and it is obtained through
the first-order conditions in equilibrium
p = mc + ∆−1q(p, θ) (3.11)
where the element of ∆, ∆ jr is zero if j and r are produced by different firms.
Otherwise, it is equal to ∂qr/∂p j . Given the underlying preference parameters
and marginal cost, this equation can be used to compute equilibrium prices and
sales.
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3.3.2 Data Generation
Through our data generation approach, we aim to mimic the U.S. auto mar-
ket. Vehicle information comes from the 2001 Wards Automotive Yearbook; ve-
hicle characteristics include miles per gallon (MPG), horsepower, weight, and
manufacturer. We construct marginal cost, a function of MPG, horsepower, and
weight, for each model based on estimates from (Berry et al., 1996).3 We ran-
domly choose a set of vehicle models (25 in the baseline simulation) and as-
sume that these models are available in each year from 2001 to 2006, the time
span for our analysis. For ease of exposition, we make several demand-side
assumptions. For preference parameters, we assume that all consumers have
the same preference on all characteristics except fuel costs. In calculating fuel
costs, we assume that the discount factor δ, annual vehicle miles of traveled
AVMT , and expected gasoline price gpe are all constant across consumers for
any given vehicle. We assume a 10% yearly discount rate. Vehicle lifetime and
age-specific annual miles of travel for passenger cars and light trucks are from
(Lu, 2006). We further assume that expected gasoline prices during a vehicles
lifetime are equal to current annual gasoline price (i.e., gasoline price follows
a random walk (Anderson, Kellogg, Sallee, & Curtin, 2011)). Annual gasoline
prices during 20012006 are from the Energy Information Administration. These
simplifying assumptions, innocuous for our conclusion, imply that consumer
heterogeneity is manifested only through the consumer-specific taste parame-
ter on fuel cost, βi. In the baseline simulation, we assume that βi has a uniform
distribution; the range of the distribution affects the degree of consumer hetero-
geneity. We choose two levels of dispersion for the taste parameter [-4, 0], and [-
3We also add a random error term to the marginal cost of each attribute and to the marginal
cost of each product based on the standard errors estimated by (Berry et al., 1996). All costs are
converted to 2001 dollars.
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3,-1]. (Anderson, Kellogg, et al., 2011) using survey data examine the dispersion
of predicted gasoline price, defined as the standard deviation of the predictions
divided by the mean. They find this dispersion ranges from 30 to 60% in recent
years, which roughly correspond to the dispersion of the two uniform distribu-
tions, noting that our distribution assumptions are different. Heterogeneity on
discount rates, VMT and vehicle lifetime will further increase the dispersion on
the parameter, βi.
We generate data in two steps. First, we generate equilibrium prices for each
model, assuming the whole market with 50,000 consumers in each year. Second,
based on equilibrium prices, we generate vehicle choices for 20,000 consumers
in each year. The choices of these consumers as well as equilibrium prices are
taken as data for the estimation.
3.3.3 Estimation
The goal of the estimation is to recover the underlying preference parameters
and to obtain consumers MWTP for reduced fuel costs. For ease of exposition,
we assume that the econometrician observes all vehicle characteristics relevant
to consumers.4 We employ two methods: a logit model and a random coeffi-
cients logit model. The logit model is estimated using the standard maximum
likelihood method. As discussed in Train (2003), the appeal of the random coef-
ficients model comes from its ability to incorporate unobserved consumer het-
erogeneity, which in our context avoids sorting bias. This model is estimated
using the simulated maximum likelihood method. To conduct numerical inte-
4In real applications, it is important to control for unobserved product attributes. Most recent
literature on the energy paradox has explicitly dealt with this issue.
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gration in the simulated method, we employ Halton sequences, which are more
efficient than direct Monte Carlo sampling.
3.3.4 Results
We find three main results from the Monte Carlo analysis. Result 1: In the pres-
ence of heterogeneity, the logit model suggests undervaluation of the MWTP
for reduced future fuel costs, even when undervaluation is not present in the
data. Support: Panel A in Table 1 shows that consumers undervalue fuel costs
by 29%. The parameter estimates on vehicle price and fuel cost implies that
consumers are only willing to pay $0.71 for a $1.00 reduction in discounted fu-
ture fuel costs. The bias comes from individuals sorting into vehicles based on
their MWTP: those very averse to fuel costs (e.g., with very negative MWTP)
purchase vehicles with low fuel costs. The correlation between fuel cost and
the average MWTP among consumers who purchase corresponding vehicles is
depicted on the left panel of Figure 1 (the correlation coefficient is 0.83). We be-
lieve that at least part of the undervaluation found in prior literature could be
attributable to this type of sorting bias.
Result 2: The random coefficients logit model correctly identifies the MWTP.
Support: Table 1, Panel A shows that, by explicitly modeling consumer hetero-
geneity, the random coefficients logit model is able to recover the underlying
parameters on vehicle price and fuel cost. The implied MWTP is 1, indicating
that consumers are willing to pay $1.00 for a $1.00 reduction in discounted fu-
ture fuel costs, consistent with our model assumption.
Result 3: The greater the heterogeneity, the larger the bias from the logit
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model. Support: The underlying data-generating process in Panel A of Table 1
implies twice the heterogeneity of Panel B. As a consequence, the undervalua-
tion for the logit model in Panel A, 29%, is larger than the 10% undervaluation
in Panel B. Table 2 presents Monte Carlo results for alternative specifications.
Panel A suggests that increased market power magnifies the bias from the logit
model, with the undervaluation going to 37% from 29% in the baseline model
in Table 1. Increasing the number of vehicle draws (Table 2, Panel B) slightly
decreases the undervaluation from 29% to 27%. The three findings discussed
above still hold when the distribution of MWTP takes a log-normal distribution
(Table 2, Panel C).
3.4 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that, if not accounted for, unobserved consumer hetero-
geneity can significantly affect the estimated MWTP for discounted future fuel
costs. We believe that this may partly explain consumer undervaluation of fu-
ture fuel costs and the wide range of estimates found in the literature. Here we
have modeled consumer heterogeneity through the valuation of fuel economy.
However, this is only one of many potential ways of representing consumer het-
erogeneity. For example, the heterogeneity could also arise from expected future
fuel costs. While ignoring this source of heterogeneity would create a similar
bias as the one identified in this paper, the implications for policy (whether or
not there are consumer mistakes that constitute market failure) may be different.
To properly evaluate the existence, source and magnitude of the energy para-
dox, further econometric analysis that explicitly models consumer heterogene-
ity from multiple sources by using random coefficient models in either a discrete
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choice or hedonic framework (e.g., (Berry et al., 1995); (Bajari & Benkard, 2005)),
are needed.
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Figure 3.1: Fuel Cost and Average Marginal Willingness to Pay among
Buyers
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Table 3.1: Monte Carlo Results
TRUE Estimates
Panel A: baseline model Logit Random coef. logit
Para S.E. Para S.E.
Constant 1 0.6 0.05 1.05 0.07
Price 2 2.02 0.01 2.00 0.01
Fuel cost 2 1.43 0.03 2.01 0.07
Weight 4 4.49 0.15 3.83 0.17
Horsepower 8 7.68 0.14 8.18 0.15
Sigmaa 4 4.18 0.26
Log-likelihood 228,335 228,268
Implied valuation for $1 drop in
fuel cost
$0.71 $1.00
Implied undervaluation 29%
Panel B: smaller heterogeneity Logit Random coef. logit
Para S.E. Para S.E.
Onstant 1 0.93 0.05 1.08 0.06
Price 2 2.01 0.01 2.01 0.01
Fuel cost 2 1.82 0.03 2.03 0.06
Weight 4 3.99 0.15 3.8 0.16
Horsepower 8 8.05 0.14 8.21 0.14
Sigmaa 2 2.31 0.31
Log-likelihood 225,942 225,933
Implied valuation for $1 drop in
fuel cost
$0.90 $1.01
Implied undervaluation 10%
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Table 3.2: Robustness Checks
TRUE Estimates
Panel A: monopoly instead of
oligopoly
Logit Random coef. logit
Para S.E. Para S.E.
Constant 1 0.62 0.06 1.1 0.09
Price 2 2.02 0.02 2.01 0.02
Fuel cost 2 1.27 0.03 2.14 0.14
Weight 4 4.38 0.19 3.8 0.21
Horsepower 8 7.86 0.18 8.32 0.19
Sigma 4 4.55 0.42
Log-likelihood 158,480 158,437
Implied valuation for $1 drop in
fuel cost
$0.63 $1.07
Implied undervaluation 37%
Panel B: 50 vehicle models in-
stead of 25
Logit Random coef. logit
Para S.E. Para S.E.
Constant 1 0.62 0.03 1 0.05
Price 2 2.02 0.01 2.00 0.01
Fuel cost 2 1.48 0.03 1.99 0.06
Weight 4 4.18 0.12 3.99 0.13
Horsepower 8 7.75 0.11 8.01 0.11
Sigma 4 4.01 0.21
Log-likelihood 326,436 326,351
Implied valuation for $1 drop in
fuel cost
$0.73 $1.01 $0.99
Implied undervaluation 27%
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CHAPTER 4
VEHICLE LIFETIME TRENDS AND SCRAPPAGE BEHAVIOR IN THE
U.S. USED CAR MARKET
This study examines scrappage patterns in passenger cars and light trucks in
the United States between 1969 and 1999. The transportation sector accounts
for 29% of all greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S., of which 79% are from pas-
senger vehicles (EPA, 2012). The magnitude of these emissions has prompted
regulators to implement gasoline taxes and increase the average fuel economy
of new vehicles using the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard.
Because 95% of all vehicles on the road are used vehicles, these policies have
the potential to have large consequences, intended or unintended, on emissions
from used vehicles. To properly evaluate the potential changes to the used ve-
hicle market, two parameters are needed: the average vehicle lifetime and an
elasticity of scrappage with respect to vehicle price. With relatively few stud-
ies of the used vehicle market, the parameters often chosen ignore how they
may change over time or are not well suited to model these types of policies.
Our study fills this gap by estimating these parameters and examines which are
stable over time and which are not. This helps to guide future analysis as our
estimates suggest that ignoring some dynamics in the used car market may be
more problematic than others. Our study estimates that vehicle lifetime has in-
creased, nearly 13% from 1969 to 1987, and that the scrappage elasticity with
respect to vehicle price is -0.83, which has remained relatively stable over time.
While the lifetime of vehicles has been estimated elsewhere, its increase has gen-
erally been ignored in policy analysis. Our estimate of the scrappage elasticity
with respect to vehicle price is also important, as the values of this parameter
commonly used are an order of magnitude more elastic. These omissions can
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have implications for many studies of the used vehicle market.
For example, while economists have advocated for federal carbon or gaso-
line taxes to reduce emissions from automobiles, policy makers continue to rely
upon the CAFE Standard, which imposes limits on the minimum average fuel
economy of the cars and trucks sold by each firm.1 While there is considerable
variation in the estimated cost of the CAFE standard, (M. R. Jacobsen, 2012b;
Klier & Linn, 2012b; Anderson & Sallee, 2011a) it is relatively expensive com-
pared with other options because it only regulates the new vehicle market and
relies on time to increase the fuel economy of the used vehicle market. The
increase in vehicle lifetime we estimate suggests that changes to the new car
market caused by CAFE will take longer to affect the used car market than ex-
pected. General equilibrium price adjustments also play a role in the compar-
ison of these policies. The CAFE standard decreases the supply of inefficient
vehicles increasing their value and unintentionally lengthening their lifetime
(Gruenspecht, 1982). Gasoline taxes, by contrast, disproportionally increase the
operating cost of inefficient vehicles, reducing their value and shortening their
lifespan (Bento et al., 2009). Comparing these policies requires a scrappage elas-
ticity with respect to vehicle price and with no direct estimates available in the
literature, these studies generally adopt values between -3 and -6.2 Our sub-
stantially more inelastic estimate of this parameter suggests a diminished role
1For much of the past few decades the standard for cars has been 27.5 mpg while it has been
20.7 for trucks. The standard must be met separately for the foreign and domestic fleets pro-
duced by a manufacturer. Recent changes to the CAFE standard allow for more flexible targets
based on the footprint of the vehicle and allow for some trading between firms. Problematically
CAFE standards can reduce the scrappage of inefficient used vehicles as substitution from the
more tightly regulated new car market increases their value (Gruenspecht, 1982). This may be
a particular concern because the recently tightened CAFE standard will likely increase the price
of inefficient, high performance new vehicles (Klier & Linn, 2012b).
2This value is derived from (Alberini, Harrington, & McConnell, 1998), which finds that a
$1000 bounty (equivalent to 67% of the average vehicle value) causes a 193% increase in the
number of vehicles scrapped. The scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price implied by
these values is approximately -3 and -6 is adopted as a robustness test.
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for these price effects, bringing these policies somewhat closer together in terms
of efficiency than previous studies might suggest.
Vehicle lifetimes are also important for studies that examine how consumers
value technology that reduces future gasoline costs (Helfand & Wolverton, 2011;
D. Greene et al., n.d.). These studies often rely on estimates of vehicle lifetime
that are many decades old (e.g. Lu, 2006). Our study allows us to place bounds
on the error introduced to these calculations by using these outdated vehicle
lifetimes. We find that omitting these lifetime increases may result in over or
undervaluation of fuel-saving technology by nearly 7%. While sensitive to as-
sumptions, we are also able to directly estimate this undervaluation through a
novel channel. By estimating the response of scrappage to a change in gasoline
price or an equivalent vehicle price change, our results are suggestive of un-
dervaluation. We find that consumers recognize between $0.53 and $0.73 of a
$1 increase in operating cost.3 These estimates lie within in the range of other
studies of that use alternative methodologies (Allcott & Wozny, 2012).
Our study uses the most comprehensive publicly available data on passen-
ger car and light truck populations by calendar year in the United States, cover-
ing vehicle model-years 1969 to 1999. The benefit of this aggregate data is that
it covers a long period of time and allows for more time series variation. The
data allows us to calculate mean scrappage rates at each age, which we fit to a
logistic curve using nonlinear least squares. The resulting scrappage rate curve
allows us to calculate the expected lifetime for a vehicle that faces those scrap-
page rates. We note that vehicle lifetime, particularly in the case of passenger
cars, has continued to rise, likely due to technology changes or demographic
3The valuation suggested by a scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price in the range
of -3, which is traditionally used for simulation, suggest a valuation of $0.15.
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shifts. Following Walker (1968) we then explain deviations from these mean
scrappage rates due to a variety of cyclical factors including changes in vehicle
prices, maintenance and repair costs, GDP, and steel prices. These regressions
allow us to estimate a scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price. We also
explore the relationship between gasoline prices and scrappage rates allowing
us to compare our study with several others that measure the relationship be-
tween gasoline prices and scrappage in depth using more recent data (M. Jacob-
sen & van Benthem, 2013; Knittel & Sandler, 2010).
Our paper complements a large body of literature on scrappage behavior
and the used car market. Several papers have examined how policies such as
CAFE and gasoline taxes can influence vehicle prices and therefore, intention-
ally or unintentionally, affect the lifetime of used vehicles (Gruenspecht, 1982;
Bento et al., 2009; M. R. Jacobsen, 2012b; Goulder et al., 2012).4 Other stud-
ies have focused on the response to policies directly targeting used vehicles,
including inspection and maintenance programs (Ando, McConnell, & Har-
rington, 2000), national vehicle retirement programs such as Cash-for-Clunkers
(Miravete & Moral Rinco´n, 2009; Li, Timmins, & von Haefen, 2011; Schiraldi,
2011), and local scrappage subsidies targeted to a specific state or city (Alberini,
Harrington, & McConnell, 1995; R. W. Hahn, 1995; Alberini et al., 1998; Adda &
Cooper, 2000; Sandler, 2012).5
4Others have examined CAFE but omit scrappage or the used car market (Klier and Linn,
2012; Goldberg, 1998). One implication of our findings is that although important general equi-
librium price effects remain in the used vehicle market, they are perhaps less important than
would be suggested by alternative parameters.
5(Ando et al., 2000) find I/M programs are limited in their ability to reduce emissions due
to costs. (Miravete & Moral Rinco´n, 2009) find Cash-for-Clunkers programs can accelerate the
adoption of new technology while Li, Linn and Spiller (2010) find it is an expensive method
to improve overall fuel economy. (R. W. Hahn, 1995) estimates a scrappage curve from a local
policy in California, while (Alberini et al., 1998) examine scrappage resulting from a program in
Delware. (Sandler, 2012) finds adverse selection played a major role in the high initial scrappage
rates for a scrappage policy in San Francisco.
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Another series of recent papers have attempted to measure the marginal
willingness-to-pay for technology that improves the fuel efficiency of vehicles.
These studies suggest that consumer may undervalue this technology because
they are more sensitive to vehicle prices than the future gasoline costs of oper-
ating that vehicle (Kilian & Sims, 2006; Allcott & Wozny, 2012; Busse, Knittel, &
Zettelmeyer, 2013; Sallee, West, & Fan, 2011). Vehicle lifetime is an important
component in calculating vehicle operating costs and existing studies often rely
on estimates of vehicle lifetime that are for vehicles several decades old (e.g.
(Lu, 2006)) which ignore the possibility that technology has extended vehicle
lifetime.
Finally our paper contributes to a literature that examines the determinants
of vehicle scrappage. These studies have focused on the role of technology
(Walker, 1968; D. L. Greene & Chen, 1981), climate (B. W. Hamilton & Macauley,
1999) and gasoline prices (Li et al., 2011; M. Jacobsen & van Benthem, 2013;
Knittel & Sandler, 2010). Several of these studies have noted the increase in
vehicle lifetime but have not noted the broader implications of these changes.
Those that have focused on gasoline prices have found divergent results for the
effect of gasoline prices. While higher gasoline prices always compositionally
shift the used vehicle fleet towards higher average fuel economy, the aggregate
scrappage rate may increase or decrease.
Our paper contributes to these literatures by estimating vehicle lifetime and
scrappage elasticities with respect to vehicle price. We also examine the scrap-
page elasticity with respect to gasoline price. Rather than focusing on the com-
positional effects of gasoline price changes, we examine the aggregate scrap-
page, or scale effect, that gasoline prices may have on scrappage. We then show
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the implications of these estimates for issues ranging from the value consumer
place on technology that improves fuel efficiency; to the effect our elasticities
have for important public policies like CAFE standards and gasoline taxes.
The rest of the paper is arranged as the following. Section 4.1 describes the
data and the empirical strategy, section 4.2 presents results, and section 4.3 dis-
cusses the policy implications and section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 Basic Model and Data
4.1.1 Basic Model
The econometric model is based on earlier models of the automobile scrappage
ultimately deriving from (Walker, 1968). The first stage of the model fits a logis-
tic curve to mean scrappage rates at each age, which largely captures engineer-
ing scrappage arising from mechanical failure.6 The second stage explains devi-
ations from the mean scrappage function estimated in the first stage, generally
resulting from cyclical factors such as changes in vehicle price or maintenance
and repair costs.
The first stage uses nonlinear least squares to fit a logistic curve to the mean
of scrappage rates by vehicle age. The logistic function, which has been shown
to fit scrappage data well (Walker, 1968; Parks, 1977; D. L. Greene & Chen, 1981;
6(Parks, 1977) describes engineering scrappage as the failure of vehicle components, which
gradually become increasingly expensive as the vehicle ages. The rate at which these failures
occur depend on the durability of the vehicle, which may be influenced by decisions made by
the manufacturer or the environment where the vehicle drives.
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Feeney & Cardebring, 1988), is given by:
Ma =
1
L + B ∗ e(−k∗a) + a (4.1)
where is age of a vehicle in years since model year, Ma is the mean scrappage
rate of vehicles at age a.7 We estimate the parameters L, B, and k to capture the
shape of the logistic function. L controls the level of the “asymptotic scrappage
rate.” If we take the limit of equation 4.1 as age approaches infinity, the function
asymptotes towards the scrappage rate 1/L.8 The error term, a, is assumed to
be normally distributed.
This estimation allows us to calculate vehicle lifetime. To calculate the ex-
pected lifetime for vehicles, LT , we follow (D. L. Greene & Chen, 1981):
LT =
∑
a
a ∗ Ma
a−1∏
i=1
(1 − Mi) (4.2)
where a is vehicle age and Ma is mean scrappage rate at age a conditional on
surviving until then as in equation 4.1. (1 − Mi) is the survival rate of vehicles
aged , hence Ma
∏a−1
i=1 (1−Mi) gives the probability of a vehicle being scrapped at
age a.
The second stage captures the deviations from the predicted average scrap-
page rate in a given calendar year:
S t = α0Rαt P
β
t KtM
∗
t (4.3)
where,
M∗t =
14∑
a=1
Kat
Kt
Ma (4.4)
7Precisely Ma is the mean proportion of vehicles surviving years that are scrapped, on the
average, prior to their (a − 1)th birthday which are average across calendar years.
8B and k determine when the scrappage rate starts to increase rapidly and enter the expo-
nential and mature phases. Ceteris Paribus, increasing B (or decreasing k) postpones when the
exponential and mature phases occur.
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Equation 4.3 defines the structural relationship of total scrappage to both engi-
neering and cyclical factors. S t is the number of vehicles scrapped in calendar
year t across all ages. Rt is the turnover rate of vehicle ownership. This term is
included because the decision to scrap a vehicle is made by used vehicle dealers
and will be subject to the volume of trade-in vehicles each year.9 Pt is the ve-
hicle price ratio index (the vehicle price divided by the maintenance and repair
costs), capturing the value of holding a vehicle, and Kt is the total number of ve-
hicles in operation in calendar year . M∗t is the predicted scrappage rate arising
from engineering factors, for the total population, which is weighted using the
age distribution of vehicles in year calendar t. It is calculated based on equation
4.4 and is a weighted average of the expected age-specific scrappage rates, Ma,
estimated using equation 4.1. The weights used are the number of vehicles of
age a in calendar year t, Kat, over the total number of vehicles in calendar year t.
To empirically estimate equation 4.3 we transform the equation using loga-
rithms. This allows us to estimate this second-stage relationship using ordinary
least squares (OLS). In our central specification, this equation becomes:
ln
S t
Kt
− ln(M∗t ) = const + α ∗ ln(Rt) + β ∗ ln(Pt) + t (4.5)
The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the elasticity of scrappage with
respect to vehicle price. This elasticity is important for simulation models of the
used vehicle market where scrappage adjusts to changes in vehicle price. The
first term on the left hand side, ln S tKt , is the log of the observed scrappage rate in
calendar year t, the second term, ln(M∗t ), is the predicted scrappage rate from en-
gineering factors related to aging.10 The residual scrappage rate is the difference
9If a new vehicle entering the system pushes an old vehicle to be scrapped α will be 1.
10Because the estimates from the first stage only enter as dependent rather than independent
variables, the uncertainty of those estimates will not affect the standard errors of the second
stage parameters.
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of these terms. It is explained by a constant, a proxy for turnover rate, and the
vehicle price ratio index. Finally we assume the error term, t, is normally dis-
tributed and newey-west standard errors are estimated in all regressions. See
Appendix A for further discussion of the advantages of the 2-stage approach
adopted here relative to other potential models.
We also use several econometric models to examine the relationship between
scrappage and gasoline prices. The first is a linear specification similar to that
used by (M. Jacobsen & van Benthem, 2013). This model does not average ob-
servations by vehicle age or calendar year as in the 2-stage specification above
but rather controls for these factors with fixed effects as follows:
yamt = αaDa + αmDm + β ∗ gpt + amt (4.6)
In this equation yamy is the scrappage rate of vehicles that are of age a and
model year m scrapped in calendar year t, Di(i ∈ {a,m}) is the vector of dummy
variables for age and model year, gpt is the gasoline price in year calendar t. The
coefficient β provides the marginal effect of gasoline price on scrappage rate.
We also estimate the scrappage elasticity with respect to gasoline price by
modifying Walker’s 2nd stage equations as follows:
ln
S t
Kt
− ln(M∗t ) = const + α ∗ ln(Rt) + β ∗ ln(gpt) + t (4.7)
This equation is identical to equation 4.5 except ln(gpt), gasoline price in cal-
endar year t, is substituted for the vehicle price ratio index.11 It also allows for
11We use the gasoline price index to be consistent across the estimation of the two nonlinear
specifications, although using real gasoline price does not significantly alter the estimates.
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more direct comparison with the hazard model run by (Knittel & Sandler, 2010),
which assumes nonlinearity in scrappage rates.
4.1.2 Data
The data used for our regressions primarily comes from publicly available
counts of automobiles collected by R.L. Polk for Ward’s Automotive. These
data, covering model years 1969-1999, provide annual counts of U.S. passen-
ger cars and light trucks by model year and are reported in Ward’s Automotive
Yearbooks (1981-2002). While covering a long time period, these data only dis-
tinguish between passenger cars and light trucks and do not provide model or
class counts. For more detailed vehicle count data we supplement these data
with household level data on vehicle holdings from National Household Trans-
portation Surveys in 1995, 2001, and 2009.
Each year Ward’s reports the number of vehicles in operation as of July 1st
for 14 model years, allowing us to calculate scrappage rates for a model year at
each age. For example in 1990 Ward’s provides the count of passenger cars and
light trucks in operation for model years 1976 through 1990. Population counts
from the 1991 Ward’s Yearbook allow for calculation of the number of vehi-
cles that were scrapped in the interim. The scrappage rate is calculated as the
number of vehicles removed from operation at age a divided by the number of
vehicles of that model year in operation at the previous age, a−1. The long time
span enables us to compare with previous studies (Walker, 1968; D. L. Greene
& Chen, 1981) and establish how vehicle lifetimes and scrappage elasticity with
respect to vehicle price have changed over time.
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The censorship of population counts beyond 14 years of age limits our abil-
ity to observe the tail of the scrappage curve, but because it asymptotes at older
ages, scrappage rates beyond 14 years can be inferred from the pattern estab-
lished before this cut-off. Scrappage rates at younger ages can also be problem-
atic. Occasionally vehicle counts increase in the first and second year of vehicle
lifetime implying a negative scrappage rate. New vehicle models tend to enter
the market ahead of the calendar year, and are often sold through the next cal-
endar year; therefore, vehicles populations for the first two years are removed
from our analysis allowing us to calculate scrappage rates for ages 2 through
14.12 This results in 650 scrappage rate observations.13 Some population data is
given for model years 1969 through 2002 but only model years 1969-1987 give
complete population counts for all 14 years of age. More recent model years do
not have population counts at older ages. Vehicles from 1999 are the most recent
with population counts at 2 years of age and are the last model year for which
we use data in any of our regressions.
Table 1 shows average scrappage rates of cars and trucks at various ages.
These are calculated for three sets of model years: 1969-1979, 1980-1987, and the
full sample, 1969-1987 to examine decadal changes in vehicle lifetime. Previous
studies (Walker, 1968; Parks, 1977; D. L. Greene & Chen, 1981; Feeney & Carde-
bring, 1988) have used the logistic curve to fit these scrappage rates because they
grow slowly for the first several years, increase rapidly around 6 years of age
and finally after 10 years begin to asymptote towards a high, but stable level.
12For example, a 2000 model year vehicle may appear in calendar year 1999 and may still be
sold as new in 2001. Scrappage for extremely new vehicles are usually very low, due only to
serious accidences. Therefore, the data we observe for 0 and 1-year-old vehicles often change
mostly due to the sales of these inventories. Including these first two years does not signif-
icantly change the point estimates of our regressions but does increase the standard errors in
some specifications.
13Model Years 1969-1987 each have 13 calendar years worth of model counts, 1988 has 12,
1989 has 11, until 1999 which is the last model year with an age of more than 2.
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Because the scrappage rates asymptote towards levels near 7-20%, rather than
100%, explains the presence of some extremely old vehicles in the current fleet.14
Table 1 also demonstrates that scrappage rates for trucks are consistently lower
at any given age than they are for cars.
In recent decades dramatic compositional changes have occurred in the light
truck. The category of light truck contains not only pickup trucks but also mini-
vans, SUVs and CUVs and these vehicles have grown as a share of the light
truck market. As we will document later, light truck lifetime appears to stag-
nate over time. We suspect this stagnation is related to the expansion of SUVs
market share within the light truck category. To explore this hypothesis, we use
data from the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) to obtain counts of ve-
hicles by the subcategories of car, SUV, and pickup truck. These surveys provide
vehicle counts by class, model year, and age up to 25 years old. NHTS exists for
five discrete calendar years, 1983, 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2009. Because the sur-
vey is not annual and sample sizes vary over time, we cannot calculate yearly
scrappage rates from this data.15 In section 3.1 we show how these data allow
us to compare the order of scrappage rates for various vehicle classes with one
another. To compare car, SUV and pickup truck scrappage rates, we use vehicle
counts for these three classes for the NHTS survey years in which the category
of SUV is recorded: 1995, 2001 and 2009.
We use a variety of data from other sources to construct key variables that af-
14The small but increasing number of extremely old vehicles on the road can also be noted
from subsequent NHTS surveys. In the 1995 NHTS, for example, 1.6% vehicles are over 25 years
old. This number grows to 3.1% in 2001 NHTS and 3.7% in the 2009 NHTS.
15Although we would ideally be able to infer information about national level scrappage rates
from these samples, we found the survey population weights did not provide vehicle counts
similar to the Wards data. For some years, the 1990 NHTS in particular, the implied vehicle
populations can be quite different from Ward’s report. Hence, we do not attempt to use these
data to determine lifetime scrappage curves but only to compare vehicle classes to one another.
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fect scrappage rates. To examine the scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle
price, we require data not only on used vehicle prices, but also on maintenance
and repair costs. These variables will affect the reservation value for scrapping
a vehicle. Studies that look to (Walker, 1968) create a vehicle price ratio index
by dividing a used vehicle price index by a maintenance and repair cost index.
This assumes that these variables will have equal but opposite effects on scrap-
page: as used vehicle prices increase or maintenance and repair costs decrease,
consumers will scrap vehicles at a lower rate. Our main specification also im-
poses this restriction but we examine this assumption in our robustness checks
by including each of the indexes individually. The used vehicle price index and
the motor vehicle maintenance and repair cost index, gathered by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, are subcategories used in the calculation of the Consumer
Price Index. Both indexes are seasonally adjusted with the base period of 1982
to 1984. In the construction of the used vehicle price index the BLS averages
vehicle auction prices from National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
and prices published by Kelly Blue Book.16
Figure 1 plots the logged vehicle price ratio index and the aggregate ob-
served scrappage rate from 1970 to 2000. Consistent with (Gruenspecht, 1982),
vehicle prices seem to decrease after the 1980’s when CAFE standards would
increase demand for relatively scarce inefficient used vehicles, while vehicle
prices adjusted to higher levels.
As noted by (Walker, 1968) vehicle turnover rate may affect scrappage rates
and will depend on many factors including credit availability, income, and as-
sets. Following this literature we proxy for the rate of turnover with the ratio of
new vehicle registrations to total vehicle ownership. The total number of new
16For more detail see (Pashigian, 2001).
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vehicles is taken as the number of age 0 vehicles from Ward’s Automotive Year-
books. The total number of vehicles in operation for each calendar year is pro-
vided by Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures. Although new car purchases
are made by consumers, while scrappage is decided on by used vehicle dealers,
it may be possible that this proxy for turnover rate is endogenous. We therefore
examine another proxy for turnover rate: annual GDP, taken from International
Financial Statistics.
Two measures of gasoline prices are also used. First we use annual gasoline
price data from the Department of Energy. We also use the gasoline price index
gathered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The BLS seasonally adjusts this index
and uses a base period of 1982 to 1984.
Finally, for robustness tests, we use the annual average U.S. steel scrap price
per metric ton from the U.S. Geological Survey,17 and U.S. imports vehicle sales
data from Ward’s yearbooks. The percentage of vehicles imported is constructed
by dividing these values by the number of new vehicles sales. Further details,
including descriptive statistics, can be found in Appendix Table A.1.
4.1.3 Time Series Properties of the Data
In the second stage of the regression, standard tests fail to reject the presence of
a unit-root for scrappage rates as well as vehicle prices. With only 30 years of
data, unit-root tests of the residuals are often marginal and sensitive to specifi-
cation. A Dickey-Fuller test strongly suggests the residuals are stationary above
171969-1998 data are from: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/metal prices/,
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/iron & steel scrap/360798.pdf. And
1999-2001 data are from http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/iron & steel scrap/index.html#myb,http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/iron & steel scrap/360303.pdf.
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the 1% level, while the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock test cannot reject a unit-root.18
Autocorrelation plots are displayed in Figures 2 and 3. While the evidence is not
decisive for stationary or nonstationary residuals, the cyclicality of the residuals
in these figures can be the result of an AR(2) process (Harvey, 1981).
In our basic specifications, we view the model as a cointegrated model, as is
implicitly assumed by prior work in this area. Although not traditionally mod-
eled as an autoregressive process, we address the possibility that the residuals
are non-stationary with AR(1) and AR(2) models, wherever possible, for both
the vehicle price and gasoline price.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Scrappage by Vehicle Age
Table 2 reports the results of estimation of equation 4.1, which fits a logistic
curve to mean scrappage rates by age. The first panel of Table 2 shows the
results for passenger cars across three periods as well as the comparison with
model years 1966 through 1977 estimated by (D. L. Greene & Chen, 1981) and
post-World War II models estimated by (Walker, 1968). Figure 4 displays these
estimated scrappage rate curves for passenger cars for two sets of model years
along with the post-war curve estimated by (Walker, 1968). Figure 4 and Table 2
show that the asymptotic scrappage rate has been declining over the last century
and that scrappage rates at any given age have progressively decreased for more
18The estimated value of rho in AR-1 and AR-2 regressions is less than 0.4, which cannot be
judged as statistically distinct from 1 with a sample size of 30 years worth of data.
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recent vehicle model years. The asymptotic scrappage rate is 26.32% for post-
war vehicles, it decreases to 21.51% for the 70s, and is 18.8% for the 80s. Table
2 also calculates the expected lifetime following equation 4.6. The lifetime for
passenger cars has increased from 10 years for post-war cohort, to 12.5 for the
70s cohort, and 14 years for the 80s cohort.
The second panel of Table 2 shows the results for light trucks. We first con-
firm that light trucks display longer lifetimes than passenger cars. The scrap-
page profile is, however, complex. Rather than decreasing, asymptotic scrap-
page rates increase from 9.25% in the 70s to 20% in the 80s, yet overall vehicle
lifetimes remain around 15- and 16-year-old.
Previous literature has noted the increased lifetime for passenger cars or the
fleet as a whole but it has generally been attributed to events that are unlikely to
explain why it continues to increase, or why it should be observed in passenger
cars and not light trucks. Reasons that have been suggested in the past include
a change in post-war technology (Walker, 1968), and an increase in the share of
light trucks (D. L. Greene & Chen, 1981). (B. W. Hamilton & Macauley, 1999),
who only examine passenger cars, suggest shifts in population to the Sunbelt
are the source of this increased lifetime. This explanation seems plausible but
should also increase the lifetime of light trucks. Another explanation is that on-
board diagnostic systems and other technology improvements may also extend
vehicle lifetime by catching small mechanical failures before they become more
expensive (EPA, 2002), which would also explain why similar trends are noted
in the vehicle fleets of other countries like Sweden (Feeney & Cardebring, 1988).
We speculate that light truck lifetime may also be increasing, either due to
population shifts or technology improvement, but the observed stagnation in
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light truck lifetime is due to opposing trends in the light truck market. The
first trend is for vehicles classified as light trucks to become more similar to
cars over time. Vans, SUVs, and, recently, CUVs are all categorized as light
trucks but may be more like cars, in terms of technology and patterns of use,
than pickup tucks. The second trend is the increasing share of SUVs at the ex-
pense of pickup trucks. Under these circumstances, ‘Simpson’s paradox’ may
appear. This is a paradox in which a trend present in all subgroups, for example
increasing vehicle lifetime, is reversed when the groups are combined19. Such
reversals are possible when subgroups have differing base rates and the share of
one subgroup is increasing. Thus if SUVs and pickup trucks are both increasing
in vehicle lifetime but SUVs have shorter lifetimes overall, increasing the share
of SUVs may undermine the overall increase in vehicle lifetime when the two
are aggregated.
Without decades of disaggregated data, we cannot definitively prove that
Simpson’s paradox is responsible for this stagnation in vehicle lifetime, but we
can show that the conditions that give rise to it are present. These two condi-
tions are that the share of SUVs is increasing over time, and that SUVs have
scrappage rates between that of passenger cars and pickup trucks, depressing
the lifetime for the broader category of light trucks. The growth of SUVs as a
share of the light trucks is well known and can be calculated from NHTS data.
The market share of SUVs in the NHTS data has increased from 7% in 1995
to 18% in 2009.20 To provide evidence for the second condition we attempt to
show that the scrappage rate of SUVs for any given model year, lies between
that of passenger cars and pickup trucks. For example between 1995 and 2001
19This paradox, named after Edward Simpson who first described it in 1951, occurs in many
manifestations including gender discrimination (Bickel, Hammel, OConnell, et al., 1975) and
smoking death rates (Appleton, French, & Vanderpump, 1996).
20See Appendix Table A.2 for descriptive statistics on each wave of NHTS survey.
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the scrappage rate of 1992 model year passenger cars, SUVs and pickup trucks
was 21%, 20% and 13%, respectively, while the same values for 1983 model year
vehicles was 69%, 42% and 39%. Because the surveys are not from consecu-
tive years, we cannot estimate the scrappage curves at each age but we can test
the relative order of the scrappage rates. To perform this test, we normalize
the scrappage rate of passenger cars to 1 and pickup trucks to 0, and rescale
the SUV scrappage rate accordingly. The density of the rescaled SUV scrap-
page rates, smoothed with an Epanechnikov kernel using a bandwidth of 0.15,
is plotted in Figure 5. The average is 0.25, which, as predicted, lies in between
that of passenger cars and pickup trucks. This means that while SUV scrappage
rates are most similar to pickup trucks, they are not identical and are lower than
passenger cars. A one tailed t-test on these values suggests that SUV scrappage
rates are statistically different from those of pickup trucks at the 10% level.21
Although we do not have yearly scrappage rates of SUVs or pickup trucks over
time to confirm the trend is due to Simpson’s paradox, the patterns noted here
are highly suggestive that the growth in the SUV share may be undermining the
within class increase of trucks.
4.2.2 Elasticity of Scrappage with Respect to Used Vehicle Price
Table 3 column I reports the OLS estimates of equation 4.5 for passenger cars.
For each regression the table reports the coefficients and standard errors. Our
estimate of -0.83, using our basic specification in Column I, is statistically indis-
tinguishable from that of Walker at -0.66 given in column IX.22 These estimates
21Based on 28 observations, the one-tailed t-statistics is 1.64. Two outliers, in which cases the
rescaled SUV scrappage rate has an absolute value greater than 3, are excluded.
22Turnover rate is higher although statistically indistinguishable from earlier estimates.
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of the scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price are, however, far lower
than in temporary and local programs (R. W. Hahn, 1995; Alberini et al., 1995;
Alberini, Harrington, & McConnell, 1996; Alberini et al., 1998). These studies
find elasticities between -1.7 and -3.23 Because these programs are geograph-
ically limited and often short in duration, vehicle owners may change their
scrappage decisions to take advantage of the program. The geographic and
temporal limits of these policy likely result in a substantially larger scrappage
elasticity with respect to vehicle price than would be expected by a permanent,
national policy like CAFE standards or a gasoline tax. Further, as documented
in (Sandler, 2012), these programs suffer from adverse selection, which may
further overstate the scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price.
Table 3 columns II through IX examine the robustness of the scrappage elas-
ticity with respect to vehicle price estimated in Column I. Following (Walker,
1968), the vehicle price ratio index regressor is the log of the ratio of the used
vehicle price index and the maintenance and repair cost index, which assumes
that coefficients of these two variables are equal in magnitude but opposite sign.
We separately estimating these coefficients in Column II and find that the nega-
tive of the estimate on ‘Maintenance and Repair Cost Index’ at 0.74 is indistin-
guishable from that on the ‘Used Vehicle Price Index’ at -0.78 supporting this
assumption. We also examine several other proxies for turnover rate including
ln(GDP) in column III finding this measure only further reduce the scrappage
elasticity with respect to vehicle price to -0.61.
23Table 6 in (Alberini et al., 1995) suggests the average scrappage elasticity with respect to ve-
hicle price is -1.7 for waivered vehicles and -2.56 for non-waivered vehicles. Table 4 in (Alberini
et al., 1996) implies that the scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price is -1.8 at the mean
vehicle value. (Alberini et al., 1998) Figure 3b. suggests scrappage rises from approximately 70
to 210 vehicles for a $1000 bounty, which is 65% of the average vehicle value of $1535.58 given
in Appendix A 2.1, implying a scrappage elasticity of -3. Table 2 in (R. W. Hahn, 1995) implies
an average scrappage elasticity of -1.75.
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Column IV examines several other potentially important covariates, includ-
ing steel price, GDP, and percentage imported vehicles. Steel price is included to
capture changes in value of the scrapped vehicles. Because it is also possible that
the entrance of foreign competitors may affect vehicle lifetime (B. W. Hamilton
& Macauley, 1999), we also control for the percentage of the fleet that is im-
ported. These additional covariates result in a point estimate of -0.76 for the
scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price, a small and statistically in-
significant decrease from the initial specification.
Columns V through VIII examine the robustness of our estimates to AR(1)
and AR(2) models. The point estimates range from -0.71 to -0.87 and all are
statistically indistinguishable from the point estimate in column I.
As demonstrated in Section 4.2.1 there have been substantial changes to
trucks over the vehicles that comprise the light truck category. While consis-
tent with our results for passenger cars, we leave these regressions to Appendix
Table A.5.
4.2.3 Results from Other Specifications
Table 4 reports estimates of the marginal effect of gasoline prices on scrappage
rates using equation 4.7. Controlling for only model year and age columns I
through IV estimate, which are occasionally statistically different from zero, but
in all cases suggest an inelastic response to changing gasoline prices. These
point estimates imply scrappage elasticities that range from 0.07 to 0.31 and the
95% confidence interval rejects an elasticity grater that 0.51. Columns V and
VI perform an unbalance panel regression using an AR(1) process following
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(Baltagi & Wu, 1999). The marginal effect estimated in column VI is 1.506 and is
statistically significant at the 5% level and suggests an elasticity of 0.28.
In Table 5 column I we estimate this elasticity using equation 4.7. This spec-
ification accounts for the nonlinearity of scrappage rates, and suggests that ag-
gregate scrappage does not react very much to gasoline prices with a point es-
timate at -0.13. This specification is most similar to (Knittel & Sandler, 2010)
who estimate that for a 5 cent per mile increase in operating cost, scrappage de-
creases by 12 percent suggesting a scrappage elasticity with respect to gasoline
price of -0.21, which is statistically indistinguishable from our estimate.24 This
point estimate is the opposite sign of what we estimate using the linear specifi-
cation but is not statistically different from zero. Columns II through IV exam-
ine the robustness of this estimate and generally suggest negative and inelastic
response to gasoline price. The decrease in the point estimate when including
GDP is particularly large suggesting that omitting income effects may bias this
coefficient towards elastic values. Without these controls, gasoline prices will
capture the substitution towards used vehicles that occurs during recessions.
Columns V through VIII show the results from AR(1) and AR(2) models, which,
although still imprecise, are statistically indistinguishable from the basic model
in Column I and range from -0.04 to 0.14. Generally, the results from Tables 4
and 5 show that the estimated elasticities are particularly sensitive to the model
used but are always statistically different from 1 suggesting that scrappage is
inelastic with respect to gasoline prices.
24For this calculation we use values given in Table 1 of (Knittel & Sandler, 2010) for 2004.
Without disaggregate data, we cannot replicate the estimation strategy of (Li et al., 2011), how-
ever these authors employ a logistic model similar to ours.
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4.2.4 Comparison of the Elasticities of Scrappage with Respect
to Vehicle and Gasoline Prices
According to economic theory, there should be a direct relationship between the
scrappage elasticities with respect to vehicle and gasoline price. A change in
gasoline price will change the operating cost of the vehicle. If consumers are ra-
tional gasoline price changes will be capitalized into the used vehicle price. This
allows us to compare our estimated elasticities. Our scrappage elasticity with
respect to gasoline price provides the scrappage response to a $0.10 increase in
gasoline cost. This increase in gasoline cost will imply a decrease in used vehi-
cle prices. The used vehicle price decrease or the gasoline price increase should
imply the same scrappage increase if consumers fully capitalize operating cost
changes into the value of the vehicle. Testing this valuation requires the use of
a scrappage elasticity with respect to gasoline price that is positive. We adopt
the value 0.24 from our simplest linear specification in Table 4 Column I. To cal-
culate the expected change in operating cost due to this price change, we must
make fairly strong assumptions about the fuel economy, vehicle price and age
of the average used vehicles during the time of our study. Values estimated by
Polk and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics put the mean fuel economy of
used vehicles at 23.8 mpg, price at $8,786 and age at 11 years for the current
fleet.25 Using these numbers we find that consumers underreact to changes in
gasoline price although we cannot reject full valuation. The estimated scrap-
page elasticity with respect to vehicle price of our basic model, -0.83, suggests
that consumers recognize only $0.53 of a $1 increase in operating cost. Using
25The discount rate used was 5% and year VMT comes from (Lu, 2006). Mean fuel economy
and price comes from BTS, mean age comes from Polk. Vehicle lifetime uses our estimates from
1980-1987.
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the lower estimate of -0.61 from our specification in Table 3 column III suggest
they recognize only $0.73 of a $1 increase.26
If we assume full valuation, the error must lie either in the average statis-
tics gathered by Polk and BTS, or in the estimation of one of the two elasticities
used in our calculation. If the error is in the estimation of the scrappage elastic-
ity with respect to vehicle price the correct value must be -0.437, lower than our
estimate and an order of magnitude lower than that from local scrappage pro-
grams.27 If the error is in the scrappage elasticity with respect to gasoline price,
the value must be 0.41, larger than our estimates using either specification, as
well as the estimates implied by (Li et al., 2011), (M. Jacobsen & van Benthem,
2013) or (Knittel & Sandler, 2010). These calculations are, of course, sensitive
to assumptions and the error may not be isolated to one element. They are,
however, similar to other estimates of this undervaluation studied through al-
ternative methods such as that of Allcott and Wozny (2012) who find consumers
only recognize $0.76 of a $1.00 increase in operating cost.
4.2.5 Identification
The capitalization of gasoline price into vehicle price also raises potential con-
cerns that other factors, particularly macroeconomic events, such as recessions,
may affect the scrappage decision and gasoline prices or vehicle prices simul-
26Using our largest scrappage elasticity with respect to gasoline price and smallest scrappage
elasticity with respect to vehicle price suggests a valuation of $1.13. Using the smallest, positive
scrappage elasticity with respect to gasoline price and largest with respect to vehicle price gives
a valuation of $0.15.
27This value is not, however, statistically different than our lowest possible estimate of this
parameter in Table 4 Column IV. This specification, which substitutes the new vehicle price
index as a proxy for turnover rate, is our most imprecise measure of the scrappage elasticity
with respect to used vehicle price.
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taneously. If this is the case, one may be concern that our estimates are biased.
Ideally we would be able to instrument for vehicle or gasoline prices to address
these concerns. Finding such an instrument is difficult for at least two reasons.
First, very few valid instruments for gasoline price have been found in the liter-
ature and those that do use them use recent supply shocks that are temporary
(e.g. (Hughes, Knittel, & Sperling, 2008)).28 Our data spans an earlier time pe-
riod and is annual, which prevents identification using short-term disruptions
in gasoline price. Second there is evidence that consumers anticipate the re-
turn of gasoline prices to earlier levels during these particularly salient shocks
(Anderson, Kellogg, et al., 2011). While consumers may make short-run adjust-
ments to VMT in response to these fluctuations, they seem less likely to make
major capital investments based on transitory shocks.
To some extent the relationship established between our estimated elastici-
ties with respect to vehicle and gasoline prices helps to gain insight into how
problematic these biases may be. If the previous implied scrappage elasticity
with respect to vehicle price of -3 is adopted, consumers must only recognize
$0.15 of a $1.00 increase in operating costs, significantly less than most esti-
mates of this undervaluation. Some omitted factors such as macroeconomic
shocks like recessions can be examined with the addition of other controls. Our
robustness tests that include GDP29 shown in Table 3 Columns III and IV, Table
4 Columns III and IV, and Table 5 Columns III and IV suggest omitting these
factors does not dramatically affect these estimated elasticities. While disag-
28These authors use supply disruptions from Hurricane Katrina as an instrument for gasoline
price. While such temporary price shocks may encourage drivers to temporarily decrease the
miles they drive, they seem less likely to have the scrappage effect that a permanent increase of
the same magnitude would.
29(J. Hamilton, 2009) documents that GDP and gasoline demand are positively correlated.
As noted during the latest downturn, recessions decrease demand for gasoline lowering its
price. Simultaneously, drivers tend to substitute away from new vehicles towards used vehicles
decreasing scrappage rates.
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gregate data may allow us to control for some of these effects, such data is not
available for nearly as many years as our aggregate data. The longer duration
of our data provides more variation in vehicle and gasoline prices over time but
precludes us from using differential effects across fuel economy levels in identi-
fication.30 Nevertheless our estimates are nearly identical to those that use more
recent disaggregate data, for example (M. Jacobsen & van Benthem, 2013) who
also estimate this elasticity at -0.7 to -0.8.
While there is little we can definitively do to address identification in these
regressions, we argue that our results, which are robust to various models and
additional covariates, represent a substantial improvement on the values that
are traditionally used in policy simulation.
4.3 Further Discussion
Estimates presented above have implications for nearly all studies of the used
vehicle market. Here we predominantly focus on the implications for two par-
ticularly active areas of research. First our parameters are central to evaluating
policies, such as gasoline taxes or CAFE standards, aimed at reducing gaso-
line consumption and vehicle emissions. Simulation of these policies requires
a value for vehicle lifetime and a scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle
price. These values help to predict scrappage changes due to general equilib-
rium price effects in the used car market. A second area of active research ex-
30This strategy uses the differential effect of gasoline price shocks on high versus low fuel
economy vehicles to identify this elasticity. It requires that shocks to GDP, which are correlated
with gasoline price changes, affect high and low fuel economy vehicles identically. This exclu-
sion restriction may fail if, for example, low-income individuals sort into fuel-efficient vehicles
and hold onto vehicles longer during recessions due to credit constraints.
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amines the possibility that consumers may undervalue technology that reduces
fuel use. Such undervaluation may guide the choice of optimal policy (Fischer et
al., 2007). The incentive to improve fuel economy when gasoline taxes increase
may be undermined if consumers do not value or understand those future fuel
costs. But to calculate how much that technology reduces discounted future fuel
costs requires a measure vehicle lifetime. Here we provide several back-of-the-
envelope calculations attempting to show the importance of our estimates for
these studies.
4.3.1 Implications for CAFE Standards
To predict the potential gasoline savings of CAFE, it is important to understand
the speed at which aging removes old vehicles from the road. Problematically,
these vehicle lifetimes may be based off of scrappage curves that are several
decades old. In order to estimate vehicle lifetimes, one must observe the full
scrappage curve of a specific model year until most of the vehicles have been
scrapped, which may take several decades. The estimates of vehicle lifetime
presented in section 3.1 suggest that vehicles several decades old may have con-
siderably shorter lifetimes than those vehicles produced today. Longer vehicle
lifetime could substantially impede the diffusion of new vehicles influenced by
CAFE into the used vehicle fleet.
To illustrate how longer vehicle lifetimes may impede this diffusion we pre-
dict the fuel economy profile of the used vehicle market using two scrappage
curves estimated 30 years apart.31 This gives some indication of how much
31Specifically we use Walker’s Postwar (1952-1957) estimates for the old scrappage curve and
our estimates from 1980-1987 as the new scrappage curve.
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discrepancy may occur between the predicted levels of fuel economy based on
outdated scrappage profiles and the true scrappage profiles that recognize the
technology change during the intervening years. To simplify this calculation
we focus on the passenger car segment, which has a separate, higher stan-
dard than the light truck segment under CAFE. Historically CAFE has man-
dated that manufacturers achieve 27.5 mpg on average for passenger cars or
pay fines based on the shortfall.32 The CAFE standard is, however, scheduled
to increase over the next decade. For our simulation, we generate an initial fleet
that uniformly meets the 27.5-mpg standard and predict how quickly a new
fleet produced at a uniform 40 mpg affects the used vehicle market.33 Using a
shorter vehicle lifetime will imply these changes in the new vehicle fleet will
change the used vehicle fleet faster than when using a longer vehicle lifetime.
The fuel economy of the average used vehicle over time is presented in Table 7
and plotted in Figure 6. The dashed blue line in Figure 6 projects the average
fuel economy using the older scrappage curves, which imply shorter vehicle
lifetimes, while the red solid line shows the outcomes under the newer scrap-
page curve, which imply longer vehicle lifetimes. The old curve suggests that
the higher CAFE standard will affect the used vehicle market much faster than
the new curve and is over optimistic about the speed at which CAFE can affect
the fuel economy of the used vehicle fleet. Table 6 shows that some intermediate
targets, like 35 mpg, can take a full four years longer to achieve using our new
scrappage profiles.
A second back-of-the-envelope calculation shows this delay from another
32For passenger cars the old CAFE standard required a minimum average fuel economy of
27.5 mpg. This standard has been changed and started to increase in 2011. Additional changes
to the standard allowed for a flexible target based on the footprint of the vehicle. These changes
may affect magnitudes but not the qualitative conclusions of this calculation.
33We generate this population by projecting a fleet back in time assuming each year 10,000
vehicles are produced and are reduced by the estimated scrappage curve at each age.
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perspective. Policy makers may want to know what CAFE standard is needed
to increase the fuel economy of the whole fleet above a particular target within
a set time frame. In Table 7 we calculate the CAFE standard required to achieve
a variety of fleet targets within 10 or 15 years assuming that the fleet starts at an
average of 27.5 mpg. For example using the old scrappage curves it will take
a CAFE standard of 42.7 to achieve a fleet average of 40 within ten years. But
the new scrappage rates suggest that the correct CAFE standard to achieve this
goal is 50.7. Increasing the standard by 8 miles per gallon is likely to be expen-
sive. Extrapolating the engineering cost curves for the subcompact category of
car, a car that can achieve that target at lower cost than other vehicles (NRC
2002), suggest this 8-mpg improvement would cost at least $1,000 more per ve-
hicle.34 As the target becomes more aggressive, the discrepancy becomes larger.
To achieve a fleet average of 50 mpg within 10 years, the older scrappage curves
would only require a CAFE standard of 56.3 while the newer curve would re-
quire a standard in excess of 80 mpg. The final pair of columns shows that as
the time frame is extended to 15 years, an age where most vehicles have been
scrapped, this discrepancy decreases but is still surprisingly large. For example
to achieve 40 mpg in 15 years the old curve would require the CAFE standard
to be 40.5 while the new curve suggests the standard would need to be 42.9.
There are additional effects that may slow this response to higher CAFE
standards further. Because CAFE reduces the supply of inefficient new ve-
hicles, consumers may substitute towards inefficient used vehicles increasing
their price (Gruenspecht, 1982). This will reduce their scrappage rate. Because
our scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price is lower than previous esti-
34Alternatively the cost of this higher target can be calculated using the coefficients from the
hedonic cost study by Berry, Kortum, and Pakes (1996) and converting to 2012 dollars. The
higher target would cost $1,400 more per vehicle using these estimates rather than $1000 esti-
mated from the engineering cost curves in the (Council, 2012) study.
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mate, there will be less leakage due to this general equilibrium price effect than
previous studies would suggest.
4.3.2 Implications for Gasoline Taxes
Our elasticities of scrappage with respect to vehicle price also have implications
for the ability gasoline taxes to improve fuel economy. Equilibrium models of
the automobile market have generally used scrappage elasticities with respect to
vehicle price that range from -3 to -6, while our estimates suggest this parameter
is inelastic at -0.83. The elastic values that are traditionally used are based off
of studies that, although well executed, were never intended to estimate this
parameter but have been used in the absence of another source. This elasticity
is particularly important for gasoline taxes because a major effect of gasoline
taxes in the used vehicle market is to increase the operating cost of inefficient
vehicles and decrease their price. By preferentially scrapping inefficient used
vehicles, the average fuel economy of this market rises faster than would occur
with aging alone.
To illustrate this we show how this parameter choice can affect predicted pol-
icy outcomes in Table 8. (Bento et al., 2009) calculates the increased scrappage
from a 25-cent gasoline tax using a price elasticity of -3 under three revenue-
recycling methods. This value is based on a local scrappage policy studied
in Alberini et al. (1998). Table 9 presents results for each revenue-recycling
method using our lower price elasticity of -0.83. We find scrappage would have
increased by only 0.10%, rather than the 0.35% simulated in the original study.
This lower scrappage would imply 120,000 more vehicles on the road than pre-
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dicted and, using average vehicle mileage and fuel economy, 48 million fewer
gallons of gasoline saved in a year than predicted.35
This calculation illustrates that a low scrappage elasticity with respect to ve-
hicle price reduces the ability of gasoline taxes to influence the used vehicle
market and increases the role of scrappage due to aging. This implies that the
CAFE standards and gasoline taxes are somewhat closer in terms of efficiency
than previous literature suggests.36
4.3.3 Implications for Studies of the Energy Paradox
As discussed in section 3.4 above, economic theory suggests a rational con-
sumer will pay $1.00 more for a vehicle that reduces discounted future fuel
costs by $1.00. In many studies, including our own, consumers seem to un-
dervalue these reductions in future fuel cost, a phenomenon often referred to as
an ‘energy paradox.’ Empirically there has been considerable disagreement of
the magnitude of this undervaluation (Helfand & Wolverton, 2011; D. Greene
et al., n.d.) ranging from $0.25 (Kilian & Sims, 2006) to $0.76 (Allcott & Wozny,
2012) to full valuation of $1.00 (Busse et al., 2013; Sallee et al., 2011). As shown
above our estimates of the scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle and gaso-
line prices, while unable to reject full valuation, suggest consumers only $0.53
to $0.73 of a $1 reduction in future fuel costs. But our estimates of the increase
35This calculation only captures savings due to scale effects that reduce the total number of
cars on the road and does not capture any compositional effects of scrappage. It also omits any
equilibrium price effects that may occur.
36It is important to note that this does not imply that the two policies are identical in terms of
gasoline savings. The CAFE standard increases the use of vehicles because improving the fuel
economy of the fleet without increasing the price for driving results in more vehicle miles trav-
eled, a phenomenon commonly referred to as the rebound effect (Small & Van Dender, 2007).
The two policies also produce different results in the new vehicle market as CAFE implicitly
taxes inefficient vehicles and subsidizes efficient ones (Kwoka, 1983).
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in vehicle lifetime also have implications for this debate.
To properly evaluate the benefit of efficiency improving technology, both
consumers and the researcher must specify how long a vehicle is likely to last.
Longer vehicle lifetimes will increase the likelihood that consumers will realize
the returns of a technology that improves fuel efficiency. Generally, researchers
have applied scrappage rates to these calculations that are several decades old
(Lu, 2006). To give some insight into the magnitude of error this may gener-
ate in these calculations we examine the value to the consumer of a technology
that increases fuel economy from 20 to 30 mpg under two scrappage curves es-
timated 30 years apart.37 When using the older scrappage curve with shorter
vehicle lifetime, we find that the value of the technology is $5663.50 while using
the newer curve with a longer vehicle lifetime provides a benefit of $6075.10.
If the researcher uses a shorter vehicle lifetime to assess the value of this tech-
nology while consumers use longer vehicle lifetimes, the researcher will bias
the results 7% towards overvaluation. Conversely consumers may form their
expectations of vehicle lifetime off their last (shorter lifetime) vehicle, while the
researcher uses newer longer vehicle lifetimes. Given the example above, this
would result in 7% under valuation.
4.4 Conclusion
Despite the large size of the used vehicle market and its importance to policies
such CAFE and gasoline taxes, relatively little attention has been paid to it. Our
paper shows that the lifetime of passenger cars has continued to increase for
37For this calculation we assume a gasoline price of $3 and annual VMT according to (Lu,
2006).
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much of the past century. We show that this lifetime increase is unlikely to be
due to one-time events and suggests that technology improvement is the likely
cause. Moreover we find that scrappage elasticities with respect to vehicle and
gasoline prices are quite inelastic, particularly compared with the high elastici-
ties estimated from temporary or local scrappage incentives.
Using a nonlinear specification we estimate that the average lifetime of pas-
senger cars has increased from about 10 years in the 1950s to about 14 in the
1980s. We also estimate the scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price at
-0.83, far less elastic than found in previous studies that estimate this parameter
using local and temporary scrappage programs. Our estimates compared with
earlier studies suggest that this elasticity has remained stable for most of the
past century. Our findings have important policy implications. The increased
vehicle lifetimes we estimate imply that the updated CAFE standards may take
several years longer to affect the used vehicle fleet than otherwise predicted.
We also show that our estimate of the scrappage elasticity with respect to ve-
hicle price reduces the ability of gasoline taxes to remove used vehicle by 71%.
Our estimates are also useful for examining the value consumers place on tech-
nology that reduces the future fuel cost of vehicles. Our point estimates of the
scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle and gasoline prices suggest that con-
sumers may only recognize $0.53 to $0.73 for every $1 change in future gasoline
costs. We also show that failing to account for the increase in vehicle lifetime
when calculating the discounted future fuel costs for vehicles may result in over
or underestimates of the energy paradox of 7%.
Our results also have implications for a variety of other programs. Longer
vehicle lifetime suggests standards for local pollutants, which are placed on new
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vehicles only and therefore have relatively high costs (Small & Kazimi, 1995),
will take longer to affect the entire fleet of vehicles. Inspections and Mainte-
nance programs (I/M), which focus on pollution reductions for the oldest ve-
hicles (Ando et al., 2000), may become more important for achieving emission
reductions. Alternatively policy makers may seek to incentivize manufacturers
to build vehicles with emissions reducing technology that lasts the life of the ve-
hicle, which other authors have found to be particularly effective (Harrington,
McConnell, & Ando, 2000). Our evidence of increasing vehicle lifetime and low
scrappage elasticity with respect to vehicle price also suggest that it may be dif-
ficult to use policy to remove the large quantity of fuel inefficient vehicles that
built up over the low gasoline prices of the past decades. If the past is any indi-
cator many policies will be implement to reduce emissions from used vehicles
and the parameters estimated here may help policy makers to accurately evalu-
ate these programs in the coming years.
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Figure 4.1: ln(Vehicle Price Index) and ln(Residual Scrappage Rates)
Figure 4.2: Autocorrelation Plot of Vehicle Price Regression Residuals
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Figure 4.3: Autocorrelation Plot for Gasoline Price Regression Residuals
Figure 4.4: Scrappage Rate Curves
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Figure 4.5: Rescaled SUV Scrappage Rates
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Table 4.1: Percent Scrappage Rate by Age for Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks
Model Year Passenger Cars Light Trucks
1969-1979 1980-1987 1969-1987 1969-1979 1980-1987 1969-1987
Vehicle Age
2 1.51% 1.09% 1.25% 0.78% 0.86% 1.33%
3 1.84% 1.47% 1.55% 1.32% 0.58% 1.46%
4 2.03% 1.12% 1.52% 1.27% 1.02% 1.58%
5 2.56% 2.03% 1.97% 1.61% 1.34% 1.81%
6 3.79% 3.09% 3.01% 2.20% 1.85% 2.47%
7 5.30% 3.80% 3.98% 2.99% 2.35% 2.85%
8 7.17% 5.16% 5.47% 3.75% 2.95% 3.58%
9 9.40% 6.58% 7.20% 3.77% 3.64% 3.88%
10 11.75% 8.22% 9.29% 5.85% 5.05% 5.57%
11 13.84% 9.66% 11.25% 5.33% 4.93% 5.35%
12 15.65% 11.41% 13.31% 6.57% 7.00% 6.93%
13 17.18% 12.77% 15.06% 7.08% 6.86% 7.09%
14 18.29% 14.26% 16.59% 7.53% 9.40% 8.31%
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Table 4.2: Estimates of Logistic Parameters of Engineering Scrappage
(69-79) (80-87) (69-87) (66-77)1 Post-War2
Passenger Cars I II III IV V
L 4.65 5.32 4.57 3.48 3.8
(0.144)*** (0.26)*** (0.203)*** (0.0651)*** (0.0105)***
B 237.08 236.21 264.09 1661.04 890.48
(30.41)*** (28.35)*** (32.12)*** (33.83)***
k 0.41 0.35 0.37 0.73 0.76
(0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.0476)*** (0.0059)***
Obs3 13 13 13
R-Squared 0.99 0.99 0.99
Asymptotic Scrap-
page Rate
21.51% 18.80% 21.88% 28.74% 26.32%
Expected Lifetime4 12.47 14.08 13.45 10.9 10
Light Trucks
L 10.81 5 6.78 7.59
(1.261)*** (2.508)* (1.877)*** (0.4944)***
B 229.55 236.38 135.82 251.72
(66.647)*** (74.774)** (25.814)***
k 0.32 0.26 0.23 0.34
(0.0455)*** (0.047)*** (0.034)*** (0.0261)***
Obs3 13 13 13
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Asymptotic Scrap-
page Rate
9.25% 20.00% 14.75% 13.18%
Expected Lifetime4 16.25 15.06 16.33 16.4
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Table 4.3: Elasticity of Scrappage with Respect to Vehicle Price Walker 2nd
Stage
Basic Model
I II III IV
Ln(Price Ratio Index) -0.83 -0.61 -0.76
(0.25)*** (0.26)** (0.31)**
Ln(Used Vehicle Price Index) -0.78
(0.31)**
Ln(Maintenance and Repair
Cost Index)
0.74
(0.38)*
Ln(GDP) -0.27 -0.05
(0.05)*** -0.11
Ln(Percent Imported) 0
-0.04
Ln(Steel Price) 0.01
-0.11
Ln(Turnover Rate) 0.96 0.88 0.84
(0.19)*** (0.17)*** (0.22)***
Constant 2.83 2.82 2.7 2.88
(0.46)*** (0.45)*** (0.43)*** (0.44)***
rho 1 - - - -
rho 2 - - - -
Obs 31 31 31 31
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Table 4.4: Elasticity of Scrappage with Respect to Vehicle Price Walker 2nd
Stage
AR(1) AR(2) Walker
V VI VII VIII IX
Ln(Price Ratio Index) -0.77 -0.78 -0.85 -0.87 -0.66
(0.31)** (0.35)** (0.22)*** (0.32)** (0.170)***
Ln(GDP) 0 -0.01
-0.11 -0.1
Ln(Percent Imported) 0.02 -0.04
-0.14 -0.14
Ln(Steel Price) -0.01 -0.07
-0.12 -0.1
Ln(Turnover Rate) 0.98 0.99 1.01 0.98 0.663
(0.16)*** (0.27)*** (0.15)*** (0.17)*** (0.156)***
Constant 2.88 2.94 2.96 3.04 0.624
(0.40)*** (0.65)*** (0.38)*** (0.71)*** (0.142)***
rho 1 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.35 -
rho 2 - - 0.2 0.26 -
Obs 31 31 31
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Table 4.5: Robustness Test for Gasoline Price Elasticity Linear Specifica-
tion
Basic Model AR(1)
I II III IV V VI
Gasoline Price 1.29 0.69 0.38 1.27 1.506
-0.912 -0.522 -1.131 -0.67 (0.608)*
Gas Price Index 0.024
(0.011)*
GDP -0.003 -0.004
(0.0000)*** (0.001)***
% of Import 0.029 0.028
(0.008)*** (0.006)***
Steel Price 7.067 7.62
(2.336)** (2.594)**
Turnover Rate -53.710*
-22.583
Constant 13.653 12.235 54.835 17.889 16.642 36.884
(1.721)*** (1.800)*** (7.703)*** (2.851)*** (0.425)*** (2.381)***
Rho 1 0.64 0.44
Obs 312 312 312 312 282 282
Elasticity 0.24 0.31 0.13 0.07
153
Table 4.6: Elasticity of Scrappage with Respect to Gasoline Price Walker
2nd Stage
Basic Model
I II III IV
Ln(Gas Price) -0.13 -0.12 -0.08
-0.11 -0.109 -0.144
Ln(Gas Price Index) -0.12
-0.107
Ln(GDP) -0.25 -0.11
(0.079)*** -0.087
Ln(% of Import) 0
-0.102
Ln(Steel Price) 0.04
-0.09
Ln(Turnover Rate) 0.89 0.88 0.69
(0.304)*** (0.319)*** -0.421
Constant 2.76 3.25 2.58 2.94
(0.752)*** (0.373)*** (0.652)*** (0.786)***
rho 1 - - - -
rho 2 - - - -
Obs 31 31 31 31
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Table 4.7: Elasticity of Scrappage with Respect to Gasoline Price Walker
2nd Stage
AR(1) AR(2)
V VI VII VIII
Ln(Gas Price) 0.07 0.16 -0.04 0.14
-0.155 -0.208 -0.11 -0.165
Ln(Gas Price Index)
Ln(GDP) -0.07 -0.1
-0.131 -0.095
Ln(% of Import) -0.03 -0.05
-0.202 -0.122
Ln(Steel Price) -0.06 -0.08
-0.142 -0.947
Ln(Turnover Rate) 1.13 1.07 1.05 1.01
(0.254)*** (0.309)*** (0.243)*** (0.213)***
Constant 3.33 4.04 3.16 4.18
(0.637)*** (1.111)*** (0.599)*** (1.054)***
rho 1 0.57 0.59 0.48 0.51
rho 2 - - 0.05 0.103
Obs 31 31 31 31
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Table 4.8: Average MPG of Fleet after CAFE Increase
Year Short Lifetime Long Lifetime
1 28.39 28.15
2 29.33 28.8
3 30.33 29.48
4 31.38 30.17
5 32.47 30.88
6 33.58 31.61
7 34.67 32.34
8 35.7 33.07
9 36.61 33.8
10 37.38 34.51
11 38 35.19
12 38.49 35.83
13 38.87 36.42
14 39.16 36.96
15 39.37 37.44
16 39.54 37.86
17 39.66 38.22
18 39.75 38.53
19 39.81 38.79
20 39.86 39
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Table 4.9: The Required CAFE Standard to Achieve Various Fleet MPG
Targets
MPG Target 10 years 15 years
Short Lifetime Long Lifetime Short Lifetime Long Lifetime
30 30.4 31.4 30.1 30.5
31 31.6 33 31.2 31.6
32 32.8 34.7 32.2 32.8
33 34 36.4 33.2 34
34 35.2 38.2 34.3 35.3
35 36.4 40.1 35.3 36.5
36 37.6 42 36.4 37.7
37 38.9 44.1 37.4 39
38 40.1 46.2 38.4 40.3
39 41.4 48.4 39.5 41.6
40 42.7 50.7 40.5 42.9
41 44 53.1 41.6 44.2
42 45.3 55.5 42.7 45.5
43 46.6 58.2 43.7 46.9
44 47.9 60.9 44.8 48.3
45 49.3 63.7 45.8 49.7
46 50.7 66.7 46.9 51.1
47 52 69.9 48 52.5
48 53.4 73.2 49 53.9
49 54.8 76.7 50.1 55.4
50 56.3 80.4 51.2 56.8
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Table 4.10: Impact on Used Car Retention Simulating a Gasoline Tax
Bento et al. 2009
Change in Used
Car Ownership
Implied Percent
Change in Price with
Elasticity of -3
Change in Used Car
Ownership with
Elasticity of -0.83
Flat Recycling of
$0.25 gas tax
-0.35% 0.12% -0.10%
[-0.13, -0.07]
Income-based recy-
cling of $0.25 gas
tax
-0.37% 0.12% -0.10%
[-0.13, -0.07]
VMT-based recycling
of $0.25 gas tax
-0.39% 0.13% -0.11%
[-0.14, -0.08]
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APPENDIX A
EQUIVALENCE OF STANDARDS AND FEEBATES
A.0.1 Initial Equilibrium
Demand
Consider an economy in which K identical firms produce J different types of ve-
hicles for a large population of consumers of size N. Each consumer is endowed
with income Io and owns an equal share of the profits of each firm. Consumers
get utility from vehicles and the consumption of a numeraire good x.
Consumers are divided into J groups depending on their preferred vehicle
type. Let N j denote the size of the group of consumers who prefer type j vehicles
and that type j consumers only consume type j vehicles, getting zero utility
from any other vehicle. To simplify the analysis we assume that utility is linear
in the numeraire good. Each consumer is characterized by the pair (w, j), where
j is the preferred vehicle type and w is the willingness to pay for that vehicle and
is distributed uniformly w ∼ U[w j,w j]. Utility maximization implies that a type
j consumer will purchase a type j vehicle if his willingness to pay exceeds the
price of that vehicle, p j. Given the uniform distribution, the demand for vehicle
j is
q j(p j) = N j
w j − p j
w j − w j (A.0.1)
159
Consumer surplus will be
CS =
∑
j
N j
(w j − p j)2
2w j − w j + NIo + pi (A.0.2)
Supply
I assume that each of the K firms, indexed by k, produces with the cost func-
tion c(qk1, . . . , qkn) =
∑n
j=1 c j(qk j).1 For each vehicle j, the cost function c j(q j) is
assumed to be increasing, smooth, and strictly convex and let mc j(q j) = c′j(q j).
The fuel economy is fixed for each vehicle. It can be expressed either as the
mile per gallon rating mpg j or its inverse g j, the gallon per mile rating, such
that mpg j = 1/g j. Firms operate in a competitive market. A representative firm
optimizes over a vector of quantity qk = {qk1, . . . , qkn} of goods to sell at market-
determined prices p = {p1, . . . , pJ}. The firms’ problem is formulated as
max
qk
J∑
j=1
[p jqk j − c j(qk j)] (A.0.3)
This optimization implies that
p j = mc j(qk j) or qk j = mc−1j (p j) (A.0.4)
Market supply of vehicle j is
qSj = Kqk j (A.0.5)
1In a setting with identical firms, tradability of permits is not required but will be if firms are
heterogeneous.
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Market Clearing
To clear the market for vehicle j, the quantity demanded equals the quantity
supplied when
qDj = N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j) = q
S
j (A.0.6)
Since mc j is monotonically increasing there exists a unique p j that sets supply
equal to demand.
Consumer surplus will be
CS =
∑
j
N j
(w j − p j)2
2w j − w j + NIo + pi (A.0.7)
An allocation in this economy is a mapping {q(w, j), x(w, j)}where:
q(w, j) =

1 if (w, j) owns a vehicle of type j
0 otherwise
x(w, j) = consumption of the numeraire
The allocation {q(w, j), x(w, j)} is feasible if:
NIo =
J∑
j=1
∫ w j
w j
x(w, j)
dw
w j − w j +
J∑
j=1
c j
∫ w j
w j
q(w, j)
dw
w j − w j
 (A.0.8)
A.0.2 Fuel Economy Standards
Take a given fuel economy standard mpg, set by the government, such that mpg
lies between the minimum and maximum fuel economy of vehicles produced.2
2This ensures that the standard can be achieved. To ensure the standard is binding, it must
also be the case that mpg is more efficient than the unconstrained level of average fuel economy.
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Let g = 1/mpg. The firm subject to this standard chooses a vector of quantities
qk = {qk1, . . . , qkJ} to solve
max
qk
J∑
j=1
[p jqk j − c j(qk j)] (A.0.9)
s.t.
mpg ≤
∑J
j=1 qk j∑J
j=1 qk j
1
mpg j
The constraint, which represents the sales-weighted harmonic mean of the ve-
hicles produced by the firm, can be rewritten as
0 ≤
J∑
j=1
(g − g j)qk j (A.0.10)
The first order conditions for product j are then
p j = mc j(qk j) − λ(g − g j) (A.0.11)
where λ is the shadow cost of the fuel economy constraint. This implies that
firms choose quantity according to:
qck j = mc
−1
j (p j + λ(g − g j)) (A.0.12)
The market clearing conditions, equation A.0.6, are now:
N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j + λ(g − g j)) (A.0.13)
The prices that solve this equation are identical for consumers and producers
and denote that vector by pc = {pc1, . . . , pcj, . . . , pcJ}. Denote the resulting alloca-
tion as {qc(w, j), xc(w, j)}
Profits in the economy, pic, are:
pic = K
∑
(pcjq
c
k j − c j(qck j)) (A.0.14)
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A.0.3 Feebate
Under a feebate with rate R and revenue neutral pivot point g0 households face
the tax/rebate inclusive price p j. The fee −R(g0 − g j) is levied on vehicle j, the
firm faces the price p j + R(g0 − g j) and chooses qk = {qk1, . . . , qkJ} to solve
max
qk
J∑
j=1
{[p j + R(g0 − g j)]qk j − c j(qk j)} (A.0.15)
which gives the first order condition
p j = mc j(qk j) − R(g0 − g j) or qk j = mc−1j (p j + R(g0 − g j)) (A.0.16)
The market clearing conditions, equation A.0.6, are now:
N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j + R(g0 − g j)) (A.0.17)
Denote the consumer price vector that solves these equations as pf =
{p f1 , . . . , p fj , . . . , p fJ}. Note that the producer prices, unlike in the case of the fuel
economy standard, are not identical to consumer prices. Denote the resulting
allocation as {q f (w, j), x f (w, j)}.
Total profits in the economy, pi f , are:
pi f = K
∑
{[p fj + R(g0 − g j)]q fk j − c j(q fk j)} (A.0.18)
Also note that revenue neutrality implies that
0 = K
J∑
j=1
R(g0 − g j)q fk j (A.0.19)
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A.0.4 Equivalence
Equivalence of Consumer Prices
As noted in equation A.0.13, the price setting condition for the fuel economy
standard is
N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j + λ(g − g j))
while the price setting condition for the feebate, equation A.0.17, is
N j
w j − p j
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p j + R(g0 − g j))
To make the two policies equivalent we set R = λ and g = g0. Because mc j is
single valued, it must be the case that prices faced by the consumer under each
policy are identical. While p fj = p
c
j this does not mean the price faced by the
manufacturers is the same. Manufacturers face price pcj under the fuel economy
standard and face price p fj + R(g0 − g j) under the feebate.
Generating the Fuel Economy Standard Vehicle Allocation with a Feebate
Take a given vehicle allocation {qc(w, j)} achieved under a fuel economy stan-
dard g and resulting in shadow cost λ. This allocation can be achieved using a
feebate with fee rate R = λ and revenue neutral pivot point g0 = g. As shown
above, this will imply that p fj = p
c
j. For product j the quantity produced with
fee rate λ will be
qSj = Kmc
−1
j (p j + λ(g − g j))
Where mc−1j is single valued, the quantity produced will be q
S
j = Kq
c
k j. Because
there are identical consumer prices and quantity supplied under this feebate
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as in the fuel economy standard, the same households will purchase vehicles
under each policy. The final requirement is that the feebate be revenue neutral.
First note that the revenue generated by the government for product j produced
by firm m is
R(g0 − g j)qck j
Summed across all products and firms, this is
K
n∑
j=1
R(g0 − g j)qck j = Kλ
n∑
j=1
(g0 − g j)qck j = 0
The first equality substituted in the values of R and g0. The final uses the fact
that qck j solves the fuel economy standard constraint for the fuel economy level
g for each firm, that is, equation A.0.10.
Generating the Feebate Vehicle Allocation with a Fuel Economy Standard
Take a given allocation {q f (w, j)} achieved under fee rate R with pivot point g0.
This allocation can be achieved using a fuel economy standard of g = g0. With
this required average, the first order conditions of the firm will be
qck j = mc
−1
j (p j + λ(g0 − g j)).
It remains to be shown that under this constraint the firm must choose to pro-
duce q fk j with a shadow cost of λ = R. Intuitively, this proof shows that a mul-
tiplier that is too low will produce too many fuel inefficient cars and not meet
the fuel economy standard, while one that is too high will over produce fuel
efficient cars. It is important that mc−1j be monotonically increasing such that
multiple values of the multiplier are not able to produce the same quantity.
Case 1
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First assume that λ < R. For vehicles where g0 − g j > 0, their fuel economy
is more efficient than the pivot point. First note that:
λ(g0 − g j) < R(g0 − g j) (A.0.20)
For the market clearing condition, equation A.0.17, this implies that:
N j
w j − p fj
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p
f
j + R(g0 − g j)) > Kmc−1j (p fj + λ(g0 − g j))
To clear the market, the price must increase such that pcj > p
f
j . Because demand
is downward sloping, this implies that quantity demanded under the fuel econ-
omy standard equilibrium will be less than that demanded under the feebate.
Therefore qck j < q
f
k j and
qck j(g0 − g j) < q fk j(g0 − g j) (A.0.21)
For the inefficient vehicles where g0 − g j < 0:
λ(g0 − g j) > R(g0 − g j) (A.0.22)
For the market clearing condition, equation A.0.17, this implies that:
N j
w j − p fj
w j − w j = Kmc
−1
j (p
f
j + R(g0 − g j)) < Kmc−1j (p fj + λ(g0 − g j))
Therefore the fuel economy standard prices must decrease and pcj < p
f
j . Down-
ward sloping demand implies that qck j > q
f
k j, that is, too many inefficient cars are
produced. Multiplying each by the negative term (g0 − g j) we have
qck j(g0 − g j) < q fk j(g0 − g j) (A.0.23)
Summing across all product using equations A.0.21 and A.0.23 we have
J∑
j=1
Kqck j(g0 − g j) <
J∑
j=1
Kq fk j(g0 − g j) (A.0.24)
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Because of the revenue neutrality of g0 under fee rate R
0 =
J∑
j=1
R(g0 − g j)q fk j =
J∑
j=1
(g0 − g j)q fk j (A.0.25)
Therefore allocation qc with shadow cost λ < R cannot satisfy the fuel economy
standard g0 as
J∑
j=1
(g0 − g j)qck j < 0 (A.0.26)
Case 2
The second case, where λ > R mirrors the first. Equation A.0.21 for efficient
products, g0 − g j > 0, becomes
qck j(g0 − g j) > q fk j(g0 − g j) (A.0.27)
while equation A.0.23, for inefficient products, where g0 − g j < 0, becomes
qck j(g0 − g j) > q fk j(g0 − g j) (A.0.28)
Summing across all product using equations A.0.27 and A.0.28, and using the
revenue neutrality of the allocation q f under fee rate R and pivot point g0,
J∑
j=1
(g0 − g j)qck j >
n∑
j=1
(g0 − g j)q fk j = 0 (A.0.29)
This implies that the allocation qc cannot satisfy the fuel economy standard g0
with shadow cost λ > R.
Therefor, it must be the case that in order to meet fuel economy standard g0
firms must do so at shadow cost λ = R and produce the same supply of vehi-
cles at the same prices. This means that the same households will buy vehicles
resulting in the same allocation qc = q f .
167
Equivalence of Consumer Surplus and Numeraire Allocation
Consumer surplus in the economy, defined by equation A.0.7, is∑
j
N j
(w j − p j)2
2w j − w j + NIo + pi (A.0.30)
Because the prices faced by consumer are the same under both the fuel econ-
omy standard and the feebate, the only potential difference lies in the potential
for a difference in firm profits, which are then distributed to consumers. Firm
profits under a feebate, equation A.0.18, can be simplified as:
pi f = K
∑
{[p fj + R(g0 − g j)]q fk j − c j(q fk j)} (A.0.31)
= K
∑
[p fjq
f
k j − c j(q fk j)] + K
∑
[R(g0 − g j)q fk j] (A.0.32)
= K
∑
[p fjq
f
k j − c j(q fk j)] (A.0.33)
= K
∑
[pcjq
c
k j − c j(qck j)] (A.0.34)
= pic (A.0.35)
The simplification from A.0.32 to A.0.33 follows from the revenue neutrality,
equation A.0.19. The final simplification makes use of the points proven above:
that under either a fuel economy standard or a feebate, the quantity produced
is the same, Kq fk j = Kq
c
k j, as well as the prices faced by the consumer, p
f
j = p
c
j.
Therefore the consumer surplus is identical since pi f = pic. Note that this does
not imply that it is equal to the unconstrained level of consumer surplus.
Given the equivalence of p j it follows that the individual vehicle choices
of the agents will be identical. Because profits and therefore dividends are
the same under each policy, the remaining budget dedicated to buying the nu-
meraire good will be the same and will produce identical allocation mappings,
{qc(w, j), xc(w, j)} = {q f (w, j), x f (w, j)}.
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